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ANALYSIS
The bill for rearmament: who pays, and under what rules
8 November 2026 — Europe
Series “Peace and rearmament” · 2 of 4
In brief
- At the NATO summit in The Hague (June 2025) the allies committed to spending 5% of GDP by 2035: at least 3.5% on defence proper, up to 1.5% on critical infrastructure, networks and civil protection.
- The figure was requested by Washington, which then threatened tariffs against the only government that held back, Spain's. The EU-US trade deal of July 2025 puts 15% tariffs and purchases of American weapons in the same package; according to the US ambassador to NATO, about half of the allies' new commitments concern weapons made in the United States.
- The European Union has created fast tools for defence: 150 billion in loans (SAFE), approved in about ten weeks through an emergency procedure that excludes the European Parliament; a derogation from the Stability Pact that allows a larger deficit, but only for defence (and, since June 2026, for part of energy spending); a 2028-2034 budget proposal that multiplies funds for defence and space by five.
- The same derogations do not exist for healthcare, education, justice or diplomacy. The share of the EU budget for conflict prevention has fallen, and a proposal under discussion would cut the instrument that funds it twice as much as the rest.
- Who has already paid: development aid in the United Kingdom and Belgium, civilian infrastructure in the United Kingdom, a public holiday in Denmark. In Italy the Parliamentary Budget Office warns that once the derogation ends, from 2029 the accounts get more complicated; the government says welfare will not be touched.
- Whether spending is "too much" depends on a comparison the numbers do not settle: measured in dollars, Europe spends almost three times as much as Russia; measured in purchasing power, the gap narrows sharply. The NATO declaration ties the 3.5% to the Alliance's capability targets, which are classified: no citizen can check whether the figure matches the needs.
The number that will decide European military spending over the next ten years was born in a negotiation. 5% of GDP is the figure demanded by the Trump administration and accepted by the allies in The Hague, split into two items to make it bearable. NATO says the first item serves to meet its capability targets; those targets, however, are not public. So, in the debate, European governments do not explain what is needed: they explain how they will reach the percentage. This Analysis follows the money: where it comes from, which rules were changed to find it, and who risks losing it.
The facts
The commitment. On 25 June 2025 the 32 allies signed a declaration committing them to spend by 2035 at least 3.5% of GDP on "core defence requirements" and up to 1.5% on protecting critical infrastructure, defending networks, and ensuring civil preparedness and resilience (LaPresse). The second item is less defined than the first, and we will come back to this.
The European tools. In March 2025 the Commission presented the ReArm Europe plan, later renamed Readiness 2030, aiming to mobilise more than 800 billion (European Commission). The first pillar, SAFE, offers up to 150 billion in loans for joint arms purchases (EU Council). The second is a derogation from budget rules, discussed below. In its proposal for the 2028-2034 budget the Commission foresees 131 billion for defence and space, five times more than today (Commission, via FastForward).
Actual spending. According to the Swedish institute SIPRI, in 2025 the 29 European members of NATO spent 559 billion dollars, and 22 of them exceeded 2% of GDP. Russia spent 190 billion, 7.5% of its GDP; Ukraine 84 billion, 40% of its own (SIPRI).
Where the 5% comes from
The pressure. The figure was requested by Washington, and accompanied by trade threats. In The Hague the only government that rejected the target was Spain's, which signed the declaration but committed to 2.1%, arguing that this was enough to meet the capabilities required by the Alliance without compromising social spending (La Notizia). The US president replied at a press conference that he would make Spain pay "twice as much" in the tariff deal (Sky TG24); in October he suggested expelling it from NATO (Open); at the Ankara summit, in July 2026, he said he no longer wanted to do business with Spain and asked his Treasury Secretary to "cut" (AFP, via Kuwait Times). On the eve of the same summit the administration did not rule out sanctions for allies lagging behind, tariffs included (Washington Examiner).
Weapons and trade in the same package. A month after The Hague, on 27 July 2025, the trade deal between the United States and the EU set 15% tariffs on most European goods and placed, next to energy purchases, the European intention to buy large quantities of American weapons (Al Jazeera). According to the US ambassador to NATO, of the roughly 139 billion dollars in new commitments made by the allies after The Hague, about half concerns equipment, weapons and ammunition produced in the United States (Washington Examiner).
Not only Washington. It would be wrong, however, to tell the story of European rearmament as an order carried out. The ReArm Europe plan was presented in March 2025, three months before The Hague, partly out of fear that the United States would no longer defend Europe. Poland and the Baltic states had been calling for more spending for years, and the Estonian prime minister said that everyone, Spain included, should reach 5% (Euronews). American pressure set the figure and the timetable; fear of Russia, and of the United States, did the rest.
A rule for weapons, none for services
The derogation. The Stability Pact limits the growth of public spending in EU countries. On 19 March 2025 the Commission established that Russia's invasion of Ukraine is an "exceptional circumstance" that allows the national escape clause to be activated, and invited states to use it in a coordinated way (Osservatorio CPI). In practice a state can spend up to 1.5% of GDP more, for four years, without breaching the Pact, provided the money goes to defence (Italpress). By February 2026 seventeen states had been authorised (Eunews). On 8 October the Commission gave the green light to Italy too, for defence and, since this year, for part of its energy spending (Il Post).
What is missing. A similar derogation for healthcare, education, justice or the maintenance of civilian infrastructure does not exist. A government wanting to hire doctors or rebuild schools with the same deficit granted for weapons would break the rules. This is not an accusation: it is the text of the rules. The consequence, however, is that for the same need, military spending is the easiest to finance.
The procedure. The timing differs too. SAFE was proposed on 19 March 2025 and adopted on 27 May. To move fast the Commission chose Article 122 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, an emergency clause that leaves the European Parliament out of the decision. Parliament asked the Court of Justice to annul the regulation, challenging not its content but its method (La Notizia); the case is pending.
Who has already paid
Development aid. In February 2025 the United Kingdom decided to bring defence to 2.5% of GDP by 2027, financing the increase by cutting development aid from 0.5% to 0.3% of GDP; the responsible minister resigned (LaPresse). Belgium cut its aid budget by 25% (Brussels Times).
Civilian infrastructure. In the plan presented on 30 June 2026, the British government also financed the defence increase by cutting civilian infrastructure projects, from roads to energy (laRegione).
Work. In 2023 Denmark abolished a religious holiday, Store Bededag, to raise about 400 million euros a year for defence; three Danes in four were against it (Il Post; Italian Chamber of Commerce in Denmark).
Conflict prevention. In the EU budget the share devoted to peacebuilding and conflict prevention has fallen since 2021 from 3.7% to 2.6% (FIIA). For 2028-2034 a proposal by the Irish presidency would cut the instrument that also funds peacebuilding, Global Europe, by almost 16%, twice the average cut (IRC).
The Italian case. Here there are no cuts yet, and the debate is open. In mid-October the prime minister said that defence funds "are not money taken from healthcare or schools". On 12 October, at a hearing, the Parliamentary Budget Office had explained that the derogation increases the deficit but does not create permanent spending room, and that from 2029, once the clause closes, the picture gets more complicated: a large part of the allocations concerns personnel and multi-year programmes that do not stop with the derogation. The Office asked the government to state already in the budget law how defence and energy will be financed after 2028 (Teleborsa; Il Fatto Quotidiano). In other words: today we pay with debt, tomorrow someone will have to pay the debt.
The labelling trick
The 1.5% item is broad: infrastructure protection, networks, civil preparedness, innovation, industrial base. This is where some governments try to fit in spending already decided. In July 2025 the Italian government considered counting the bridge over the Strait of Messina, about 13.5 billion, and the new breakwater of the port of Genoa as infrastructure of military value (Il Post; Il Fatto Quotidiano). The US ambassador to NATO replied that the bridge has no military value; the transport ministry responded that the project is financed with state funds and not with defence funds (Il Post; Open).
The label can be used in two directions. You can call a civilian project "defence" to reach the percentage without spending more; or you can pass off as "civil security" spending that is in fact military. Either way the citizen no longer knows what he is paying for. L'Espresso wrote as much about Italy: for years defence spending has been judged by accounting targets, not strategic ones (L'Espresso).
Too much, or enough?
This is the hardest question, and the numbers do not settle it. Measured in dollars at market exchange rates, spending by NATO's European members is almost triple Russia's. Measured at purchasing power parity, that is, taking into account that in Russia a soldier or a shell costs much less, the gap shrinks almost to nothing, and some argue that Russia spends more than all of Europe combined (Money.it; IISS, via Startmag). The two measures answer different questions, and whoever quotes only one has already chosen the conclusion.
What is missing, in any case, is the intermediate step in public form. NATO's capability targets, to which the Hague declaration ties the 3.5%, are classified (LaPresse). Secrecy about exactly what is lacking has understandable military reasons; but without at least a public version, no Parliament can judge whether the figure is right. The 5% is a spending target, not a result target. You can reach it by buying the wrong things, or miss it and have what you need.
Legal commentary
The EU budget and weapons. The Treaty on European Union prohibits financing from the common budget operations with military or defence implications (Article 41(2)). This is why the common European part of military aid to Ukraine goes through the European Peace Facility, which sits off-budget and is paid by the states, and why SAFE takes the form of loans. These are legitimate solutions, but they reduce the control of the European Parliament, which has co-decision powers over the ordinary budget.
Article 122. The clause is designed for severe difficulties in the supply of certain products or for exceptional circumstances. It was used for the pandemic and for the energy crisis. Using it for a long-term loan programme is the choice Parliament is challenging before the Court. If the Court upholds it, Article 122 will become the ordinary route for urgent decisions, and the definition of "urgent" will be given by the government of the day.
The derogation from the Pact. The national escape clause (Article 26 of EU Regulation 2024/1263) requires exceptional circumstances outside the state's control and spending that does not endanger debt sustainability in the medium term. The war in Ukraine can be an exceptional circumstance. A spending commitment running to 2035, with personnel and programmes lasting decades, is harder to fit into the word "temporary".
Symmetry test
The opposing argument. Some argue that defence and welfare are not alternatives but complements: without security Europe attracts less investment, grows less and in the end cannot pay for the welfare state. Lorenzo Bini Smaghi is among those who make this case, noting that the Nordic countries, with the strongest welfare states, are also those that have increased military spending most (IEP Bocconi). It is a serious argument. But it holds only if growth really comes, and it does not say who pays in the meantime.
The threat is real. Russia has attacked a European country, spends 7.5% of GDP on defence, and Danish intelligence believes it could be ready for a large-scale war against Europe within five years (same IISS source). Those who criticise rearmament must say what they propose instead: it is not enough to say it costs too much.
The same yardstick for the accounts. If we denounce "creative accounting" when a government calls a bridge defence, we must also denounce it when a government calls weapons spending infrastructure, or when critics of rearmament set side by side figures that measure different things.
Our judgment
This section expresses the site's position. It is separate from the facts set out above.
The problem is not that Europe defends itself. It is that the rules have been changed in one direction only. For weapons, the deficit is allowed, the procedure is shortened, Parliament is bypassed, the labels are widened. For schools, healthcare, justice and diplomacy the old rules apply, and in some cases deeper cuts. For the same need, the spending with the most convenient rules always wins.
Rearmament decided this way is disproportionate not because the threat is invented, but because the figure comes before the needs, and the costs are pushed forward, onto budgets that will have to repay the debt once the derogation is over. And it is dangerous because every euro spent without a plan is a euro that buys no security, and every year spent rearming without a diplomatic channel makes more likely the very war it claims to want to avoid.
What can be done
The proposals that follow are also the basis of a manifesto and a petition on this site.
- A social clause. No increase in defence spending financed by cuts to healthcare, education, justice and civilian infrastructure. If a larger deficit is allowed for weapons, the same rule must protect essential services.
- Needs first, then the number. Every government should present to Parliament a public version of the missing capabilities and their costs, and justify spending on that basis, not on a percentage of GDP.
- Honest labels. Separate, verifiable accounts for defence proper and for civil security. No civilian project counted as defence, no military spending hidden among infrastructure.
- Parliament decides. No emergency procedures such as Article 122 for long-term programmes.
- Parity for diplomacy. Conflict prevention is not cut more than the rest of the budget, and the EU equips itself with an envoy with a mandate for negotiations on Ukraine.
- We decide. Defence spending is set on European needs, not under the threat of tariffs, and is not tied to trade deals. Purchases are chosen for what they are needed for, not for the flag of whoever makes them: neither to please Washington nor to favour European industry.
Those who want to act have some real levers: the national Parliament, which votes on the budget and gives direction to the government in the Council; petitions to the European Parliament (Article 227 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU); the vote.
What to watch
- The Court of Justice ruling on the European Parliament's challenge to SAFE.
- Negotiations on the 2028-2034 EU budget: funds for defence and for Global Europe.
- National budget laws for 2027: where the funding for defence is found.
- The Council's decision on the escape clause for Italy, expected by November.
- The national plans the allies must submit to NATO every year, and what they count in them.
Sources: LaPresse · European Commission · EU Council · Commission, via FastForward · SIPRI · La Notizia · Sky TG24 · Open · AFP, via Kuwait Times · Washington Examiner · Al Jazeera · Euronews · Osservatorio CPI · Italpress · Eunews · Il Post · La Notizia · LaPresse · Brussels Times · laRegione · Il Post · Italian Chamber of Commerce in Denmark · FIIA · IRC · Teleborsa · Il Fatto Quotidiano · Il Post · Il Fatto Quotidiano · Il Post · Open · L'Espresso · Money.it · IISS, via Startmag · IEP Bocconi
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