I Will Not Look Away

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ANALYSIS

How far self-defence goes: Ukraine's attacks inside Russia, one by one

8 November 2026 — Russia – Ukraine – Black Sea

Series “Peace and rearmament” · 3 of 4

In brief

In June 2025 more than a hundred drones, hidden in the trailers of trucks that had entered Russia, took off near four air bases, as far as the Arctic. In July 2026 Ukrainian naval drones hit 28 vessels in one night in the Sea of Azov. In less than two years, in and around Moscow, at least three Russian generals have been killed by bombs. Ukraine is taking the war inside Russia, and part of the European public wonders whether this is still defence. International law has an answer, but it is not a yes or a no: it is a list of conditions, to be applied case by case. How the war came about we reconstructed in "From 1990 to 2022", with the wrongs of all sides; the conclusion of that piece is also the starting point of this one: no Western mistake makes an invasion lawful, and therefore Ukraine has the right to defend itself. The question here is how far.

The rule

Two levels. International law looks at war on two planes. The first concerns why force is used: the UN Charter prohibits it (Article 2(4); see use of force) with one exception, self-defence against an armed attack (Article 51). The International Court of Justice has made clear that defence must be necessary and proportionate (Nicaragua, 1986; Oil Platforms, 2003). Proportionality is measured against the aim, stopping the aggression, and not blow by blow. Against an ongoing invasion that occupies about a fifth of Ukrainian territory, striking the bases from which missiles and bombers take off is hard to regard as disproportionate.

The second plane concerns how: humanitarian law, which applies to the aggressor and the victim alike. Only military objectives may be attacked, that is, objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose destruction offers a definite military advantage (Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, Article 52). Even a military objective may not be attacked if the expected harm to civilians is excessive in relation to the advantage (Article 51). And all feasible precautions must be taken (Article 57). Russia and Ukraine are parties to these treaties, and the rules are customary law in any case.

Being attacked, then, does not give the right to do anything at all. But nor does it take the right away.

Lawful

Air bases and bombers. On 1 June 2025 Ukraine's security service (SBU) launched operation "Spiderweb". According to Al Jazeera, 117 drones smuggled into Russia were launched together near the airfields where strategic bombers were parked, including the Olenya base in the Arctic, about 2,000 kilometres from Ukraine (Al Jazeera). The SBU spoke of 41 aircraft hit; satellite images analysed by independent sources confirmed at least thirteen in the first days (The Insider). The bombers from which missiles are launched at Ukrainian cities are military objectives by nature. This is the clearest case.

The Kursk incursion. In August 2024 the Ukrainian army entered Russia's Kursk region and occupied part of it for some months, before Russian troops, helped by North Korean soldiers, took it back. Taking the war onto the aggressor's territory falls within self-defence. But whoever occupies territory, even briefly, has the obligations of an occupying power towards the civilians who live there (Fourth Geneva Convention). The judgment on those months depends on how they were treated.

Officers on duty. In December 2024 General Igor Kirillov, head of Russia's chemical defence troops, was killed in Moscow by a bomb hidden in a scooter; the SBU openly claimed it. There followed General Yaroslav Moskalik, in April 2025, and General Fanil Sarvarov, in December 2025, both by car bombs, and in June 2026 Damir Davydov, who ran the army's supply of missiles and artillery ammunition; Ukraine has not commented (Euromaidan Press; The Washington Times). A soldier on active duty is a legitimate target, even far from the front and outside working hours. The limit is the means. A bomb in a courtyard or a car park in a residential neighbourhood must avoid disproportionate harm to passers-by, and the law prohibits killing by feigning protected status, that is, by perfidy (Article 37 of Protocol I). A hidden bomb is not in itself perfidy. Trump's envoy for Ukraine, Keith Kellogg, said however that the killing of Kirillov violated the rules of war (Strat News Global).

Contested

Refineries and pipelines. This is the broadest campaign. According to the International Energy Agency, at the end of August 2026 only five large Russian refineries had not yet been hit by Ukrainian drones (IEA). The legal question is whether a refinery is a military objective. According to the prevailing view, oil infrastructure is not one by nature: it can become one through use or purpose (Lieber Institute, West Point). A refinery that supplies the army becomes one: an analysis by Global Witness found that some of the refineries hit had supplied fuel to the Russian armed forces (Global Witness). In April 2024 the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe declared Russian refineries legitimate targets (same source). More doubtful is the case of a plant hit only because it earns money for Russia: American doctrine accepts striking objects that "sustain the war" by financing it; the International Committee of the Red Cross does not. The judgment must be made plant by plant.

The Druzhba pipeline adds a problem: it carries Russian oil to Hungary and Slovakia, the last EU countries still receiving it by this route. In July the two governments protested over three interruptions in less than two weeks caused by Ukrainian attacks (The Moscow Times). But the longest stoppage, from January, had been caused by a Russian attack on a station in western Ukraine (Reuters, via Devdiscourse). Hitting a plant in Russia that also serves allies does not make it unlawful, but the harm to third parties enters the proportionality calculation.

The tankers of the "shadow fleet". Since late 2025 Ukraine has been hitting with naval drones the tankers that carry Russian oil while evading sanctions: in the Black Sea, including off the Turkish coast, and in December 2025, for the first time, in the Mediterranean, where an SBU source called the ship "an absolutely legitimate target" (Kyiv Post). Putin spoke of piracy (Dawn). Here the law is stricter than on land. An enemy merchant ship may be attacked only if it has become a military objective; a ship flying the flag of a neutral country may, as a rule, be stopped and captured, not sunk (San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea, 1994, paragraphs 59-60 and 67). Many ships of the shadow fleet fly the flags of third countries. Hitting them only because they bring money to Moscow is the same controversial thesis of objects that "sustain the war", with an added risk for neutral countries and their crews. The position is stronger for the ships in the Sea of Azov carrying fuel to occupied Crimea, where Russian troops use it: on 11 July 2026 Ukraine hit 28 of them in one night (Ground News, summarising several sources).

Unlawful

Targeted civilians. In August 2022 Darya Dugina, a nationalist commentator and daughter of the ideologue Alexander Dugin, was killed by a car bomb near Moscow. American officials said they believed the attack had been authorised by elements of the Ukrainian government (The Washington Times); Kyiv denied it. In April 2023 the military blogger Vladlen Tatarsky (Maxim Fomin) was killed by an explosive statuette in a café in St Petersburg (Kyiv Post). Someone who makes war propaganda is not a combatant. Killing a civilian for supporting the enemy is murder, and in war it is a crime.

Attacks on border towns. Russia's Belgorod region has been hit for years. On 20 July 2026 a Ukrainian drone hit a bus in Shebekino, killing five people, including a child (AFP, via BSS); in December 2023 Moscow reported at least 20 dead in central Belgorod, accusing Ukraine of using cluster munitions (SBS). Russian authorities speak of 250 civilians killed in Russia in the first half of 2026, but the UN is unable to verify this (Arab News). Not all these attacks are necessarily unlawful: a border town may host military objectives. But if an attack hits a bus or a square without a precise military objective, or with weapons that do not discriminate, it is a war crime. Judging requires independent investigations, which are not possible in Russia today.

Nord Stream. On 30 June 2026 the German federal prosecutor indicted a former Ukrainian officer, Serhii Kuznietsov, as head of the group that blew up the Baltic pipelines in September 2022. According to the indictment, he and the others were soldiers acting on behalf of Ukrainian state authorities, and the charge includes complicity in a war crime: the attack on civilian infrastructure (Eurointegration). The trial opened in Hamburg on 14 October (Euronews). Germany's Federal Court of Justice, in a decision on pre-trial detention, wrote that the pipeline was civilian infrastructure in neutral waters and could not be a military objective (Babel); the defence argues the opposite. Kyiv denies organising the sabotage. If the charge is proven, Nord Stream will be the clearest example of the limit of defence: a civilian asset, in the waters of third countries, owned in part by European companies. We analysed the question in detail in "Was Nord Stream a military objective?", in the series "Europe's choices".

Is the arms supplier complicit?

In general, no. Helping a state exercising self-defence is not a wrongful act, because the defence is lawful. The supplier is responsible in two cases. The first: if it supplies weapons knowing they will be used to commit war crimes (Article 16 of the Articles on State Responsibility; Arms Trade Treaty, Articles 6 and 7, for states parties; EU Common Position 2008/944). The second: if it takes direct part in operations, for example by choosing targets. The restrictions some allies placed on the use of their long-range weapons against Russian territory were political choices, not legal obligations. According to Kyiv, most of the attacks described here, refineries included, are carried out with drones built in Ukraine.

And the price of energy?

The attacks on refineries have reduced Russian fuel production and pushed Moscow to restrict diesel exports. According to Axios, the drone campaign is helping to push up world energy prices, already high because of the war with Iran (Axios). The effect concerns diesel above all. The cost of energy for European industry depends mainly on gas and electricity, and the EU has not imported Russian refined products since 2023. A cost to third parties does not make an attack on a military objective unlawful; it can, however, enter into the allies' political choices.

Symmetry test

The same rule for Moscow. If a refinery that supplies the army is a legitimate target, so is a Ukrainian fuel depot. If a power station that serves homes is a civilian object, it is one on both sides. In 2024 the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants against four senior Russian commanders, including former defence minister Shoigu and chief of the general staff Gerasimov, for attacks on the Ukrainian power grid, considered directed against civilian objects or in any case disproportionate (see our page on ICC fugitives).

The proportions. The yardstick is the same, the numbers are not. According to the UN, in the first half of 2026, 96% of civilian casualties were recorded on Ukrainian territory, caused largely by Russian long-range missiles and drones; the same source reports Russian figures on casualties in Russia, without being able to verify them (Gwara Media). Saying that Ukraine commits wrongful acts does not reduce Russia's responsibility; saying that Russia commits many more does not erase Ukraine's.

The same Court for everyone. Ukraine rightly asks the International Criminal Court to judge Russian crimes. It has been a party to the Rome Statute since 1 January 2025. But at ratification it used a transitional provision, Article 124, to exclude for seven years the Court's jurisdiction over war crimes allegedly committed by its nationals: it is the first time a state has used it in this way (Coalition for the ICC). Amnesty International has asked for the declaration to be withdrawn (Amnesty). It is a clause provided by the Statute, but it is also the point where the yardstick risks not being the same for everyone.

The sources. On many of these episodes the sources are partisan: the Russian authorities for casualties in Russia, the SBU for the results of its operations. We have flagged them as such, and where independent verification exists we have preferred it.

Our judgment

This section expresses the site's position. It is separate from the facts set out above.

The question "can you defend yourself by attacking?" has a clear answer: yes. A country that has been invaded is not obliged to wait for missiles on its own territory, and striking the bases from which they are launched is defence in the strictest sense. Those who ask Ukraine not to touch Russian territory are asking it, in practice, to fight with one hand tied.

But the law that protects Ukraine from aggression is the same law that sets it limits. A bomb for a blogger, a drone on a bus, a civilian pipeline in neutral waters are not defence: they are the same logic Ukraine rightly denounces when Moscow applies it. Supporting Ukraine's defence and demanding that it respect humanitarian law are not two positions in conflict. They are the same position.

What to watch

Sources: Al Jazeera · The Insider · Euromaidan Press · The Washington Times · Strat News Global · IEA · Lieber Institute, West Point · Global Witness · The Moscow Times · Reuters, via Devdiscourse · Kyiv Post · Dawn · Ground News, summarising several sources · Kyiv Post · AFP, via BSS · SBS · Arab News · Eurointegration · Euronews · Babel · Axios · Gwara Media · Coalition for the ICC · Amnesty

Russia–UkraineInternational law

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