ANALYSIS

Who really decides Europe's choices

18 October 2026 — Europe

In brief

The dollar is a real lever. In 2014 France's BNP Paribas paid $8.9 billion for breaking US sanctions; in 2023 Europe's vehicle for trading with Iran was shut down after a single transaction.
On 9 October 2026 the United States sanctioned the International Criminal Court. Europe protests, but does not use the law that would let it protect its own companies.
The bond spread, by contrast, had a European hand. In 2011 the letter to Italy was signed by the ECB of Trichet and Draghi; according to then US Treasury Secretary Geithner, European officials asked Washington to help them bring down Berlusconi, and Washington refused.
On taxes, in 2025 the G7 exempted US multinationals from the global minimum tax. But Europe also fined Apple, Meta and Google despite Trump's threats.
On security, the European commissioner who negotiated the tariff deal said it openly: "It's not only about the trade, it's about security, it's about Ukraine."

The claim to be tested

One claim comes up often: Europe does not really decide. Washington steers it without needing to give orders, through the dollar, interest rates, rating agencies and big funds. A government that gets in the way can be brought to its knees in a few days.

In this piece of the series, which follows the one on the choices after 2022, we test the claim lever by lever. For each one we look for documented cases where it worked and cases where Europe resisted. One rule, as always: a proven interest is not proof of a cause.

First lever: the dollar and sanctions

The dollar is still the world's leading currency: it makes up 56.7% of central bank reserves (IMF, 30/9/2026). Anyone doing business in dollars passes through the American system, and that is why Washington can punish even those who break sanctions decided by it alone.

The best-known case is French. In June 2014 BNP Paribas pleaded guilty before a New York court and paid $8.9 billion for having evaded, between 2004 and 2012, US sanctions on Sudan, Cuba and Iran (Al Jazeera, 30/6/2014).

When the United States left the nuclear deal with Iran, France, Germany and the United Kingdom created INSTEX, a company to trade with Tehran without going through the dollar. In four years it made a single transaction, a delivery of medical goods in early 2020. In March 2023 it was wound up; European governments blamed Iran, which had rejected its proposals (UK Government, 9/3/2023).

The most recent case concerns international law. On 9 October 2026 Washington sanctioned the International Criminal Court as such, after the arrest warrant for Netanyahu and the investigation into US troops in Afghanistan. European banks and insurers that work with the Court risk secondary sanctions. 58 MEPs asked the Commission to activate the "Blocking Statute", the European law that forbids companies from applying foreign sanctions and allows them to claim damages (Euronews, 14/10/2026). For now the Commission prefers diplomacy (EUobserver, 14/10/2026); on 16 October the European Council said it "deeply regrets" the sanctions, but its conclusions do not mention the Blocking Statute (European Council, 16/10/2026). We have written about the long siege of the Court here.

The counter-example. In May 2021 the Biden administration waived sanctions on the Nord Stream 2 company and its chief executive, while acknowledging they had engaged in sanctionable activity, so as not to break with Germany, which wanted the pipeline (Maritime Executive, 19/5/2021). When Berlin holds firm, Washington can give way.

Second lever: the bond spread

Here the claim needs correcting. In the two hardest European debt crises, the decisive pressure came from Frankfurt and from European capitals.

Italy, 2011. On 5 August the European Central Bank, with the signatures of Jean-Claude Trichet and Mario Draghi, wrote to the Berlusconi government demanding precise and immediate measures: cuts, reforms, a balanced budget. ECB support for Italian bonds was tied to those demands. The letter was made public by Corriere della Sera on 29 September; Berlusconi resigned on 12 November (Wikipedia, Trichet-Draghi letter). In his memoir, then US Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner wrote that in that autumn "European officials" asked Washington to help them bring down Berlusconi, including by refusing support for an IMF rescue. Washington refused: "We cannot have blood on our hands" (The Local, 14/5/2014).

Greece, 2015. On 28 June, on the eve of the referendum on the creditors' plan, the ECB refused to increase emergency liquidity for Greek banks. The Tsipras government closed the banks and imposed limits on withdrawals (NPR, 28/6/2015).

The counter-example. The same ECB ended the spread crisis. On 26 July 2012 Draghi said in London: "The ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro." Rates for the weaker countries fell (Quartz). And markets do not only punish those who disobey Washington: in September 2022 Liz Truss's United Kingdom, one of America's most loyal allies, announced unfunded tax cuts; sterling hit a record low, the Bank of England had to intervene and Truss resigned after 44 days (CNBC, 21/10/2022).

On rating agencies and big investment funds we found no documented evidence of direct pressure on a European government on Washington's behalf. That is why we do not count them among the proven levers.

Third lever: taxes

On 28 June 2025 the G7 countries, including Germany, France and Italy, agreed to exempt US multinationals from the 15% global minimum tax agreed at the OECD: they will pay only in the United States. The deal came while Congress was debating a "revenge tax" against countries that applied the minimum tax to American companies (Reuters via Arab News, 28/6/2025).

But the picture is not one-way. In September 2024 the EU Court of Justice ruled that Ireland had granted Apple illegal state aid and that Apple had to pay back more than €13 billion in taxes. Defending Apple, alongside the company, was the Irish government (Silicon Republic, 10/9/2024). The tax competition that favours multinationals was, in this case, the work of a European country.

The counter-example. In April 2025 the Commission fined Apple €500 million and Meta €200 million under the new Digital Markets Act (AFP via Arab News, 23/4/2025). In September 2025 it fined Google €2.95 billion; Trump threatened trade retaliation (Euronews, 6/9/2025). The fines were imposed all the same.

Fourth lever: security

This is the most explicit lever. On 28 July 2025, defending the deal that accepted 15% US tariffs, EU trade commissioner Maroš Šefčovič said: "It's not only about the trade, it's about security, it's about Ukraine" (IBTimes, 28/7/2025). The previous pieces showed the rest: 58% of the weapons imported by European NATO countries come from the United States, and European governments buy American weapons for Kyiv.

The counter-example. In 2008, at the NATO summit in Bucharest, Germany and France blocked the membership path for Ukraine and Georgia that Washington wanted to start (NATO, 3/4/2008).

And the US debt?

It is also said that the United States needs Europe to finance its debt. The numbers say otherwise. In July 2026 US Treasury securities in foreign hands were worth about $9,250 billion (Trading Economics, on Treasury data), less than a quarter of a debt that passed $40,000 billion in August (Africanews, 20/8/2026). The largest foreign holders are Japan, the United Kingdom and China. US debt is financed mostly at home.

What worked

When Europe acts together, with common rules and institutions, it gets results even against American interests: the fines on the big digital platforms were imposed despite the threats, the Apple ruling is final, the ECB stopped speculation against the euro in 2012, and in 2021 Berlin got Washington to waive sanctions on the Nord Stream 2 company.

Our assessment

This section expresses the site's position. It is separate from the facts set out above.

The original claim is half true. Washington has real, documented levers: the dollar, with which it punishes those who trade with its enemies, and security, which it openly trades for commercial and tax concessions. The sanctions on the International Criminal Court show it starkly: they hit a court that Europe wanted and funds.

But the other half of the claim does not hold. The spread that bent Italy in 2011 and Greece in 2015 had a European address: Frankfurt and the European capitals. And the tax havens that favour multinationals are also inside the Union. Saying that America is in charge is true for one part; for the other part it is a convenient way of absolving Europe's ruling classes.

The point, for us, is another. When Europe uses the tools it has, it wins: the ECB and competition policy have shown it. The Blocking Statute has existed since 1996, and it has stayed in a drawer even now that sanctions are hitting the International Criminal Court. Dependence is not only imposed: in large part it is chosen, every time Europe gives up using what it has.

What to watch

The Commission's decision on activating the Blocking Statute to protect the International Criminal Court.
Implementation at the OECD of the exemption for US multinationals from the global minimum tax.
Purchases of American weapons with European funds, and the share of European products in rearmament programmes.

Sources: IMF, 30/9/2026 · Al Jazeera, 30/6/2014 · UK Government, 9/3/2023 · Euronews, 14/10/2026 · EUobserver, 14/10/2026 · European Council, 16/10/2026 · Maritime Executive, 19/5/2021 · Wikipedia, Trichet-Draghi letter · The Local, 14/5/2014 · NPR, 28/6/2015 · Quartz · CNBC, 21/10/2022 · Reuters via Arab News, 28/6/2025 · Silicon Republic, 10/9/2024 · AFP via Arab News, 23/4/2025 · Euronews, 6/9/2025 · IBTimes, 28/7/2025 · NATO, 3/4/2008 · Trading Economics, on Treasury data · Africanews, 20/8/2026

European Union United States Sanctions International Criminal Court International law

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