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Freezers at 50 degrees: who attacked Europe's supermarkets, and what we really know
8 November 2026 — Europe
Series “Peace and rearmament” · 1 of 4
In brief
- On the night of 1 to 2 November cyberattacks tampered with the refrigeration systems of supermarkets in at least eleven European countries, Italy included. In many cases freezers were pushed to 50 degrees. Tonnes of food were thrown away.
- It repeated an attack carried out in France on 12 October. In both cases the target was remote-control software, partly outdated and exposed online without adequate protection.
- On 4 November two pro-Russian groups, NoName057(16) and Z-Pentest, claimed the attacks on Telegram. The messages were later deleted and nobody has verified them independently.
- In 2025 the United States and Denmark had already pointed to links between these groups and the Russian state; according to the American indictment, Z-Pentest is another name for a group directed by Russian military intelligence. For the attacks on the fridges, however, no authority has published evidence of state direction. The Kremlin denies it.
- Under international law the difference is decisive: a state is responsible for what its organs do, or those acting under its control, not for what sympathisers do. But it also has a duty not to let its territory be used to harm others.
A supermarket fridge is an ordinary object. It becomes less ordinary when you discover that, to make it go haywire, you do not need to enter the shop: you only need to find online the panel that controls it. On the night of 2 November someone did this in hundreds of stores, from Dublin to Bucharest. Who did it is the question on which, within a few days, an entire political reading was built. This piece tries to separate what we know from what is being said.
The facts
France, 12 October. The first attack in this series hit several hundred French supermarkets. Police counted about 700 refrigeration units tampered with, in chains such as Intermarché, Coopérative U, Carrefour, Leclerc and Monoprix, with damage above 130,000 euros (GreenMe). The attackers had exploited old versions of Danfoss software for remote monitoring of the systems (Informat.ro). According to an expert quoted by CNN, more than 1,700 installations of that software were visible online before the attack (QN).
Europe, 2 November. Three weeks later the same technique was repeated on a continental scale. The attackers switched the evaporators of fridges and freezers into defrost mode, pushing temperatures up to 50 degrees (Teleborsa; Cybernews). At least eleven countries were hit (Euronews); other sources count twelve, including Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, Estonia, Ireland, Germany, Romania and Portugal (RetailDetail). In Ireland the SuperValu chain pulled products from 13 stores; in Belgium Carrefour spoke of about 15 outlets out of 700 (Cybernews; TweakTown).
Italy. Attacks were recorded in Sicily, at least three stores in Catania and one in Palermo, as well as in Tuscany and Emilia-Romagna, where the National Cybersecurity Agency identified one against a frozen-food company (Open). On 3 November the government convened the Agency and the heads of the intelligence services at Palazzo Chigi; the final statement spoke of a limited impact on the distribution chain (ItaliaOggi).
The investigations. In Belgium prosecutors opened a criminal investigation (Al Jazeera). The European Commission convened agencies and national authorities, but did not attribute the attacks to any state or group (Informat.ro). Agriculture Commissioner Christophe Hansen called them a deliberate attempt to hit the food supply chain (Informat.ro).
Who did it: three levels not to confuse
1. The claim. On 4 November NoName057(16) and Z-Pentest jointly claimed the attacks, with a video and some Telegram messages that were later deleted. NoName057(16) also reportedly published a sample of more than 2,500 lines with usernames and passwords of Danfoss employees and customers. Nobody has verified it. A researcher quoted by Cybernews doubts that the groups actually breached the systems, rather than taking credit after the media had named them as suspects (Cybernews). According to Agenda Digitale, the statement contains no exclusive technical data that only the perpetrators could know (Agenda Digitale).
2. The groups' links to Moscow. Here there is evidence, but it concerns the past. On 9 December 2025 the US Department of Justice brought charges describing the Russian government's support for NoName057(16) and for another group, Cyber Army of Russia Reborn, which according to the indictment also uses the name Z-Pentest and was founded, funded and directed by Russian military intelligence, the GRU (Kyiv Independent). A few days later Denmark attributed to Z-Pentest a 2024 attack on a water treatment plant. According to the security firm Forescout, since the start of 2026 Russia-based groups have claimed at least 20 attacks on refrigeration systems (Pillitteri, summarising the DOJ, the Danish government and Forescout). The suspicion, then, does not come from nowhere.
3. Direction by the Russian state. This is the unproven part. For the attacks on the fridges no authority has published evidence of state direction (same source). The Kremlin called the accusations "absurd" (AFP, via Macau Business). A Belgian expert said he was "95% sure" it was Russian sabotage (RetailDetail): that is a professional assessment, not proof.
The jump from the first level to the third is the one public debate made fastest. In Italy, for example, the government spoke of a Russian lead on 3 November, before any claim of responsibility (Pillitteri).
The weak spot
Whoever the perpetrator, the door was open. According to security experts, about 13,000 refrigeration systems in Europe still run on outdated software with known vulnerabilities (dev.ua). Until this wave, nobody had thought these systems needed high-level cyber defences (QN). The countermeasures set out by the French agency CERT-FR are simple: take the systems off direct internet access, change default passwords, update the firmware, and reopen access only through a VPN (Pillitteri). On 4 November in France an attack of the same kind against the cold rooms of three blood storage centres was foiled (Liga.net).
Legal commentary
When an attack belongs to a state. Under international law a state is responsible for the actions of its organs and of persons or groups acting on its instructions, or under its direction or control (articles 4 and 8 of the International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility, 2001). In Nicaragua v. United States (1986) the International Court of Justice required "effective control" over the specific operations (ICJ). General support, or political sympathy, is not enough.
The duty of vigilance. There is, however, a second obligation. As early as 1949, in the Corfu Channel case, the Court held that no state may knowingly allow its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other states (ICJ). If groups known to a country's authorities repeatedly hit another country's infrastructure, the state from which they operate has a duty to stop them, even if it does not direct them.
What kind of violation. Remotely damaging another country's civilian installations, with economic losses but without deaths or destruction comparable to military action, hardly reaches the threshold of an "armed attack" that allows self-defence (Article 51 of the UN Charter). It is closer to a violation of sovereignty or of the prohibition of intervention. The permitted responses are therefore of another kind: investigations, diplomatic measures, sanctions. Since 2019 the EU has had a specific sanctions regime for cyberattacks.
Symmetry test
The same yardstick for evidence. If we demand public proof before attributing an attack to Moscow, the same demand applies to cyberattacks the press attributes to Western states, such as the Stuxnet virus against Iranian centrifuges, which the United States and Israel have never officially acknowledged.
The same night. In the same hours as the attacks on the fridges, the air-raid alert apps of Ukraine and Russia showed false nuclear alerts. Kyiv blamed Moscow; the Russian app had been hit too, and nobody claimed it (TweakTown). Cyber warfare does not have a single author.
The same yardstick for prevention. Those who ask Moscow to stop the groups operating from its territory must ask European operators to close the doors they leave open. The two responsibilities do not exclude each other.
Our judgment
This section expresses the site's position. It is separate from the facts set out above.
The suspicion towards pro-Russian groups is well founded: they have a record, they boasted, and two Western governments have documented their links with the Russian state. But a well-founded suspicion is not proof, and the difference matters precisely because the political consequences are large. Authorities that speak of "hybrid war" should publish what they know, as Denmark did for the water plant.
In the meantime there is something that can be done without waiting for any attribution: update the software and take exposed panels off the network. It costs little, and it is the defence that would have prevented freezers at 50 degrees.
What to watch
- The investigations by Belgian prosecutors and national authorities: whether anyone publishes technical evidence about the perpetrator.
- Whether the Commission or the Council formally attributes the attacks, and whether they use the cyber sanctions regime.
- Verification of the sample of Danfoss credentials published by NoName057(16).
- New attacks against the cold rooms of hospitals, transfusion centres and food warehouses.
- The numbers: how many of the exposed systems are secured.
Sources: GreenMe · Informat.ro · QN · Teleborsa · Cybernews · Euronews · RetailDetail · TweakTown · Open · ItaliaOggi · Al Jazeera · Informat.ro · Cybernews · Agenda Digitale · Kyiv Independent · Pillitteri, summarising the DOJ, the Danish government and Forescout · AFP, via Macau Business · dev.ua · Liga.net · ICJ · ICJ
Related pieces: The bill for rearmament: who pays, and under what rules · Rearmament is a dish best served cold · Hybrid war, hidden evidence: escalation on two tracks · Anatomy of an alarm: Russian drones, an anonymous source and two stories without proof