ANALYSIS

Why Ukraine and not Sudan

18 October 2026 — Europe

Series “Europe's choices” · 6 of 6

In brief

The question

Why Ukraine and not Sudan? In the previous pieces of this series we saw how much Europe has spent after 2022 and how the war came about. Here we put Ukraine next to three other conflicts, Sudan, Gaza and the West Bank, and Yemen, and measure them with the same yardstick. First, though, let us see what Ukraine is worth, and to whom.

What Ukraine is worth

To Europe. Ukraine borders four EU countries: Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania. Since the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, European security has rested on the principle that borders are not changed by force. Before the war Ukraine exported about 10% of the wheat and 15% of the maize sold worldwide (farmdoc daily, University of Illinois, 24/2/2023). On its territory stands Zaporizhzhia, Europe's largest nuclear power plant, with six reactors: it is in Russian hands and has produced no electricity since 11 September 2022 (Interfax, 17/4/2026).

To Russia. In 1997 Zbigniew Brzezinski, a former US national security adviser, wrote in The Grand Chessboard that without Ukraine Russia ceases to be a Eurasian empire. Crimea hosts the base of Russia's Black Sea fleet. Moscow still demands that the "root causes" of the conflict be addressed: NATO enlargement and the protection of Russian speakers (House of Commons Library, 15/9/2026).

To the United States. On 25 April 2022, in Poland, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said: "We want to see Russia weakened to a degree that it can't do the kinds of things it has done in invading Ukraine" (Axios, 25/4/2022). On 30 April 2025 Washington and Kyiv signed a minerals deal: a joint fund receives half of the revenue from new mining, oil and gas projects, and future US military aid counts as the US share (CSIS, 1/5/2025). The previous pieces showed the rest: American gas and weapons sold to Europe.

The same yardstick: humanitarian aid

To compare conflicts we need consistent numbers: same source, same year, same unit. The first table compares the needs estimated by the UN for 2026 with the humanitarian aid allocated by the European Commission in the same year.

UkraineSudanPalestinian territoriesYemen
People in need of aid in 202610.8 million33.7 million3.6 million23.1 million
European Commission humanitarian aid in 2026€220 million€162 millionover €217 million€120 million (2025)
Euros per person in needabout €20about €5about €60about €5

Sources: UN, Global Humanitarian Overview 2026, for Sudan and for the other countries as reported by Concern; European Commission country pages for Ukraine, Sudan, Palestine and Yemen. For Yemen the 2026 figure has not yet been published; we use 2025. For Sudan we count only aid inside the country, not aid for refugees in neighbouring countries.

On humanitarian aid, then, Europe does not favour Ukraine. Those who receive least, by far, are Sudan and Yemen: the two crises with the most people in need.

The same yardstick: political choices

The difference lies in what Europe does beyond humanitarian aid.

UkraineSudanIsrael and PalestineYemen
Weapons€75.2 billion supplied by the EU and member statesEU arms embargo since 1994member states sell to Israelmember states have sold to the Saudi-led coalition
Money for the state€43.3 billion in financial assistance, plus the €90 billion loan for 2026-27noneup to €1.6 billion for the Palestinian Authority for 2025-27about €500 million in development aid since 2015
EU sanctionsabout 4,600 Russian individuals and entities18 individuals and 8 entities, from both sides21 violent settlers and organisations; no measures against the Israeli government; Hamas on the EU list of terrorist organisationsthe Houthis, under a UN embargo adopted by the EU

Sources: Ukraine, Eunews on European Parliament data, 1/6/2026, AP, 19/12/2025, Council of the EU, 12/10/2026; Sudan, SIPRI and Dabanga, 29/1/2026; Israel and Palestine, The New Arab, 1/10/2025, European Commission, 14/4/2025, J Street, June 2026, Lovguiden, 30/7/2026; Yemen, Reuters via The New Arab and Council of the EU, 14/3/2022.

Two examples give the measure. Germany had authorised about €251 million in military exports to Israel between early 2024 and mid-2025; in August 2025 it suspended them for a few weeks, then resumed them (The New Arab, cited above). In 2023 Italy lifted the embargo on selling bombs and missiles to Saudi Arabia that it had introduced over the war in Yemen (Reuters, cited above).

The European Council of 15 and 16 October 2026 shows the same pattern in words. On Ukraine, the conclusions call for new sanctions against Russia and release €6.6 billion for weapons. On Gaza and the West Bank, they condemn settlement expansion and settler violence, warn companies against bidding for construction in the E1 area and call for Hamas to disarm, but provide for no measures against the Israeli government. On Yemen, they condemn the Houthis' attacks on Saudi Arabia and express solidarity with Riyadh, saying nothing about the Saudi-led coalition. Sudan is never mentioned (European Council, conclusions of 16/10/2026).

The dead

Death tolls are not in the tables because the sources measure different things. We give them one by one, saying what they count.

What worked

European humanitarian aid does not follow alliances: per person, the Palestinian territories receive more than Ukraine. In April 2026, in Berlin, the EU and member states pledged more than €812 million for Sudan and its refugees (European Commission, 15/4/2026). And in Sudan, European sanctions hit both sides, the army and the Rapid Support Forces.

Our assessment

This section expresses the site's position. It is separate from the facts set out above.

The principles are not false: the UN Charter applies in Ukraine as in Sudan, in Gaza as in Yemen. But Europe enforces them with all its strength only where they coincide with its own interests and with Washington's. In Ukraine they coincide: the Union's borders, grain, nuclear power, a rival to weaken. In Sudan and Yemen they do not, and there Europe sends aid, not policy. In Gaza the interests pull the other way, and European weapons keep reaching one of the parties.

International law is not an ideology to be used where it suits. Either it applies to everyone, or it becomes a flag. This site exists to demand that it apply to everyone: the same sanctions for whoever bombs civilians, whoever they are; the same diplomatic effort for every war; the same halt to arms for whoever violates humanitarian law.

What to watch

Sources: farmdoc daily, University of Illinois, 24/2/2023 · Interfax, 17/4/2026 · House of Commons Library, 15/9/2026 · Axios, 25/4/2022 · CSIS, 1/5/2025 · Sudan · Concern · Ukraine · Sudan · Palestine · Yemen · Eunews on European Parliament data, 1/6/2026 · AP, 19/12/2025 · Council of the EU, 12/10/2026 · SIPRI · Dabanga, 29/1/2026 · The New Arab, 1/10/2025 · European Commission, 14/4/2025 · J Street, June 2026 · Lovguiden, 30/7/2026 · Reuters via The New Arab · Council of the EU, 14/3/2022 · European Council, conclusions of 16/10/2026 · UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission, 14/7/2026 · Newsweek, on ACLED data · The Conversation via Polity, 7/10/2026 · AP via PBS, 14/6/2026 · Al Jazeera, 23/11/2021 · European Commission, 15/4/2026 · Lovguiden, 9/10/2026

European UnionRussia–UkraineSudanYemenInternational law

← All news and manifestos

Stay informed

A concise digest, only when a fact deserves it. No spam, no algorithm: your email stays yours.

By subscribing you agree to receive updates from I Will Not Look Away. Unsubscribe anytime.