ANALYSIS
Europe stopped depending on Moscow. Who does it depend on now?
10 October 2026 — Europe
In brief
- In 2021 Russia supplied over 45% of the gas imported by the European Union; in 2025 about 13%.
- Today the largest supplier is Norway, with about 30%. The United States supplies 58% of liquefied gas, about a quarter of all the gas consumed in Europe.
- European households pay on average almost twice as much for gas as in early 2021: from 6.4 to 12.3 cents per kWh.
- In 2025 American liquefied gas was, on average, the most expensive of those bought by Europe.
- On 9 October Trump suspended sanctions on Russian diesel until April 2027.
- The trial over the Nord Stream sabotage opens in Hamburg on 14 October.
Europe is entering winter with its lowest gas reserves in almost twenty years: at the end of August storage was about 63% full (Oilprice, 27/8/2026, based on Gas Infrastructure Europe data). Qatari gas, blocked at Hormuz, has almost disappeared (see the Hormuz crisis).
Europe suffered this part of the crisis. But its fragility in the face of such a shock stems from a choice made four years ago. This is the first piece in a series on the major choices of Europe's leadership: for each one we ask what was decided, what alternatives existed, what it cost and what worked.
The choice of 2022
After the invasion of Ukraine, the Union decided to exit Russian gas. The choice was not entirely free. In the summer of 2022 it was Moscow that cut Nord Stream flows to a fifth of capacity (Bloomberg, 25/7/2022), and in September the pipeline was destroyed.
The exit is now written into a regulation, 2026/261 (EUR-Lex). Short-term contracts are already banned: since 25 April 2026 for liquefied gas, since 17 June for pipeline gas. Long-term contracts end on 1 January 2027 for liquefied gas and on 30 September 2027 for pipeline gas.
The question is how that gas was replaced. In 2021 Russia accounted for over 45% of European imports; in 2024, 19%; in 2025 about 13%, according to Energy Commissioner Dan Jørgensen (ANSA via Il Nordest, 24/4/2025). Today the largest supplier is Norway, with about 30% (European Commission, quarterly gas report, Q2 2025). The rest arrives mainly by ship, as liquefied gas, and 58% of that gas comes from the United States: about a quarter of all European demand (ACER, 2026).
The dependence on Moscow is over; the dependence on the sea, and on Washington, has begun. In July 2025, in the trade deal with Trump, the Union also pledged to buy 750 billion dollars of American energy over three years: a political, non-binding commitment that many analysts consider unachievable (Oil & Gas 360, 28/7/2025).
How much we pay
Liquefied gas is more expensive by nature: it has to be cooled, shipped and regasified. But there is more to it. In the second quarter of 2025 gas in the United States cost 13.7 euros per megawatt-hour; once in Europe it cost 35.5 (European Commission, report cited above). That gap covers the costs, and the margins of those who sell. According to IEEFA, in 2025 American liquefied gas was on average the most expensive for European buyers, ahead of Qatari and Russian gas; from 2022 to 2025 the Union bought 131.5 billion euros' worth of it (IEEFA, European LNG Tracker). IEEFA is an American non-profit institute, funded by philanthropic foundations, which states that it supports the transition to clean energy.
On the bill, the European average for households, taxes included, looks like this:
| First half of 2021 | Second half of 2025 | |
|---|---|---|
| Average EU household gas price (cents per kWh) | 6.4 | 12.28 |
| Example: a home using 10,000 kWh a year | about €640 | about €1,230 |
Sources: Eurostat, 5/5/2026 for 2025; Eurostat figure for 2021 reported by Euronews, 26/2/2026. The example is our own calculation on an indicative consumption level; differences between countries are very large.
The price has almost doubled, and the late-2025 figures do not yet include the Gulf war: between February and April 2026 gas in European capitals rose by a further 6.8% (Euronews, 14/5/2026, HEPI index). It must be said, however, that wholesale prices had already started to soar in the second half of 2021, months before the invasion, with the post-pandemic recovery (World Bank, monthly series): the crisis does not stem from European choices alone.
While Washington negotiates with Moscow
Europe is giving up Russian gas; its main ally is doing the opposite. On 9 October Trump announced a deal with Putin to receive Russian diesel: over 300,000 tonnes immediately, then growing quantities up to a few million. The US Treasury issued a licence suspending until April 2027 the sanctions on Russian diesel already loaded on ships (OPB, 9/10/2026). Zelensky called it “a weak decision” by strong partners.
On 8 October Reuters reported that envoy Jared Kushner and Kirill Dmitriev, an adviser to Putin, had discussed bringing an American investor into Nord Stream (Reuters via WHBL, 8/10/2026). The White House says it has not been discussed recently; Berlin says a reopening is “not desired”. The pipelines are under European sanctions: under EU law a restart would remain illegal, whatever Washington decides.
Who destroyed Nord Stream
On 14 October the trial of Serhii Kuznietsov opens in Hamburg. A Ukrainian citizen extradited from Italy, he is accused of leading the group of seven people who planted the charges. According to German investigators, the order came from a Ukrainian state agency, to deprive Moscow of gas revenues. Kyiv denies it; Zelensky has said he knew nothing about it (JusticeInfo). A second suspect, Volodymyr Zhuravlyov, was arrested in Croatia in August, after a Polish court had refused his extradition (LIGA, 19/8/2026). The theories circulated in recent years blaming the United States or Russia itself have not been borne out by any judicial investigation. The charges, in any case, have yet to be proven in court.
What worked
In 2022 many predicted rationing and closed factories. It did not happen: Europe replaced most Russian gas in three years and stopped being open to blackmail by a supplier that used deliveries as a weapon. That is a real achievement. The price was a bill that has almost doubled and a new dependence, more expensive and more exposed to distant crises.
Our assessment
Leaving Russian gas was a defensible choice: no country should entrust the heating of its homes to a state that has just invaded a neighbour. The mistake was doing it without building real autonomy. Europe changed supplier, not condition. It tied a quarter of its gas to a single country, promised to buy even more, and now finds that this country is negotiating with Moscow on its own, on diesel and perhaps on Nord Stream, while European households pay the bill. A leadership able to choose, in a time of transition, should have asked not only whom to stop buying from, but whom never again to depend on so heavily.
What to watch
- Gas storage levels on 1 November and the Hamburg trial, from 14 October.
- Deliveries of Russian diesel to the United States and the talks on Nord Stream and Lukoil.
- Eurostat household bill data for the first half of 2026, expected at the end of October.
Sources: Oilprice, 27/8/2026 · Bloomberg, 25/7/2022 · EUR-Lex · ANSA via Il Nordest, 24/4/2025 · European Commission, quarterly gas report, Q2 2025 · ACER, 2026 · Oil & Gas 360, 28/7/2025 · IEEFA, European LNG Tracker · Eurostat, 5/5/2026 · Euronews, 26/2/2026 · Euronews, 14/5/2026 · World Bank, monthly series · OPB, 9/10/2026 · Reuters via WHBL, 8/10/2026 · JusticeInfo · LIGA, 19/8/2026
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