ANALYSIS

The Appeal That Fell Flat: Trump, the ICC, and the Weight of What Goes Unrecognized

September 2026

Series “The Court under siege” · 4 of 6

The facts

On September 22, 2026, addressing the UN General Assembly, Donald Trump called the International Criminal Court a "rogue", "out of control" institution, adding that its officials are "an evil group of people". He called on every member state to resign immediately, and reiterated that Washington will never allow American service members or other citizens to face "show trials" by an "anti-American tribunal" with no jurisdiction over the United States. He did not name Israel or Netanyahu.

The outcome, per Reuters, is measurable: across the whole General Assembly, only one country took up the call. Naoero — the small Pacific island nation formerly known as Nauru — announced, through President David Adeang, its withdrawal from the Rome Statute, citing the Court's "increasing irrelevance". A senior State Department official for East Asian and Pacific Affairs hailed the move on X as a defense of sovereignty against the ICC's "illegitimate overreach".

Other interests at stake

The appeal did not come out of nowhere. Under the executive order Trump signed in February 2025, the US has already sanctioned more than a dozen ICC judges and prosecutors; in August 2026 the list extended to the Court's president, Japan's Tomoko Akane. In July, Secretary of State Marco Rubio had promised a campaign to dismantle the Court "brick by brick". Since then, Venezuela and Chad have announced their withdrawal from the Statute, following Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger the year before.

The escalation, reported by the Wall Street Journal and picked up by Reuters, lies in the target: sanctions so far have hit individual officials; now they would target the Court as an institution, with the stated aim of cutting it off from much of the dollar-based financial system after a six-to-seven-month grace period. No final decision had been made as of the first reports, but US officials told reporters an announcement could come as soon as during the General Assembly or shortly after.

The motive is partly declared by Trump himself, who on other occasions has tied the campaign to protecting Netanyahu, who in 2024 — along with then-Defense Minister Yoav Gallant and a Hamas commander — received an ICC arrest warrant for war crimes in Gaza, where more than 73,000 people have been killed according to Palestinian health authorities. Washington also wants the Court's older investigation into US troops in Afghanistan closed.

In the hall, the pushback came from several directions. Dutch Prime Minister Rob Jetten, whose country hosts the Court, said the ICC is "under attack" and urged the international community to protect global legal institutions, drawing loud applause. Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi reaffirmed Japan's support for the Court in her own address. The EU, through High Representative Kaja Kallas, said it is considering a blocking statute against any US sanctions. Germany's human rights commissioner, Lars Castellucci, pushed back on Trump's appeal, saying "the most serious crimes must not go unpunished".

Legal commentary

Washington's legal argument deserves to be stated precisely, because it is the one point where its position has a technical basis: the US holds that the Court has no jurisdiction over citizens of states that have not ratified the Rome Statute. The Statute's answer is Art. 12(2)(a): ICC jurisdiction is territorial, not nationality-based. The Court can try crimes committed on the territory of a state party, whoever commits them. Both Palestine and Afghanistan are states parties. The real dispute, then, is not whether jurisdiction exists in the abstract, but whether a non-party state can shield its own nationals — or those of a non-party ally, in Israel's case — from a territorial jurisdiction that belongs to others.

On the duration of its acts, Art. 29 of the Statute provides that crimes within the Court's jurisdiction are not subject to any statute of limitations. A warrant does not lapse when the administration contesting it changes, nor when the wanted person's state refuses to recognize it. Even a withdrawal from the Statute is not immediate: under Art. 127, it takes effect one year after notification — a rule that applies to Naoero too.

Implications — the symmetry test

The first friction concerns declared irrelevance and mobilized sanctions. Naoero justified its withdrawal by citing the Court's "increasing irrelevance", and Washington applauded the choice as a defense of sovereignty. At the same moment, the administration is preparing the heaviest sanctions ever aimed at an international tribunal against that same Court — so heavy that the Court's presidency and registry have warned that even routine operations could be affected, including buying IT and insurance services or paying dozens of American staff. The US Treasury is not mobilized against a truly irrelevant institution: the campaign undercuts the very argument it applauds.

The second friction concerns intermittent jurisdiction. In March 2023, President Joe Biden called the ICC arrest warrant against Vladimir Putin "justified", while acknowledging that the US does not recognize the Court: "it's not recognized internationally by us either — but I think it makes a very strong point," he said. Back then it was Moscow branding the Court a "politically biased" body and "a puppet" of the West. Today Washington uses not dissimilar language against the same institution. ICC jurisdiction, for two successive US administrations, seems to matter when it hits others.

The third friction concerns what remains. Disowning a court is a political act, and lasts only as long as whoever makes the declaration. The Court's acts follow a different logic: they do not expire, and a withdrawal from the Statute only takes effect a year after notification. Biden's own words on Putin confirm this indirectly: the president of a state that does not recognize the ICC still acknowledged the weight of an act issued by that Court. Non-recognition changes where a wanted person can travel safely. It does not change what has been established, or what remains on the record.

New York, two days later

On September 25, Netanyahu addressed the General Assembly in a hall dozens of delegations had left as soon as he took the podium, amid jeers and cheers alike. He called them "moral cowards", inviting anyone still in the hall to leave. He attacked New York Mayor Zohran Mamdani — who had asked federal authorities to enforce the ICC arrest warrant — calling him "antisemitic" and telling him: "You tried to stop me from coming here. You tried to silence me. Well, you can't silence me." He dismissed the Gaza genocide allegations as "the biggest lie of the century".

Hours earlier, Palestinian President Abbas had addressed the Assembly only by video link: for the second year running, the State Department denied him a visa to enter the United States. Netanyahu, wanted by the ICC, was welcomed in person by the same country that denied entry to the leader of the Palestinian side. The US is not party to the Rome Statute and had no obligation to arrest him; the UN Headquarters Agreement guarantees access to heads of government regardless. But the asymmetry between who gets in and who is kept out is not explained by any rule. It is a choice.

Related pieces: Six months for the Court: Washington sanctions the entire ICC and opens a negotiation over its independence · A Mayor, an Arrest Warrant, and a Question No One Wants to Ask Seriously · Fifteen Years for One Warrant · Two Warrants, Zero Arrests · Niger Leaves the International Criminal Court

Sources: Reuters/US News — Trump's UN speech · The Federalist — full quotes and WSJ sanctions report · Reuters — only Naoero follows the appeal · Politiko — Jetten's statement · Al Jazeera — Netanyahu's speech · CBC — Abbas denied a visa · NPR — Netanyahu and Mamdani · Biden on the Putin warrant (March 2023) · Rome Statute — Arts. 12, 29, 127

Verification note: sanctions against the ICC as an institution were, at publication, reportedly prepared but not officially announced — per WSJ/Reuters, not confirmed by the State Department; phrased conditionally. The "more than a dozen" sanctioned officials and Tomoko Akane's designation rely on aggregated press reporting, with no consolidated official list found this session — to verify against the OFAC list once available.

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