ANALYSIS

What Europe could do: seven proposals

18 October 2026 — Europe

Series “Europe's choices” · 10 of 10

The question

In this series we have tested the choices of Europe's leadership: energy, the electric car, relations with Russia before and after 2022, the weight of the United States, Nord Stream, immigration. The verdict has almost always been harsh. But criticising is the easy part. What could be done instead?

This piece is different from the others: it is a proposal, so it expresses the site's position from beginning to end. To avoid writing wishes, we have tested each proposal against four questions: whether there is a historical precedent, what legal basis it rests on, who would have to accept it, and where it risks failing.

This piece expresses the site's position. The facts cited are given with their sources.

The starting point

In mid-October 2026 peace in Ukraine is at a standstill. On 9 October Vladimir Putin told Donald Trump that an immediate resumption of negotiations is unlikely; Secretary of State Marco Rubio speaks of a "dangerous stalemate" (Al Jazeera, 10/10/2026). The negotiations, when there are any, go through Washington and Moscow. Europe pays most of the aid to Kyiv, but it does not sit at the table: we described this in the piece on the choices after 2022.

The goal: living together

Before the proposals, the goal. Not victory for one side, but civil coexistence: a Europe in which Ukraine and Russia remain neighbours, and must be able to do so without shooting at each other. Getting there takes three principles, which run through all the proposals.

Every step towards the other side is rewarded. Whoever makes a concrete gesture gets something in return, and whoever backs out loses what it has gained. It worked in the Cold War: in June 1963 John F. Kennedy announced that the United States would no longer carry out nuclear tests in the atmosphere, as long as others did the same. Nikita Khrushchev responded by accepting, for the first time, a ban limited to atmospheric tests, and within a few weeks the treaty was ready (Arms Control Association, 2013).

Understanding the reasons of all sides. A war does not come out of nowhere. The parties must be able to put on the table what each has suffered and what each has done. Understanding the causes does not mean justifying the aggression, which the UN General Assembly condemned with 141 votes in March 2022 (UN News). It means knowing what has to be resolved so that the war does not start again.

A compromise that leaves no one in ruin. A peace that destroys the economy of one of the parties prepares the next war. And Europe cannot finance indefinitely a war that for years no one has managed to win on the battlefield.

1. A seat at the table, in exchange for aid

The proposal. Europe does not ask permission to take part: it sets it as a condition. Aid to Kyiv continues, but tied to two commitments: the Union sits at the negotiations with its own envoy, and the parties follow an agreed roadmap, with stages and deadlines. Whoever pays has the right to say how peace is reached.

The first item on the roadmap is a table on the reasons: experts from both sides put in writing their mutual accusations, from NATO enlargement to the war in Donbas since 2014, from the Russian-speaking minorities to the guarantees promised to Ukraine and not kept. For each accusation, a proposed solution.

The precedent. European aid to Ukraine is already conditional: the €90 billion loan decided in December 2025 has precise rules on repayment and on the use of frozen Russian assets (OSW, 19/12/2025). It would be a matter of adding a political condition. Further back, the Helsinki Accords of 1975 show that Europe can sit at the table between the blocs. And for the table on the reasons there is a model: the Polish-Russian Group on Difficult Matters, created by the two governments in 2002. Historians from both countries wrote side-by-side chapters on the most painful points of their shared history, from 1918 to 2008, published both in Warsaw and in Moscow (University of Pittsburgh Press).

The basis. Decisions on aid and on the common foreign policy belong to the 27, by unanimity.

Who has to accept it. The 27, Kyiv, and then Moscow and Washington, which today negotiate with each other.

Where it could fail. Placing conditions on aid to a country under attack can be read as abandonment, and Moscow could take advantage of it to harden its position. Unanimity is difficult. A roadmap works only if Russia accepts it too. And a table on the reasons can turn into a tribunal of accusations: the Polish-Russian group worked in years of thaw, not during a war.

2. A genuine referendum on the contested territories

The proposal. Freezing the front solves nothing: it postpones the problem, as has happened for decades in other conflicts. The principle should be the self-determination of peoples. The fate of the contested territories should be decided by those who live there, with a referendum built into the negotiations. But a genuine referendum, not those organised under occupation: with the withdrawal of troops, a temporary international administration, a vote for those who fled too, and UN observers.

The precedent. In 1999 the UN organised in East Timor, then under Indonesia, a consultation under an agreement between Indonesia and Portugal: 98% of those registered voted and 78.5% chose independence. Militia violence followed, then an international force and a UN administration until independence (UN peacekeeping). The counter-example is the referendums in Crimea in 2014 and in the other territories in 2022, organised under military occupation and not recognised by the vast majority of states.

The basis. The UN Charter recognises the self-determination of peoples. But the Ukrainian Constitution establishes that changes to the territory can be decided only by an all-Ukrainian referendum, and it forbids referendums under martial law (Washington Law Review, 2022). A truce is therefore needed first.

Who has to accept it. Kyiv, Moscow and the UN, which would have to organise it.

Where it could fail. Who votes? Millions of people have fled, others have arrived. Moscow will not agree to withdraw its troops before the vote; Kyiv fears losing the territories. And Timor teaches that the aftermath of a vote can be violent.

3. NATO only within an agreement that Moscow also signs

The proposal. Ukraine's entry into NATO should not be a security problem for Russia. That is why it should happen only within an agreement that Moscow also signs. In return, Ukraine remains armed, free to join the European Union, and obtains written guarantees from countries willing to intervene if it is attacked again.

The precedent. In 1955 Austria obtained the withdrawal of all foreign troops, including about 40,000 Soviet soldiers, in exchange for permanent neutrality, later written into its Constitution (Country Studies, Austria). And in 2008, in Bucharest, Germany and France slowed down Ukraine's entry precisely so as not to provoke Moscow. The opposite precedent is the Budapest Memorandum of 1994: Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons in exchange for "assurances" that prevented neither 2014 nor 2022 (our piece from 1990 to 2022).

The basis. The Charter for European Security signed in Istanbul in 1999, by Russia too, contains two principles together: every state is free to choose its own alliances, and no one should strengthen its own security at the expense of the security of others (Istanbul Charter, OSCE, 1999). An agreement that takes account of both must be written into a treaty.

Who has to accept it. Kyiv, Moscow, the NATO countries and the guarantor countries.

Where it could fail. Giving Moscow the last word on a neighbour's alliances creates a precedent that other countries, from Moldova to Georgia, fear. The Ukrainian Constitution names NATO membership as a strategic goal. And the lesson of Budapest is that guarantees without concrete commitments are worth nothing.

4. Sanctions: the first step is up to Europe

The proposal. Sanctions often also hit people who bear no blame. And since 2022 they have grown, package after package, mostly by European decision, to increase pressure, rather than in response to new Russian actions. If the escalation was a European choice, it is Europe that must take the first step: immediately lift the measures that hit civilians, from food to medicines to everyday goods, and propose a timetable for reducing the others, step by step, tied to progress in the negotiations. With a written rule: if the commitments are broken, the sanctions return.

The precedent. The 2015 nuclear deal with Iran provided for exactly this: sanctions lifted in exchange for verified commitments, and a mechanism to reimpose them. In September 2025 that mechanism was used and UN sanctions returned (Congressional Research Service, 7/7/2026).

The basis. European sanctions are adopted and lifted by unanimity of the 27.

Who has to accept it. The 27. Moscow would have to respond with concrete steps.

Where it could fail. Moscow could pocket the gesture without giving anything in return. Some European governments would see it as a surrender. And American sanctions remain outside European control, as we saw in the piece on who really decides.

5. Who pays for the damage: the Russian state, not private individuals, and a judge for both sides

The proposal. Two kinds of Russian assets are frozen in the Union, and they must not be confused. There are the assets of the Russian Central Bank, that is, of the state: more than €200 billion. And there are the assets of sanctioned private individuals: about €24 billion in 2023 (Mind, on Commission data, 25/5/2023). Private individuals did not decide the war, and their assets cannot be used for reconstruction without a court conviction. The state's assets, on the other hand, can go into a fund for war damage, provided for in the peace agreement.

But the fund must apply the same yardstick to everyone. Whoever started the war pays for its damage. Each party, however, pays for the violations of the laws of war it has committed: Ukraine too, for civilians hit in Russia or for attacks such as the one on Nord Stream, if they are proven. This should be decided by an independent commission, with public accounts and checks on every euro.

The precedent. After the war between Eritrea and Ethiopia, an arbitral commission found Eritrea liable for the invasion, but found both countries liable for violations committed during the war, from mistreated prisoners to looting: in 2009 it awarded about $174 million to Ethiopia and about $163 million to Eritrea (ASIL, 2009). And after the invasion of Kuwait, Iraq paid $52.4 billion in compensation from part of its oil revenues, the last instalment in 2022 (UN News, 9/2/2022).

The basis. An agreement that Russia signs, or an international decision. In December 2025 the 27 already linked the frozen assets to the payment of reparations (OSW).

Who has to accept it. The 27, starting with Belgium, where most of the assets are held; Kyiv, which would have to agree to answer for its own damage too; Moscow.

Where it could fail. Using the assets without an agreement exposes Europe to lawsuits and financial risks. Kyiv could refuse to be judged alongside the aggressor. And a commission takes years.

6. Security through transparency, not imposed inspections

The proposal. No one wants the adversary in their home checking up on them. So instead of imposing inspections, there should be incentives for transparency: whoever publishes data on its own forces, exercises and troop movements near the borders gets something in return, such as a reduction in sanctions or access to trade and joint programmes. More transparency, more benefits.

The precedent. The Open Skies Treaty, signed in 1992 and in force since 2002, allowed more than thirty countries, Russia and the United States included, to fly over each other with unarmed aircraft to observe military forces: a less intrusive way of checking than inspections on the ground. The United States withdrew in 2020, Russia in 2021 (Center for Arms Control). The 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces set ceilings on weapons in Europe; Russia withdrew from it in 2023 (Overt Defense, 7/11/2023).

The basis. A new agreement between the European states, Russia and the United States, including within the OSCE.

Who has to accept it. Everyone: that is why it is the slowest road.

Where it could fail. Declared data can be falsified, and without a minimum of verification trust does not grow. But a system of incentives can start with just a few steps, and widen if it works.

7. A compromise that pays off for everyone, economically too

The proposal. Peace must pay off for all parties, in the accounts too. For Ukraine, a funded reconstruction and an open road to the Union. For Russia, a gradual reduction of sanctions and the resumption of some trade, tied to respect for commitments. For Europe, the end of spending that weighs on its budgets and its citizens. Trade with Russia could resume, but with new rules: no dependence, as we proposed for gas.

The precedent. Five years after the Second World War, France proposed pooling coal and steel with Germany, yesterday's enemy, so that a new war between the two would become "not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible". From that proposal the first European Community was born in 1951 (Council of the EU, the Schuman Declaration).

The basis. The peace agreement and the Union's trade treaties.

Who has to accept it. The 27, Kyiv, Moscow.

Where it could fail. Europe has been spending on Ukraine for more than four years and will continue to do so: the €90 billion loan covers 2026 and 2027, and in May and June 2026 alone European institutions allocated nearly €11 billion, mostly through that loan (Kiel Institute, 13/8/2026). But reopening trade with a country that attacked a neighbour divides European governments, and without guarantees it risks financing the next war. The Community of 1951 was born after the war ended, not during it.

The lessons of the other pieces

The seven proposals concern the war. But the series has also touched on other choices, and each suggests a correction:

• Energy: no supplier should weigh more than a certain share of Europe's gas, whether Russian, American or Qatari (the piece).
• The electric car: setting a date is not enough; investment in research and batteries is needed, not just tariffs (the piece).
• Sovereignty: use the tools Europe already has, such as the law that protects European companies from foreign sanctions, which today sits in a drawer (the piece).
• The same yardstick: the protection and attention given to Ukraine should also apply to Sudan and the other forgotten wars (the piece).
• Immigration: legal channels and return agreements with countries of origin, instead of costly centres abroad (the piece).
• The rules for everyone: even a country that has been attacked and is supported by Europe must respect the laws of war (the piece on Nord Stream).

Our assessment

None of these proposals is easy. Some may fail, and we have said so. But they all start from the same principle, which runs through the series: diplomacy comes first, always. And they share the same goal: not victory for someone, but civil coexistence.

A Europe that chooses does not ask permission to sit at the table: it uses the weight it has, and rewards every step by the other side. It does not freeze conflicts hoping they will resolve themselves: it lets those who live there decide. It does not make one country's security another's insecurity. It acknowledges its own responsibilities, starting with the sanctions it escalated, which also hit people who bear no blame. It applies the same yardstick to everyone: whoever attacked pays, but each answers for its own crimes, allies included. And it seeks a peace that pays off even for today's enemy, because that is the only kind that lasts.

What to watch

• The resumption of negotiations and whether Europe gets a seat at the table.
• The fate of the frozen Russian assets and of the €90 billion loan.
• The European Council in December, where Ukraine, sanctions and immigration will return.

Sources: Al Jazeera, 10/10/2026 · Arms Control Association, 2013 · UN News · OSW, 19/12/2025 · University of Pittsburgh Press · UN peacekeeping · Washington Law Review, 2022 · Country Studies, Austria · Istanbul Charter, OSCE, 1999 · Congressional Research Service, 7/7/2026 · Mind, on Commission data, 25/5/2023 · ASIL, 2009 · UN News, 9/2/2022 · Center for Arms Control · Overt Defense, 7/11/2023 · Council of the EU, the Schuman Declaration · Kiel Institute, 13/8/2026

Related pieces: After 2022: what Europe chose and what it cost · From 1990 to 2022: how the war in Ukraine came about · Who really decides Europe's choices

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