ANALYSIS

From 1990 to 2022: how the war in Ukraine came about

15 October 2026 — Europe

In brief

In 1990 Western leaders verbally assured Gorbachev that NATO would not expand eastwards. They never put it in writing.
Russia has signed several times the right of every state to choose its own alliances, and in 1994 it guaranteed Ukraine's borders.
The political clash begins around 2007-2008. The rupture comes in 2013-2014, when Europe and Russia compete for Ukraine's economy.
Ukraine's far right existed and was armed, but it never won more than 5% at the polls.
The war in Donbas killed about 14,300 people in eight years. According to the European Court of Human Rights, Russia controlled the separatist areas from May 2014.

Why this piece

The full-scale war begins on 24 February 2022, but the rupture between Europe and Russia goes back a long way. The previous piece distinguished between those who had an interest in that rupture and those who caused it. Here we set out thirty years in order, with one rule: for every fact that is uncomfortable for one side, we also look for those uncomfortable for the other, and we give the floor first to courts and international observers, then to governments.

1990: the verbal promise

On 9 February 1990 US Secretary of State James Baker told Gorbachev, three times, that NATO would not move "one inch" eastwards. Bush, Kohl, Mitterrand and Thatcher said similar things. This is shown by the documents published in 2017 by the National Security Archive.

But none of those statements ended up in a treaty. The treaty on German reunification only bans foreign NATO troops and nuclear weapons in the former East Germany. In 2014 Gorbachev himself said that eastward enlargement was not discussed in those years; he added, however, that the West had betrayed their spirit (German Federal Academy for Security Policy).

What Moscow signed

Helsinki 1975 and Istanbul 1999: every state freely chooses its alliances. The Istanbul Charter adds that no one may strengthen its own security at the expense of others, the argument Moscow has always used, and that no one may consider any part of Europe its own "sphere of influence". Both are in the same paragraph.
Budapest 1994: Ukraine gives up the ex-Soviet nuclear weapons; Russia, the United States and the United Kingdom undertake to respect its borders.
NATO–Russia Founding Act, 1997: neither side has a veto over the other's decisions.

And it was the Eastern countries that asked to join NATO: Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and the Baltic states remembered Soviet invasions and occupations.

From cooperation to confrontation

1999. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic join NATO. In the same year NATO bombs Serbia over Kosovo without UN approval. Moscow will not forget it.

2002. It is still a time of cooperation: the NATO–Russia Council is born. In those months, standing next to Ukrainian President Kuchma, Putin says that relations between Ukraine and NATO are "a matter for those two partners" (Kremlin).

2007-2008. In Munich Putin openly attacks the US-led order. Warnings also come from the West: back in 1997 the American diplomat George Kennan had called enlargement the gravest error of American policy since the Cold War (New York Times, 5/2/1997). In February 2008 the US ambassador in Moscow, William Burns, writes to Washington that Ukraine in NATO is the brightest red line for Russia's entire ruling class (cable published by WikiLeaks, Fair Observer).

In April, at the Bucharest summit, NATO announces that Ukraine and Georgia "will become members" (NATO, 3/4/2008), but Germany and France block the concrete path to membership. The result: Moscow feels threatened, Kyiv is left without protection. In August war breaks out in Georgia; an inquiry commissioned by the European Union will conclude that Tbilisi fired first, but that Russia's response went beyond the limits of self-defence (RTÉ, on the Tagliavini report).

Even then the road was not set: in 2010 the United States and Russia sign a new nuclear arms treaty, and in 2012 Russia joins the World Trade Organization, welcomed by Europe (EUI).

2013: two markets for one country

The real rupture comes from an economic dispute. Moscow wants Ukraine in its customs union; Brussels offers it a free-trade agreement. It cannot have both.

In August 2013 Russia blocks Ukrainian goods at the border for a week (OSW). An adviser to Putin calls signing with Europe "suicidal" (Reuters via Moscow Times). In November President Yanukovych gives up signing; on 17 December Moscow grants him $15 billion and a one-third discount on gas (Moscow Times). This is where the Maidan protests come from.

2014: Maidan, Crimea, Donbas

Maidan. After three months of protests, Yanukovych flees in February. Between 18 and 20 February alone, in central Kyiv, 73 civilians and 11 police officers are killed (Hromadske). In early February a leaked phone call had already been released in which the American diplomat Victoria Nuland discussed with the ambassador who should join the government and swore at the European Union (MPR, citing AP): Washington wanted a say, and did not agree with Brussels.

The far right. It existed and was armed. The Azov battalion was founded in 2014 and its first commander came from a neo-Nazi group; in 2018 the US Congress banned funding it (The Hill, republished by Congressman Ro Khanna). But at the polls it carried little weight: in 2019 the entire far right, running together, won 2.15% and stayed out of parliament (Swedish Institute of International Affairs). The same year Zelensky, from a Jewish family, won with 73%.

Crimea and Donbas. In March Russia annexes Crimea; the UN General Assembly declares the referendum invalid, with 100 votes in favour, 11 against and 58 abstentions (Library of Congress). In April an armed group led by Igor Girkin, a former Russian intelligence officer, takes Sloviansk. Girkin will say he "pulled the trigger of the war", while admitting that by summer most fighters were local (Moscow Times). In 2025 the European Court of Human Rights ruled that Russia controlled the separatist areas from 11 May 2014, and that it is responsible for shooting down flight MH17 (ECHR, 9/7/2025).

Odesa. On 2 May clashes between pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian groups leave 48 dead; 42 die in the fire at the Trade Unions House, where the pro-Russian activists had barricaded themselves (Kyiv Post). In 2025 the European Court found against Ukraine for failing to prevent the violence, rescue the victims and investigate properly (ECHR, 13/3/2025).

The dead. From 2014 to 2021 the UN counts about 14,300 dead, at least 3,404 of them civilians, most in the first two years (OHCHR).

Minsk: an agreement nobody kept

The Minsk agreements (2014-2015) provided for a ceasefire, the withdrawal of weapons and foreign forces, and autonomy for Donbas. They were never implemented. In 2022 Merkel said Minsk had also served to give Ukraine time to grow stronger (TASS, on Die Zeit): for Moscow this is proof of Western bad faith. But Russia never withdrew its forces, as the agreement required.

The last weeks

In the days before the invasion OSCE monitors record a surge in shelling along the front: in Donetsk, between 18 and 20 February 2022, more than 2,100 ceasefire violations (OSCE). Each side blames the other.

Moscow justifies the invasion with an alleged "genocide" of Russian speakers in Donbas. In March 2022 the International Court of Justice says it has no evidence of that genocide (ICJ).

Our assessment

This section expresses the site's position. It is separate from the facts set out above.

Explaining is not justifying. The West gave verbal assurances and then disregarded them, ignored its own diplomats and in Bucharest chose the worst path: announcing membership without granting it. Washington tried to shape the government born of Maidan. In Ukraine the armed far right was tolerated for too long, and in Odesa the state failed. These are facts, and an honest account must include them.

But Russia had signed the right of every state to choose its alliances and had guaranteed Ukraine's borders. It used a trade blockade to stop Kyiv from making an economic choice, then took Crimea and Donbas. No Western mistake makes an invasion lawful: the UN Charter forbids the use of force to everyone, including those who feel threatened. It is the same yardstick we use for Washington, and it must be used for Moscow too.

What to watch

The next piece in the series: Europe's choices after 2022 and what they have cost.
The individual cases against Russia at the European Court of Human Rights, opened up by the July 2025 judgment.

Sources: National Security Archive · German Federal Academy for Security Policy · Istanbul Charter · Kremlin · New York Times, 5/2/1997 · Fair Observer · NATO, 3/4/2008 · RTÉ, on the Tagliavini report · EUI · OSW · Reuters via Moscow Times · Moscow Times · Hromadske · MPR, citing AP · The Hill, republished by Congressman Ro Khanna · Swedish Institute of International Affairs · Library of Congress · Moscow Times · ECHR, 9/7/2025 · Kyiv Post · ECHR, 13/3/2025 · OHCHR · TASS, on Die Zeit · OSCE · ICJ

Russia–Ukraine Russia European Union United States International law

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