ANALYSIS

The Rohingya verdict that has not come: what the Court must decide, and what is left for those who wait

19 October 2026 — The Hague / Cox's Bazar

In brief

The background

In June we reported on the hearings and on the state of the country after the coup (The International Court of Justice deliberates on the Rohingya genocide). This piece explains what the Court must decide, what may happen next, and what the Rohingya are living through today.

In short: in August 2017 Myanmar's army launched what it called "clearance operations" in Rakhine State, in response to attacks on police posts by a Rohingya armed group, ARSA. Within a few months more than 700,000 Rohingya fled to Bangladesh. In 2019 The Gambia, a distant state but, like Myanmar, a party to the Genocide Convention, brought the case before the International Court of Justice (what the Court is).

The facts

The stages of the case. In January 2020 the Court unanimously ordered Myanmar to take provisional measures to protect the Rohingya. In July 2022 it rejected Myanmar's objections and ruled that it has jurisdiction. Eleven states have intervened to explain how the Convention should be read: Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the Maldives, Slovenia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Belgium and Ireland. The hearings on the merits were held from 12 to 29 January 2026, with witnesses heard behind closed doors (ICJ, press releases).

The two cases. The Gambia argues that the violence of 2017 was the peak of a persecution that began at least in the late 1980s, made of restrictions on marriage and movement and of a hate campaign to dehumanise the Rohingya. Myanmar, represented in court by Ko Ko Hlaing, called the report of the UN Fact-Finding Mission a "condemnation without trial". It argues that these were counter-terrorism operations against ARSA, and it does not deny the killings: it denies the intent to destroy the group (Impunity Watch).

When the judgment comes. No one knows. On the Court's case page the latest press release is the one from late January. The indication "October" comes from The Gambia's Minister of Justice, Dawda Jallow, who gave it in late August to a Bangladeshi minister (TBS News). In this case the Court has always announced its decisions one or two weeks in advance: eight days ahead for the 2020 provisional measures, eleven for the 2022 judgment.

Seen from above. Some evidence of the 2017 destruction does not depend on witnesses. Using satellite imagery, Human Rights Watch counted 354 Rohingya villages wholly or partly burned after 25 August 2017. At least 118 were burned after 5 September, when the government said the operations were over (HRW, 18/12/2017).

The camps. About 1.2 million Rohingya live in the camps of Cox's Bazar, in Bangladesh. Since 2024 about 150,000 more have arrived, fleeing the new fighting in Rakhine (UNHCR, via Ittefaq). Since 1 April 2026 the World Food Programme has divided aid into tiers. A third of the people, the poorest, keep 12 dollars a month each; the others receive less, and some go down to 7. For the WFP this is not a cut, because the minimum calorie intake is still guaranteed; for Bangladesh's refugee commissioner it is, and he fears unrest. This year the programmes for the Rohingya are 19% funded (AP, via NPR).

Rakhine today. The army has lost almost the whole region. The Arakan Army, the armed group of the ethnic Rakhine, controls 14 of the 17 townships and the entire border with Bangladesh. According to Human Rights Watch, the Arakan Army too restricts the Rohingya's movement, confiscates land and houses, and forces them to work and to enlist. A young man abducted in 2024 says he was sent to the front line as a "human shield" (HRW, 28/7/2025). In the same report HRW writes that in 2024 ARSA and other Rohingya armed groups fought alongside the army.

The criminal courts. The International Court of Justice judges states, not individuals. For individuals there are two other routes, both stalled. In November 2024 the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court requested an arrest warrant for the army chief Min Aung Hlaing, but the judges have not yet decided. In April 2026 Min Aung Hlaing became president, elected by a parliament that came out of elections organised by the junta; the ICC recalled that the office gives him no immunity (DVB). In February 2025 an Argentine court, under universal jurisdiction, issued 25 arrest warrants, one of them for him (JURIST).

Legal commentary

What the Court must decide. That the Rohingya were killed, driven out and stripped of their homes is admitted even by Myanmar. The 1948 Convention, however, asks for more: that these acts were committed with the intent to destroy the group, in whole or in part. When intent is not written in an order, the Court infers it from conduct, but only if it is the only reasonable conclusion. This is the standard set in the judgments on Bosnia (2007) and Croatia (2015), and it is very high: under that standard the Court has recognised only one genocide, Srebrenica. In 2018 the UN Fact-Finding Mission concluded that there was sufficient information to infer intent. The Court may reach the same conclusion or stop short of it.

The middle ground. Even without genocide, the Court can find against Myanmar. In the Bosnia case, Serbia was held responsible not for genocide, but for failing to prevent it and to punish those responsible.

What it can order. The Gambia asks for a declaration of responsibility, guarantees of non-repetition, reparations and the conditions for a safe return of the Rohingya, including the right to citizenship (JusticeInfo). A declaration is the most likely outcome. On reparations there is a precedent: in 2022 the Court ordered Uganda to pay 325 million dollars to the Congo (UN News). Citizenship is the hardest point, because judges hesitate to tell a state who must be its citizen. Myanmar also argues that The Gambia, not having suffered direct harm, can obtain only a declaration.

The limit. The Court's judgments are binding, but the Court has no force of its own to enforce them. If a state does not comply, the other party can turn to the Security Council, where China and Russia, two of the countries that supply weapons to the junta, hold a veto.

Symmetry test

Our assessment

This section expresses the site's position. It is separate from the facts set out above.

When the judgment comes, it will be news for a day. It deserves to be: it is the first genocide case brought by a state not directly affected to reach a judgment on the merits, and the decision on intent will weigh on the cases concerning Gaza and Ukraine as well. But after that day, little will change for a Rohingya in Cox's Bazar. There will be no less hunger in the camps, he will not get his land back in Rakhine, where a militia rules that no court in The Hague can try as a state, and the accused general will, in all likelihood, remain president.

International law has done its part: a small African country brought the case, eleven states supported it, the Court listened. What is missing is what the law cannot do on its own: funding for the camps, real pressure on those who arm the junta, protection for the Rohingya from the militia that has taken their land as well. Without these things, a judgment risks remaining a page of history.

What to watch

Sources: ICJ, press releases · Impunity Watch · TBS News · HRW, 18/12/2017 · UNHCR, via Ittefaq · AP, via NPR · HRW, 28/7/2025 · DVB · JURIST · JusticeInfo · UN News

MyanmarRohingyaGenocideUNInternational lawForgotten crises

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