ANALYSIS
Libya: a deal to vote within two years, as militias shoot it out around the refinery
14 October 2026 — Libya
In brief
- On August 30, at the UN mission's headquarters in Tripoli, representatives of Libya's two camps signed an agreement: presidential and legislative elections within 24 months, under a single government.
- The House of Representatives in Benghazi has approved it; the heads of the High Council of State and of the Presidential Council in Tripoli contest it.
- In Zawiya, home to the country's main refinery, armed groups attached to ministries of the Tripoli government clashed in May (at least 13 dead) and in August. Between August 8 and 12, drones struck fuel tanks, a desalination plant and an electricity substation.
- Tripoli government sources, quoted by the Guardian, link the drone attacks to Saddam Haftar, Khalifa's son. There is no public evidence and no response from his camp has been reported.
- The UN mission's mandate expires on October 31: the Security Council must renew it this month.
The background
Since 2014 Libya has had two centres of power. In the west, Abdul Hamid Dbeibah's Government of National Unity, recognised by the UN, together with the High Council of State. In the east, the House of Representatives in Benghazi and General Khalifa Haftar's Libyan National Army, which controls most of the oil fields and terminals. The elections planned for December 2021 were postponed indefinitely and have never been rescheduled (Security Council Report, October 2026).
This year UN mediation has produced two results: in April the first unified budget in more than ten years, and in August an electoral agreement (Al Jazeera, 8/7/2026). On the ground, however, the violence has not stopped.
Who is who
| Institution or force | Led by | Position on the Tripoli agreement |
|---|---|---|
| Tripoli · Government of National Unity, recognised by the UN | Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, prime minister | Signed through two of its delegates |
| Tripoli · Presidential Council, collective head of state | Mohamed al-Menfi | Critical: questions the transparency of the talks and the role of foreigners |
| Tripoli · High Council of State, second chamber | Mohamed Takala | Opposed: stayed away from the signing and on September 22 rejected the outcome together with other parties |
| Benghazi · House of Representatives, the parliament elected in 2014 | Aguila Saleh, speaker | In favour: approved on September 14 |
| Benghazi · Libyan National Army | Khalifa Haftar, commander; his son Saddam, deputy commander | Signed through two of its delegates |
Then there are the Zawiya militias, formally serving the Tripoli government: Mohamed Bahroun's Anti-Security Threats Agency (attached to the prime minister's office), Othman al-Lahab's 103rd Infantry Brigade (defence ministry), Muhannad al-Suwaisi's judicial security (justice ministry) and Mohamed Kashlaf's Petroleum Facilities Guard (ACLED; Libya Crimes Watch).
And the outside actors. The UN mediates through its mission, led by envoy Hanna Tetteh. The United States is working on a plan of its own through Massad Boulos and Secretary of State Marco Rubio. Turkey, Tripoli's long-standing backer, has extended military cooperation to Saddam Haftar; Qatar and France have received or met Haftar (Al Jazeera, 1/9/2026). Russia and the United Arab Emirates have been documented for years on Haftar's side. Italy hosted in Rome, in April, the first meeting of the small negotiating table that later wrote the agreement (Security Council Report).
The facts
The Tripoli agreement. On August 30 eight delegates, two for the Tripoli government, two for Haftar's command, two for the House of Representatives and two for the High Council of State, signed a seven-article text (UNSMIL, text of the agreement). The agreement reconstitutes the leadership of the electoral commission, revises the voting laws and sets presidential and legislative elections within 24 months, "under a single executive authority". The new rules allow military personnel to run for president, with neutrality safeguards, as well as dual nationals, provided they renounce their other citizenship before taking the oath. According to Al Jazeera, both Haftars are believed to hold US citizenship: the rule seems written with them in mind too. If the two chambers do not approve it within a month, the parties will seek the Security Council's endorsement. On September 8 the Council welcomed the agreement as "an important step" towards free elections (Italpress, 9/9/2026).
Who approves and who does not. On September 14 Aguila Saleh's House of Representatives approved it in Benghazi. Mohamed Takala, who leads the High Council of State, and Mohamed al-Menfi, who leads the Presidential Council, contest it: they argue that key institutions were left out of the talks, which were in practice conducted by Dbeibah's government and Haftar's command (Libyan Express, 21/9/2026). On September 22 the High Council and some parties rejected the outcome of the talks, demanding that it not override the constitutional declaration or the powers of the institutions (Xinhua, 22/9/2026). The rejection comes from the High Council even though two of the signatories are its members.
Zawiya. Forty-seven kilometres from Tripoli stands Libya's largest operating refinery. In 2026 the monitoring group ACLED counted more than 30 armed clashes in the city, linked to territorial control and fuel smuggling (ACLED, 12/8/2026). On May 8 fighting between rival groups killed at least 13 people, civilians included (UNSMIL, briefing of 18/6/2026). On August 4 new clashes in Zawiya and Surman killed three civilians and injured four, including two children and a migrant. The groups involved, according to the NGO Libya Crimes Watch, formally report to the defence ministry, the justice ministry and the prime minister's office of the Tripoli government (Libya Crimes Watch).
The drones. Between August 8 and 11 at least five drone attacks hit Zawiya: a naphtha tank, a desalination plant, a tank holding about 4.5 million litres of petrol, then two diesel tanks at the refinery. On August 12 an electricity substation was hit, causing a blackout south of the city. No one has claimed the attacks (ACLED; The New Arab, 7/9/2026). On September 6 Dbeibah's government announced the arrest of five people, Libyan and foreign, without identifying them or presenting evidence. On October 3 the Guardian reported that, according to sources in the same government, three of those arrested belong to a Libyan National Army brigade and were working for Saddam Haftar. The allegations have not been independently verified and no response from Haftar's camp has been reported (The New Arab, 4/10/2026).
The oil. On September 21 an armed group closed a valve on the pipeline that carries crude from the Sharara field to Zawiya, cutting production. On September 26 the UN mission warned that anyone who attacks or obstructs energy infrastructure may face Security Council measures under resolution 2213 of 2015 (Libya Herald, 26/9/2026).
The American plan. In parallel, Donald Trump's envoy for Africa, Massad Boulos, is working on a deal to unify the institutions. According to leaked and unconfirmed details, Saddam Haftar would become president and Dbeibah would remain prime minister. The United States would encourage its companies to invest in the oil fields (Al Jazeera, 8/7/2026). On September 22 Boulos rejected the charge that he wants to hand the country to two families: "It's going to be an absolute partnership" (Semafor, 22/9/2026). Russia and China, in the Council, insist instead on a Libyan-led process.
Legal commentary
The agreement. It is a political understanding between Libyan parties, not a treaty. Its strength depends on the approval of the two chambers, and that is where it has stalled. Article 5 provides, failing that, for recourse to the Security Council: an outside endorsement when the institutions at home cannot agree.
Who answers for the clashes. In Zawiya it is not a government fighting its enemies, but armed groups wearing the insignia of ministries of the same government. Under the rules on State responsibility drawn up by the UN International Law Commission (article 4), the conduct of State organs is attributable to the State. The Tripoli government cannot present those clashes as the doings of militias foreign to it. International humanitarian law, including customary law, protects civilians and objects indispensable to their survival, such as a desalination plant. The UN mission has called for prompt and credible investigations into civilian casualties.
The International Criminal Court. In May 2025 Libya accepted the Court's jurisdiction over crimes committed from 2011 to 2027. In July this year the Court confirmed 17 charges against Khaled El Hishri, a former official of Mitiga prison in Tripoli, for torture, rape and killings of detainees: it is the first Libyan case to go to trial. Eight suspects are still at large, in the east and the west (Human Rights Watch, 16/7/2026). Among the wanted was Osama Almasri, arrested in Italy in January 2025 and sent back to Libya two days later. The 2011 arms embargo remains in force, violated by both sides, as we documented in July.
Symmetry test
- Tripoli. The deaths in Zawiya were caused by groups formally serving the government recognised by the UN. The same government blames "external entities" without public evidence.
- Benghazi. The accusation against Saddam Haftar comes from his opponent's sources and is not proven. Haftar's camp controls most of the oil and would be among the beneficiaries of the American plan.
- The outsiders. Washington is negotiating a deal between families with an eye on the oil fields. Russia and China call for a Libyan-led process, but Chinese and Turkish weapons have been documented at Haftar's bases, alongside Russian and Emirati support (we reported on it in July). Italy sent a suspect wanted by the Court back home.
What worked. April's unified budget, the first in more than ten years; the agreement on the electoral commission; the International Criminal Court's first trial over a Libyan prison.
Our assessment
This section expresses the site's position. It is separate from the facts set out above.
Libya today has two roads out of division, and they lead in different directions. The Tripoli agreement aims for the ballot box: imperfect, contested, but built on written rules and with a deadline. The American plan aims for a pact among those already in charge, with oil as the glue. The second may arrive sooner; the first is the only one that gives the choice back to Libyans.
But neither road says what to do about the weapons. In Zawiya, groups paid by the State are fighting each other, and no one answers for the drones. As long as the guns stay with those who hold them, an election risks being just another negotiation between militias with a date on the calendar. The renewal of the UN mandate is the moment to say so: a political mission without a disarmament plan can accompany an agreement, not guarantee it.
What to watch
- The renewal of the UN mission's mandate by October 31 and Hanna Tetteh's briefing to the Security Council.
- The High Council of State's formal approval or rejection, and any recourse to the Security Council.
- The investigation into the drone attacks and the evidence the Tripoli government has promised.
- The fate of the Boulos plan after the accusations against Saddam Haftar.
- The start date of El Hishri's trial.
Sources: Security Council Report, October 2026 · Al Jazeera, 8/7/2026 · ACLED · Libya Crimes Watch · Al Jazeera, 1/9/2026 · UNSMIL, text of the agreement · Italpress, 9/9/2026 · Libyan Express, 21/9/2026 · Xinhua, 22/9/2026 · UNSMIL, briefing of 18/6/2026 · The New Arab, 7/9/2026 · The New Arab, 4/10/2026 · Libya Herald, 26/9/2026 · Semafor, 22/9/2026 · Human Rights Watch, 16/7/2026
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