ANALYSIS
The Euro-Russian market that worried Washington: what the numbers say
15 October 2026 — Europe
Series “Europe's choices” · 2 of 3
In brief
- Trade between the European Union and Russia peaked in 2012 and then fell: by 2021, before the invasion, it was already almost a quarter lower.
- In 2021 Russia was the fifth market for European goods; 62% of what Europe bought from Moscow was energy.
- The United States openly opposed Nord Stream 2, with sanctions in 2019 and with Biden's promise of 7 February 2022.
- Today the Union takes more than half of American liquefied gas, and 58% of the weapons imported by Europe's NATO members come from the United States.
- Over the same period Europe resumed selling weapons to Saudi Arabia and called Azerbaijan's gas "reliable".
A recurring thesis
In public debate, in Italy and elsewhere, one idea keeps coming back: before the war a great market was taking shape between Europe and Russia, European industry joined with Russian raw materials. A prospect that would have weakened the United States, and that Washington would have had an interest in stopping.
The idea has a true part and a part the numbers do not confirm. Here we separate them. This is the third piece in the series on the choices of Europe's leadership, after the one on energy.
The dream "from Lisbon to Vladivostok"
The project has a date. On 25 November 2010 Vladimir Putin, then prime minister, proposed in a German newspaper a great economic space "from Lisbon to Vladivostok", with a free-trade area (Moscow Times, 25/11/2010).
Berlin answered cautiously: Angela Merkel said she shared the idea, but that Russia was not moving in that direction (AFP via bilaterals.org). The project never went beyond statements.
And the dollar? In 2019 Rosneft, Russia's largest oil company, switched all its export contracts from the dollar to the euro, to shield itself from American sanctions (High North News, citing Reuters).
What the numbers say
| EU–Russia trade in goods (€ billion) | 2002 | 2012 | 2021 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Imports from Russia | 61 | 204 | 158 | 27 |
| Exports to Russia | 33 | 118 | 89 | 30 |
Sources: Eurostat, 7/3/2022 for 2012 and 2021; for 2002, Eurostat data reported by Chronicle.lu; for 2025, Eurostat Comext data reported by The Trade Hub, consistent with the quarterly data from Eurostat.
Trade grew until 2012, then fell with the Crimea crisis, the first sanctions and the drop in oil prices. In 2021 Russia accounted for 4.1% of European exports and 7.5% of imports, and 62% of what Europe bought from Moscow was energy (Eurostat, cited above).
It was an important relationship but a simple one: Russian raw materials in exchange for European machinery. And before the war it was already shrinking. Russia's GDP, $1,830 billion, was about a tenth of the Union's, $17,300 billion (World Bank via FRED). Talk of an economic "empire" in the making finds no support in the data.
Who had opposing interests
American interests, on the other hand, are documented.
On 20 December 2019 Trump signed a law sanctioning the companies laying Nord Stream 2. A few hours later the Swiss-Dutch company Allseas suspended work (Reuters via PGJ). The German government said it rejected "extraterritorial" sanctions (EUobserver).
On 7 February 2022, next to Chancellor Scholz, Biden said that in case of an invasion Nord Stream 2 would be finished. Scholz avoided naming the pipeline (CNBC, 7/2/2022).
After 2022, who gained can be measured:
- Gas. In 2025, 54% of the liquefied gas exported by the United States went to the Union, 63% more than the year before (Banchero Costa via Hellenic Shipping News). The energy piece in this series showed at what price.
- Weapons. Between 2021 and 2025 the United States supplied 58% of the weapons imported by Europe's NATO members (SIPRI via Defense News, 9/3/2026).
On the dollar, by contrast, the war did not change the trend. In 1999 it made up 71% of central bank reserves; today it is at 56.7%, while the euro has risen to 20.6% (IMF, 30/9/2026).
An interest is not a cause
Having an interest does not mean having caused an event. The full-scale war began on 24 February 2022, when Russian troops entered Ukraine. On 2 March the UN General Assembly demanded their withdrawal with 141 votes in favour (UN, resolution ES-11/1). On 16 March the International Court of Justice ordered Russia to suspend its military operations (ICJ, order). How we got to that day, with everyone's responsibilities, is the subject of the next piece.
The moral bill
There is one point where the criticism of Europe fully holds. While giving up Russia in the name of principles, the Union built other relationships with fewer scruples:
- On 18 July 2022 Commission President von der Leyen signed an agreement in Baku to double gas from Azerbaijan by 2027, calling the country a reliable partner (European Commission, IP/22/4550). A year later Azerbaijan took Nagorno-Karabakh with a military offensive, and more than a hundred thousand Armenians fled to Armenia (UNHCR, via Reuters).
- On 31 May 2023 Italy lifted the ban on selling bombs and missiles to Saudi Arabia, imposed over the war in Yemen (Reuters via The New Arab).
- In January 2024 Germany dropped its veto on Eurofighters for Riyadh, citing the Saudi attitude towards Israel after 7 October (AP via PBS).
What worked
Cutting trade took away the lever Moscow had used for years to influence European governments. Since the second quarter of 2025 the Union has had a trade surplus with Russia, for the first time in more than twenty years (Euronews, 30/8/2025; Eurostat via Sofia Globe, 24/2/2026). A Europe that in 2021 bought 45% of its imported gas from a single country was exposed to blackmail; today it is much less so.
Our assessment
This section expresses the site's position. It is separate from the facts set out above.
Those who argue that the United States had an interest in separating Europe from Russia are right: Washington said so and acted on it, with the Nord Stream sanctions and with Biden's promise. Those who argue that for this reason America "made the war break out" confuse an interest with a cause, and erase the choice of whoever sent in the tanks. The Euro-Russian market was not killed in 2022: it had stalled ten years earlier, when Moscow preferred Crimea to free trade.
One fact weighs more than intentions. Whatever the cause of the war, its outcome left Europe with no alternative and made it more dependent on Washington, its main beneficiary. But the Russian alternative was itself a dependence. A sovereign Europe should have built its own autonomy, not chosen between two masters.
And there is the double standard. The Union broke with Moscow in the name of principles, but at the same time resumed selling weapons to those who had bombed Yemen and called reliable a government that a year later would settle a conflict by force. Principles applied only to the enemy of the moment are not principles: they are convenience.
What to watch
- Eurostat data on trade with Russia in 2026 and the 23rd sanctions package.
- The $750 billion commitment to American energy: how much of it has actually been bought.
- The review of the EU common position on arms exports.
Sources: Moscow Times, 25/11/2010 · AFP via bilaterals.org · High North News, citing Reuters · Eurostat, 7/3/2022 · Chronicle.lu · The Trade Hub · Eurostat · World Bank via FRED · Reuters via PGJ · EUobserver · CNBC, 7/2/2022 · Banchero Costa via Hellenic Shipping News · SIPRI via Defense News, 9/3/2026 · IMF, 30/9/2026 · UN, resolution ES-11/1 · ICJ, order · European Commission, IP/22/4550 · UNHCR, via Reuters · Reuters via The New Arab · AP via PBS · Euronews, 30/8/2025 · Eurostat via Sofia Globe, 24/2/2026
Related pieces: Europe stopped depending on Moscow. Who does it depend on now? · Interests first, order second. And no nuclear power is pushing back · From 1990 to 2022: how the war in Ukraine came about