ANALYSIS
Was Nord Stream a military objective?
18 October 2026 — Germany / Baltic Sea
Series “Europe's choices” · 8 of 8
In brief
- On 26 September 2022 a series of explosions ripped open three of the four Nord Stream lines, in the economic waters of Denmark and Sweden. Since 14 October 2026 a former Ukrainian officer, Serhii Kuznietsov, has been on trial in Hamburg. He denies any involvement.
- The defence also argues something else: the pipeline was a legitimate military objective, "a weapon in the hands of the Russians". In 2025 a Polish judge said something similar, speaking of a "just war".
- American and Russian theories have also circulated: no investigation has confirmed them. According to Der Spiegel and the Wall Street Journal, the CIA knew of the Ukrainian plan and in June 2022 asked for it to be stopped.
- Under the law of war, an object is a military objective only if it makes an "effective contribution to military action" and destroying it offers a definite military advantage. When it was hit, Nord Stream was carrying no gas, was partly owned by European companies and lay in the waters of neutral countries.
- Germany's Federal Court of Justice has already written, in a ruling on pre-trial detention, that it was civilian infrastructure. The same criteria led the International Criminal Court to seek the arrest of Russia's top military commanders for the strikes on Ukraine's power grid.
- Our assessment: by the same yardstick, the military-objective argument does not hold. The justice of a war does not make every blow lawful. It is for the court, however, to establish who acted and on whose orders.
The question
We wrote about Nord Stream in the first piece of this series, on energy, to explain how Europe's dependence changed. Here we ask two questions. Who destroyed it, on the evidence available? And if it really was Ukraine, as the prosecution in Hamburg argues, was it a lawful act of war?
The question matters beyond this trial. It concerns all energy infrastructure: pipelines, cables, refineries, power plants. And it concerns the yardstick Europe uses to judge attacks, depending on who carries them out. The charges against Kuznietsov have yet to be proven: we reason on the prosecution's hypothesis, not on established guilt.
The facts
The explosions. On 26 September 2022 a series of explosions damaged three of the four lines of Nord Stream 1 and 2, at a depth of about 80 metres near the Danish island of Bornholm (Intellinews). The explosions took place outside territorial waters, but within the exclusive economic zones of Denmark and Sweden. Neither country was at war.
The state of the pipelines. Nord Stream 1 was no longer carrying gas: Moscow had cut off supplies at the end of August 2022. Nord Stream 2 had never entered service, because in February 2022 Germany had suspended its certification (AP via ClickOnDetroit, 26/2/2024). Both, however, contained gas, which escaped into the sea.
The owners. Nord Stream 1 was 51% owned by Russia's Gazprom. The rest belonged to four European companies: Germany's Wintershall Dea and E.ON (15.5% each), the Dutch Gasunie and France's Engie (9% each) (Euronews, 27/9/2022).
The damage to the environment. According to a study published in Nature, the lines released up to 485,000 tonnes of methane: four to five times the Aliso Canyon leak in California in 2015 (Queen Mary University of London).
The investigations. Sweden and Denmark closed their investigations in February 2024 without charging anyone. Germany went ahead. Kuznietsov, arrested in Italy in August 2025, was handed over to Germany in November after Italy's Court of Cassation gave the green light (Maritime Executive, 28/11/2025). The trial opened on 14 October 2026 before the Higher Regional Court in Hamburg. According to the prosecution, Kuznietsov and other Ukrainian military personnel acted "by order of Ukrainian state agencies" to permanently disrupt gas supplies. The defendant denies it and did not speak in court (Courthouse News, 14/10/2026). There are four charges: a war crime (attacking protected civilian objects) and three ordinary offences, namely causing an explosion, destroying structures and disrupting public services (Diplomacy and Law, 13/10/2026). Ukraine's Prosecutor General's Office says it found no evidence of state involvement.
A second suspect. Ukrainian diver Volodymyr Zhuravlyov was arrested in Poland in 2025. On 17 October 2025 a Warsaw court refused to hand him over to Germany and released him (Notes from Poland, 17/10/2025). Arrested again in Croatia in August 2026, in September a Croatian court authorised his extradition; his lawyers have announced an appeal (Euromaidan Press, 24/9/2026).
Who was behind it: the theories
Over these four years three different accounts have circulated, alongside the German prosecution's. We compared them with the same questions: who put them forward, what they rest on, who denies them, what investigations have made of them.
| United States | Russia | Ukraine, with the CIA informed | Ukraine (German prosecution) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Who put it forward | Journalist Seymour Hersh, February 2023 | German news site t-online, March 2023 | Wall Street Journal (August 2024) and Der Spiegel (February 2026) | German Federal Prosecutor |
| What it rests on | A single anonymous source | Russian military ships in the area a few days before, with position signals switched off | Anonymous sources, including one person who says he took part | Judicial investigation: the rented yacht, false identity documents |
| Who denies it | White House and CIA | Moscow blames the West | CIA ("completely false"); Zaluzhny ("a provocation") | Kyiv; the defendant |
| What investigations have made of it | None has confirmed it | None has confirmed it | Partly matches the German investigation | Trial under way in Hamburg |
Sources for the table: Hersh and the denials (Snopes, 10/2/2023); the Russian ships (t-online, 25/3/2023); the Wall Street Journal (Ukrainska Pravda, 15/8/2024); Der Spiegel (taz, 19/2/2026); the charges and the false documents, from the German Federal Court of Justice ruling cited below.
A few more details, because each theory has a strong point and a weak one.
United States. Hersh wrote that US Navy divers, with Norway's help, planted the charges in June 2022 during a NATO exercise. In its favour, people cite a remark by Joe Biden on 7 February 2022: if Russia invades, "there will no longer be a Nord Stream 2. We will bring an end to it." But the whole account rests on one person nobody can verify. In March 2023 Russia asked the UN Security Council for an international inquiry: only Russia, China and Brazil voted in favour, while the other twelve members abstained (Arab News, 28/3/2023).
Russia. The theory of self-sabotage rests on movements of Russian ships reconstructed from satellite images and anonymous sources. The article itself uses the conditional: no ship was identified with certainty and no investigator has confirmed the lead.
Ukraine, with the CIA informed. This is the most detailed account. According to Der Spiegel, in spring 2022 the Ukrainian group presented the plan to CIA contacts, who at first did not object. In June Dutch intelligence reportedly warned the CIA and German intelligence; at that point Washington reportedly asked Kyiv to stop, without success. The operation, costing about $300,000, was reportedly paid for by a private businessman. The two investigations, however, disagree on one point: for the Wall Street Journal, Zelensky had approved the plan and then asked for it to be stopped; for Der Spiegel he had not been informed, and the final word came from then commander-in-chief Valerii Zaluzhny.
One thing is certain: the theories about the United States and Russia have, to date, found no confirmation in a court of law. The Ukrainian trail is the only one to have reached trial.
What the law of war says
The central rule is Article 52 of the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions. Attacks must be limited to military objectives. An object is a military objective only if two conditions are met together: by its nature, location, purpose or use it makes "an effective contribution to military action"; and its destruction offers, in the circumstances ruling at the time, "a definite military advantage". In case of doubt, an object normally used for civilian purposes is presumed civilian (First Protocol, official text, Swiss Confederation).
The same Protocol lays down a principle that matters a great deal here: the rules apply to everyone, "without any adverse distinction based on the nature or origin of the armed conflict or on the causes espoused" by the parties. The law of war does not ask who is right in the war. It asks how the war is fought. It applies to the aggressor and to the victim of aggression alike.
Experts are divided on one point: whether objects that finance a war, such as oil and gas exports, can become military objectives. The United States takes the broadest reading, but even for Washington an object that generates revenue is not, in itself, a military objective: a concrete link with operations is needed (Lieber Institute, West Point, 7/7/2026). According to a number of scholars, most states take a narrower view.
The two arguments
The defence. In court, lawyer Nicola Canestrini called the pipelines "a weapon in the hands of the Russians" and asked for the charges to be dismissed (Courthouse News). The argument is that Moscow used gas to blackmail Europe and to finance the war.
The Polish judge. In refusing Zhuravlyov's extradition, judge Dariusz Łubowski said Ukraine's defence is a "just war", and that blowing up the enemy's infrastructure in such a war "is not sabotage, but military action": "justified, rational and just". Prime Minister Donald Tusk commented: "The case is closed" (Notes from Poland).
The German Federal Court of Justice. On 10 December 2025, ruling on Kuznietsov's pre-trial detention, the Federal Court of Justice wrote that the pipelines were civilian infrastructure and therefore not a legitimate target. It also ruled out combatant privilege: it does not cover military personnel who act covertly, without distinguishing themselves from civilians. And it found "strong grounds" to believe that the operation was decided and directed by the Ukrainian state. It was a provisional assessment, not a verdict (LTO, 16/1/2026).
The scholars. As early as 2023, legal scholar Alexander Lott of the Norwegian Centre for the Law of the Sea had reached the same conclusion: a doubtful military objective, because the pipelines also served Germany, which was not at war, and they carried no gas when they were hit. He added that the attack failed to take account of the marine environment (University of Tromsø, 21/11/2023).
The same yardstick
To see whether the judgment changes depending on who strikes, we compared three campaigns against energy, with the same questions.
| Ukraine's power grid | Russian refineries | Nord Stream | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Who strikes | Russia | Ukraine | Ukraine, according to the German prosecution (Kyiv denies it) |
| Where | In Ukraine, a country at war | In Russia, a country at war | In Danish and Swedish waters, countries not at war |
| Did it serve the armed forces when it was hit? | In part: a grid with civilian and military use | In part: some supply the army, others export | No: no gas flowing, one line never in service |
| What courts or experts have said | The International Criminal Court sought the arrest of four senior Russian officers for attacks on civilian objects and excessive harm to civilians | Lawful for those that supply the army; for export facilities the call is "too close" | German Federal Court of Justice (provisionally): civilian infrastructure |
Sources for the table: for the power grid, the International Criminal Court warrants against Kobylash and Sokolov (March 2024) and against Shoigu and Gerasimov (June 2024), for strikes between October 2022 and March 2023 (JusticeInfo, 25/6/2024); for the refineries, the Lieber Institute analysis; for Nord Stream, the German Federal Court of Justice ruling cited above.
The comparison says something simple: the same criteria that make Russia's strikes on Ukraine's power grid unlawful also weigh on Nord Stream, and weigh more heavily. Nord Stream is the case furthest from a military objective: it was not in use, it was not in a country at war and it was partly owned by companies from Ukraine's allies.
What worked
European judicial cooperation worked, at least in part. Italy handed Kuznietsov over under the European arrest warrant, and a Croatian court authorised the surrender of the second suspect. Germany is trying in public a citizen of a country it supports with weapons and money, on a charge that implicates the Ukrainian state. The trial will allow the evidence to be tested in court, with the defence present.
Our assessment
This section expresses the site's position. It is separate from the facts set out above.
By the same yardstick we apply to Russia, the military-objective argument does not hold. An idle pipeline, in the waters of countries not at war, partly European-owned, was making no effective contribution to Russian military action. Depriving Moscow of future revenue is not enough: if it were, every income-producing asset would become a target, in every war. And the damage to the environment, hundreds of thousands of tonnes of methane, fell on everyone.
The Warsaw judge's "just war" conflates two questions that the law deliberately keeps apart: why a war is fought and how it is fought. Ukraine has the right to defend itself. That does not make every blow lawful, just as the defence claimed by Moscow does not make it lawful to bomb Ukraine's power stations in winter. Whoever accepts the argument for Nord Stream must accept it when the other side uses it too.
Then there is a European point. If the accounts by Der Spiegel and the Wall Street Journal are true, Dutch, German and American intelligence knew of the plan three months in advance: it is legitimate to ask what they did to stop it, and why they failed. An infrastructure in which German, Dutch and French companies had invested was destroyed; the head of an EU government welcomed the release of one suspect, while Germany is trying another. If the prosecution's case is confirmed, Europe will have to say clearly what it has so far avoided saying: that even a country under attack, and supported by Europe, is bound by the rules Europe asks others to respect. But Kuznietsov's responsibility, and that of the Ukrainian state, will be established by the court, not by us.
What to watch
- The next hearings in Hamburg, scheduled until December, and the testimony of the military commanders called by the defence.
- Whether the trial brings out what American, Dutch and German intelligence knew, and when.
- Whether the court finds the war crime proven, or only the ordinary offences.
- Zhuravlyov's appeal in Croatia and his possible surrender to Germany.
- Attacks on energy in the ongoing war, by both sides, with winter approaching.
Sources: Intellinews · AP via ClickOnDetroit, 26/2/2024 · Euronews, 27/9/2022 · Queen Mary University of London · Maritime Executive, 28/11/2025 · Courthouse News, 14/10/2026 · Diplomacy and Law, 13/10/2026 · Notes from Poland, 17/10/2025 · Euromaidan Press, 24/9/2026 · Snopes, 10/2/2023 · t-online, 25/3/2023 · Ukrainska Pravda, 15/8/2024 · taz, 19/2/2026 · Arab News, 28/3/2023 · First Protocol, official text, Swiss Confederation · Lieber Institute, West Point, 7/7/2026 · LTO, 16/1/2026 · University of Tromsø, 21/11/2023 · JusticeInfo, 25/6/2024
Related pieces: Europe stopped depending on Moscow. Who does it depend on now? · Who really decides Europe's choices · After 2022: what Europe chose and what it cost