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GLOSSARY

Myanmar: its peoples, its history, who is fighting and why

Updated 22 October 2026

News about Myanmar talks of the junta, of rebels, of the Rohingya, but rarely explains who these peoples are, where the war comes from and who profits from it. This entry gathers the essential background. It can be updated: every change is recorded at the end, with its date and source.

Land and peoples

Myanmar is shaped like a horseshoe. In the centre lies a great plain along the Irrawaddy River, home to the majority; all around it, towards Bangladesh, India, China, Laos and Thailand, are mountains home to the minorities. This geography explains much of the country's history: the centre rules, the periphery resists.

A warning about the numbers. In 2014 Myanmar held its first census in thirty years. Almost all the results were published in 2015, showing a population of more than 51 million, and the data on religion in 2016. The data on ethnicity, however, have never been made public (The Irrawaddy); when the UN closed the project, it too noted that they were the last data still withheld (UN Myanmar). The issue is political: some argue that, if all minorities were counted, the Bamar might not be an absolute majority. That is why the figures below are of three kinds, always labelled:

• estimate: the percentages of the CIA World Factbook, the only widely used and consistent series (CIA), which other sources consider too favourable to the majority;
• census: the share of the population living in the state named after a people, from the 2014 results (UNFPA). States are mixed, so the number does not match the people;
• UN and NGOs: for the Rohingya, data from the UN refugee agency (UNHCR) and Human Rights Watch.

The total population is estimated today at about 54 million (Freedom House).

• Bamar (Burmans) — about 68% (estimate), more than 35 million people. They live in the central plain, speak Burmese and are largely Buddhist. Almost all army and political leaders come from among them. The name "Burma" comes from them.
• Shan — about 9% (estimate), almost 5 million. They live on the eastern plateau, bordering China, Laos and Thailand; Shan State, the largest in the country, was home in 2014 to 11.3% of the population, about 5.8 million people (census). They are linguistic relatives of the Thais and Buddhist. This is where the opium "Golden Triangle" lies and where several armed groups operate.
• Karen — about 7% (estimate), more than 3.5 million. They live in the south-east, on the Thai border, and partly in the delta plain; Karen (Kayin) State had 1.57 million inhabitants in 2014 (census). Many are Christians, converted by missionaries in colonial times. Their armed organisation, the KNU, has fought the central government since 1949: it is one of the longest-running insurgencies in the world.
• Rakhine (Arakanese) — about 4% (estimate), about 2 million. They live on the west coast, on the Bay of Bengal, and are Buddhist. Until 1784 they had an independent kingdom, Arakan, later conquered by the Burmans. Today their army, the Arakan Army, controls almost all of Rakhine State (see "Who's who").
• Rohingya — Muslims of northern Rakhine, on the border with Bangladesh. The 1982 citizenship law does not include them among the recognised peoples, so they are stateless; the government calls them "Bengalis", meaning illegal immigrants. In the camps in Bangladesh UNHCR counts about 1.2 million (Daily Observer, on UNHCR data); in Rakhine, according to Human Rights Watch, about 630,000 remained in 2024 (HRW). They have fled in waves: in 1978, in 1991-92 (HRW) and in 2017, the worst. This is the case before the ICJ.
• Chinese of Myanmar — about 3% (estimate). Communities that arrived mostly in colonial times, today very present in trade. Not to be confused with the Kokang (see below).
• Indians of Myanmar — about 2% (estimate). They arrived in colonial times as officials, traders and workers; many were expelled after the 1962 coup.
• Mon — about 2% (estimate); Mon State was home in 2014 to 4% of the population (census). They live in the south, around Mawlamyine, and are Buddhist. Theirs is an ancient civilisation that helped bring Buddhism to the region; their kingdom fell in 1757, conquered by the Burmans.
• Kachin — no reliable estimate. Kachin State, in the far north on the border with China, was home in 2014 to 3.3% of the population, about 1.7 million people (census), not all of them Kachin. Most are Christians. Their land holds the great jade mines of Hpakant and the mines that produce about half of the world's heavy rare earths (Reuters, via Mining.com). Their army is called the KIA.
• Chin — no reliable estimate. Chin State, in the western mountains on the border with India, was home in 2014 to 0.9% of the population, fewer than half a million people (census). Most are Christians and they are among the poorest in the country; many have fled to India.
• Karenni (Kayah) — no reliable estimate. Kayah State, in the east, is the smallest: 286,738 inhabitants in 2014 (census). In 1875 an agreement between the British and the Burmese king recognised the independence of the Karenni states, which is why the Karenni claim never to have been part of Burma.
• Wa — no reliable estimate. They live in the north-east, on the Chinese border. They have the largest non-state army in the country, the UWSA, closely tied to China, and a de facto autonomous region.
• Kokang — no reliable estimate. They are ethnically Chinese and speak Mandarin; they live in northern Shan State. Their armed group, the MNDAA, played a key role in the 2023 offensive.
• Ta'ang (Palaung) — no reliable estimate. They live in northern Shan State, are Buddhist and grow tea. Their armed group is the TNLA.

Religion (2014 census, data published in 2016): about 88% Buddhist, 6% Christian, 4% Muslim. The census did not count most of the Rohingya, so the real Muslim share is higher.

Resources: jade, rubies, gold, rare earths, natural gas, oil, timber, tin. Myanmar is also the world's main known source of illicit opium: in 2025 cultivation rose to 53,100 hectares, its highest level in ten years, according to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, UNODC (Anadolu).

A short history

Before colonisation. For centuries different kingdoms rose and fell in the region: Burman, Mon, Shan, Arakanese. The first great Burman kingdom, Pagan, emerged in the 11th century. In the 18th century the Burman Konbaung dynasty conquered the Mon (1757) and Arakan (1784) and pushed as far as Assam and Manipur, in India. That is where it clashed with the British Empire.

British colonisation (1824-1948). The British conquered the country in three wars, between 1824 and 1885, and ran it as a province of British India until 1937 (CIA). Two colonial choices still weigh today:

• Two Burmas. The plain, "Burma proper", was ruled directly; the minorities' mountains were administered separately, through local chiefs. The two parts grew apart.
• An army without Bamar. Colonial troops were recruited mainly among the Karen, Kachin and Chin, many of them converted to Christianity, while the Bamar were almost excluded. For Burmese nationalists, the minorities thus became "the soldiers of the British".

Because Burma was a province of India, hundreds of thousands of workers and traders also arrived from the rest of the empire, including Muslims from Bengal into Arakan. At the time this was internal movement; today the government treats it as illegal immigration (HRW). It is one of the roots of the dispute over the Rohingya (see "Where the conflict comes from").

War and independence (1942-1948). In 1942 Japan invaded Burma. The young nationalist Aung San, father of Aung San Suu Kyi, first fought alongside the Japanese and then, in 1945, went over to the Allies. Many Karen instead stayed loyal to the British, and there were massacres between the two sides. In February 1947, at Panglong, Aung San signed an agreement for a federal union with Shan, Kachin and Chin leaders. In July he was assassinated. Independence came on 4 January 1948, but Panglong's federal promise was not kept: within a year the Karen, the communists and other groups took up arms.

The military in power (1962-2011). In 1962 General Ne Win seized power in a coup and ruled for 26 years with an isolationist military regime, the "Burmese Way to Socialism". In 1988 a popular uprising was crushed in blood; Aung San Suu Kyi emerged. In 1990 her party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), won the elections, but the military refused to recognise them. Under that junta she spent a total of 15 years under house arrest (Daily Mirror, from Reuters). In 2007 the monks' "Saffron Revolution" was crushed. In 2008 the military pushed through a Constitution that reserves a quarter of parliamentary seats for them, and therefore the power to block any amendment, together with the ministries of Defence, Home Affairs and Border Affairs.

The civilian interlude (2011-2021). From 2011 a government led by former officers opened up the economy and politics. In 2015 the NLD won the elections and Aung San Suu Kyi became de facto head of government, but the army kept control of security. In August 2017, after attacks by a Rohingya armed group (ARSA) on police posts, the army launched "clearance operations" in northern Rakhine: more than 700,000 Rohingya fled to Bangladesh. In 2019 Aung San Suu Kyi defended her country before the ICJ, and her international standing collapsed.

The coup and the civil war (since 2021). On 1 February 2021, after another NLD victory, commander Min Aung Hlaing seized power. Peaceful protests were crushed; many young Bamar fled to minority areas and took up arms. For the first time Bamar and minorities fought on the same side. In October 2023 three armed groups (the Kokang, the Ta'ang and the Arakan Army) launched "Operation 1027" and took dozens of towns. In 2024-25 the army lost most of the borders. On 28 March 2025 a magnitude 7.7 earthquake struck the centre of the country, near Mandalay: the official toll is 3,768 dead (ReliefWeb).

The elections and the presidency (2025-2026). Between December 2025 and January 2026 the junta held elections without the NLD, which it had dissolved in 2023, and without voting in many war zones. The military's party, the USDP, won by a landslide. On 3 April 2026 the new Parliament elected Min Aung Hlaing president, with 429 votes out of 584; command of the army passed to General Ye Win Oo, a former intelligence chief (Al Jazeera; CNBC). On 30 April the junta announced that Aung San Suu Kyi would serve the rest of her sentence under house arrest. Her son says he has no proof she is alive, and no one has been able to verify it (Il Post; Daily Ittefaq, from the BBC).

Who governs, and how

Formally, Myanmar today is a presidential republic with an elected Parliament. In practice power remains with the military: the president is the former head of the junta, a quarter of the seats are reserved for the army by the Constitution, and the pro-military bloc holds almost 90% of the seats, according to India's public broadcaster (All India Radio). Of the 30 ministers in the new government, 28 are serving or retired generals, lawmakers of the military's party or members of the previous junta (same source).

Two independent institutes, from two different countries, reach the same conclusion:

• Freedom House (United States), 2026 report: 4 points out of 100, "not free". The score fell from 7 in 2025 because the junta's laws prevented a genuine opposition from standing and some minority voters could not vote (Freedom House).
• V-Dem (Sweden), 2026 report: "closed autocracy", the category of regimes in which people do not freely elect those who govern (V-Dem). What distinguishes an autocracy from a democracy is explained in our entry Autocracy.

Western governments and many observers criticised the elections as not free (CNBC). China, by contrast, promptly congratulated the new president (Al Jazeera).

Who's who

Where the conflict comes from

We use the four levels of our piece Are the world's wars "Muslim"?.

The ground: a country drawn by others. Myanmar's borders are the ones drawn by the British, who joined into a single state kingdoms and peoples that had never had a common government. The border mountains, rich in jade, timber and opium, have always been hard to control, and whoever controls the resources can pay for an army. After independence no government managed to build the federal state promised at Panglong.

This does not absolve later governments. The colonisers left the ground, but the choice to govern through the army, to deny the minorities autonomy and to strip the Rohingya of citizenship was made in Rangoon and Naypyidaw, after 1948.

The spark: the 2021 coup. The border wars had been going on for seventy years. The coup turned them into a national war, because for the first time the Bamar of the plain rebelled too.

The flag: Buddhist-Burman nationalism. The junta presents its war as a defence of national unity and of Buddhism. The most extreme case is that of the Rohingya. For the junta and for many Burmese they are Bengali immigrants who arrived in colonial times; the Rohingya answer that they have lived in Arakan for centuries. The historical sources partly support both: Muslim traders were present on the Arakan coast from the 8th century, and in the 15th century Arakan's Buddhist kings had Muslim officials at court; then, under British rule, strong immigration from Bengal followed (HRW). Neither story justifies denying citizenship to people born in the country.

The external multiplier: weapons, protection and business. A war of this length cannot be fought without supplies. The next section documents who sells weapons, who buys resources and who protects the junta at the UN.

Who profits

We document declared or verifiable interests, not motives. When an actor denies, we say so.

The junta and its conglomerates. The armed forces control two large business groups, MEHL and MEC, active in mining, banking and construction. The United States and the United Kingdom sanctioned them in March and April 2021, Canada already in 2007 (Gibson Dunn), and the European Union on 19 April 2021 (GlobalSecurity, from an EU statement). For the military, the war is also the defence of a fortune.

China is the junta's main ally. Its documented interests:

• energy: a gas pipeline (operating since 2013) and an oil pipeline (since 2017) run from Made Island, off Kyaukphyu in Rakhine, to Yunnan in China (GlobalSecurity). They allow part of the oil bound for China to avoid the Strait of Malacca;
• the port of Kyaukphyu, part of the Belt and Road: in April 2026 Beijing congratulated Min Aung Hlaing, promising "high-quality" cooperation on exactly these projects (Al Jazeera). The Arakan Army is fighting a few kilometres from the port;
• rare earths: in 2025 Myanmar supplied about 53% of China's rare-earth imports, according to S&P Global as cited by Geopolitical Monitor (Geopolitical Monitor). The mines are in KIA areas; the KIA took control of them in October 2024. According to Reuters, China threatened to stop buying unless the KIA gave up its assault on the town of Bhamo; China's foreign ministry replied that it was not aware of the details (Reuters, via Mining.com);
• jade: the mines of Hpakant, in Kachin State, supply China every year with jade worth billions of dollars (Crisis Group).

China, however, talks to all sides, and when needed it also puts pressure on the rebels. In November 2024, according to The Irrawaddy, it held the Kokang leader, Peng Daxun, in Kunming to persuade him to leave Lashio; Beijing said he was in China for medical treatment (The Irrawaddy). In April 2025 the city returned to the army, with Chinese observers present at the handover (RFA).

Russia is the main arms supplier. According to the UN special rapporteur Tom Andrews, between February 2021 and December 2022 the junta imported weapons and materials worth at least one billion dollars: 406 million from Russian entities, including the state agency Rosoboronexport (Su-30 and MiG-29 fighters); 267 million from China; 254 million from entities based in Singapore; 51 million from India; 28 million from Thailand (The Irrawaddy; UN). Andrews specifies that he has no evidence that the governments of Singapore and Thailand approved those transfers, unlike Russia, China and, to a lesser extent, India. Special rapporteurs are independent experts and do not speak for the UN.

India built the port of Sittwe, in Rakhine, as part of the Kaladan project, a trade route towards its north-eastern states. Since 2024 the port has been idle because of the fighting, and the route crosses areas controlled by the Arakan Army (BNI). India is also seeking access to Kachin rare earths: according to Reuters, in 2024 it sent officials of a state-owned company to KIA areas (Reuters, via Mining.com).

Thailand buys much of Myanmar's gas: about 70% of the gas from the Yadana field goes to the Thai company PTT (Oil & Gas Journal). It also hosts hundreds of thousands of refugees and workers from Myanmar.

The United States and Europe. They have sanctioned the junta and its conglomerates. In January 2022 France's TotalEnergies and America's Chevron announced their withdrawal from the Yadana field, citing worsening human rights (same source). According to Geopolitical Monitor, the Trump administration has received proposals to gain access to Myanmar's rare earths, including by dealing with the junta or the KIA (Geopolitical Monitor): an interest to watch. For symmetry: the West has given Myanmar far less attention and far less aid than other crises. The UN humanitarian plan for 2026 aims to help 4.9 million people, 27% fewer than the year before, for lack of funds (OCHA); more than 16 million people need help (OCHA, July 2026).

The armed groups. The militias too are financed by resources: taxes on the trade route to China (at least 40 toll gates and checkpoints, ISP-Myanmar), jade, gold in Sagaing and rare earths. Along the borders online scam centres have grown, run by local clans linked to pro-government militias. China has begun to prosecute them: in January 2026 it executed 11 members of the Ming family, which ran scam centres in the Kokang region (CNN, via ABC17).

Who intervenes from outside

• ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations). On 24 April 2021 ASEAN leaders and the junta agreed on a "five-point consensus": an immediate end to violence, dialogue among all parties, an ASEAN special envoy, humanitarian aid, and a visit by the envoy to meet all parties (Malay Mail). The junta did not implement it and was excluded from summits. Since the elections Min Aung Hlaing has been trying to return; the 2026 Philippine chairmanship has asked that the ASEAN envoy be allowed to meet Aung San Suu Kyi (Newcastle Herald, from AAP).
• UN. In December 2022 the Security Council adopted resolution 2669, the first on Myanmar according to the British representative: 12 votes in favour, none against, with China, Russia and India abstaining. It calls for an end to violence, the release of political detainees, including Aung San Suu Kyi, humanitarian access and the safe return of the Rohingya (UN). The Secretary-General's special envoy is Julie Bishop (The Star, from AFP). An independent UN investigative mechanism (IIMM) collects evidence for trials.
• Bangladesh. It hosts about 1.2 million Rohingya in the camps of Cox's Bazar and on the island of Bhasan Char. Since December 2024 another 150,000 have arrived (Daily Observer, on UNHCR data).

The human cost. According to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP), a Burmese organisation close to the opposition that counts only verified cases, the junta and allied militias have killed at least 8,211 people since the coup, as of 28 July 2026 (AAPP); more than 22,000 people are detained for political reasons (AAPP). The count does not include fighters or the victims of other armed groups. Internally displaced people number almost 3.8 million, the highest figure ever recorded in the country (UNICEF).

International law

The treaties. According to treaty databases (HRL Minnesota; Guide to humanitarian law), Myanmar:

• has been a party to the Genocide Convention since 1956, with a reservation to Article VIII, which concerns recourse to UN organs;
• has been a party to the Geneva Conventions since 1992, but not to their Additional Protocols;
• is not a party to the Rome Statute, that is, to the International Criminal Court;
• has not signed the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

The ICJ case (The Gambia v. Myanmar). On 11 November 2019 The Gambia, mandated by the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), accused Myanmar of violating the Genocide Convention against the Rohingya. The stages:

• 23 January 2020: provisional measures, that is, the Court's unanimous order to Myanmar to protect the Rohingya;
• 22 July 2022: the Court rejects Myanmar's objections, including the one claiming that the real applicant was the OIC and not The Gambia, and declares itself competent (ICJ);
• eleven states intervene to explain how the Convention should be read: Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the Maldives, Slovenia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Belgium and Ireland;
• 12-29 January 2026: hearings on the merits (ICJ);
• judgment: as of 22 October 2026 the Court has not announced the date.

The ICJ judges states, not people: a conviction would send no one to prison, but it would oblige Myanmar to make reparation and to punish those responsible. What the Court must decide, and what it can order, we explain in The Rohingya verdict that has not come.

**The International Criminal Court.** Myanmar is not a member, but Bangladesh is. The judges have ruled that the ICC can try crimes begun in Myanmar and completed in Bangladesh, such as deportation (FIDH). On 27 November 2024 the prosecutor requested an arrest warrant for Min Aung Hlaing for the deportation and persecution of the Rohingya in 2017 (UN Geneva). As of 22 October 2026 the judges have not yet decided, a delay that several organisations and jurists consider unusual (CSW; Opinio Juris). The Court has stated that his new office as president gives him no immunity (DVB). The case is on our ICC Fugitives page.

Universal jurisdiction. In February 2025 an Argentine federal court issued international arrest warrants for Min Aung Hlaing and others, for genocide and crimes against humanity (DVB). Universal jurisdiction allows a state to try the gravest crimes wherever they are committed.

Other parties' responsibilities. International law does not concern the junta alone:

• the Arakan Army is accused by Human Rights Watch of killings and arson against the Rohingya in 2024 (HRW); armed groups are bound by humanitarian law just as states are;
• according to the UN special rapporteur, Russian arms transfers after the coup violate international humanitarian law (Bangkok Post): the Geneva Conventions (common Article 1) oblige states not to help those who violate them.

Timeline

Change log

• 22 October 2026: first version.

Sources: The Irrawaddy · UN Myanmar · CIA · UNFPA · Freedom House · Daily Observer, on UNHCR data · HRW · HRW · Reuters, via Mining.com · Anadolu · Daily Mirror, from Reuters · ReliefWeb · Al Jazeera · CNBC · Il Post · Daily Ittefaq, from the BBC · All India Radio · Freedom House · V-Dem · ISP-Myanmar · The Irrawaddy · Moemaka, 27/9/2026 · Jamestown · ISP-Myanmar · BNI, 11/8/2026 · ISP-Myanmar · ISP-Myanmar · RFA · Crisis Group · ISP-Myanmar · The Irrawaddy, 6/4/2026 · RFA · Gibson Dunn · GlobalSecurity, from an EU statement · GlobalSecurity · Geopolitical Monitor · The Irrawaddy · The Irrawaddy · UN · BNI · Oil & Gas Journal · OCHA · OCHA, July 2026 · CNN, via ABC17 · Malay Mail · Newcastle Herald, from AAP · UN · The Star, from AFP · AAPP · AAPP · UNICEF · HRL Minnesota · Guide to humanitarian law · ICJ · ICJ · FIDH · UN Geneva · CSW · Opinio Juris · DVB · Bangkok Post

Related pieces: The Rohingya verdict that has not come: what the Court must decide, and what is left for those who wait · The International Court of Justice deliberates on the Rohingya genocide · Are the world's wars "Muslim"? What the data say, and what the causes are

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