NEWS
Two warrants, zero arrests
27 July 2026 — Hungary / Mongolia / Tajikistan / International Criminal Court
The context
A court can issue an arrest warrant. But if no one has the power to execute it, that warrant remains a piece of paper, however solemn. That is exactly what has happened twice in the past two years at the International Criminal Court: two heads of government under arrest warrant have visited, without consequence, states that were treaty-bound to arrest them. The first case concerns Russian President Vladimir Putin, the second Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The political circumstances could not be more different. The mechanism that makes them identical, however, is the same.
The warrant against Putin: Mongolia and Tajikistan
On 17 March 2023 the ICC issued an arrest warrant against Putin over the unlawful deportation of Ukrainian children. On 3 September 2024 Putin visited Mongolia, a Rome Statute member state since 2000, received with full state honours; no arrest was made. On 24 October 2024 ICC judges formally found Mongolia in non-compliance and referred the matter to the Assembly of States Parties; the finding was upheld on appeal. On 9 October 2025 the sequence repeated in Tajikistan: Putin was received in Dushanbe, and the Tajik government cited obligations toward Moscow under the Commonwealth of Independent States framework as justification for not acting; the ICC rejected the argument and formalised a second referral to the Assembly on 19 March 2026.
The warrant against Netanyahu: Hungary
On 21 November 2024 the ICC issued an arrest warrant against Netanyahu, together with then-Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, for war crimes and crimes against humanity in Gaza. From 3 to 6 April 2025 Netanyahu visited Hungary at the invitation of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who had publicly rejected the warrant in advance and guaranteed it would not be enforced; no arrest occurred. On 16 April 2025 the ICC opened proceedings under Article 87 of the Rome Statute, setting a response deadline of 23 May; on 13 June 2025 judges formalised the finding of Hungarian non-compliance. In the same week as the visit, Orbán announced Hungary's intention to leave the Court — the first EU member state to do so. A further Netanyahu trip to Hungary was announced for March 2026, close to Hungary's elections; on 12 April 2026 opposition candidate Péter Magyar won the election and stated that, unlike Orbán, he would have Netanyahu arrested and would keep Hungary in the Court — a sign that non-cooperation stemmed not from an institutional constraint on the country but from a political choice of the sitting government, reversible with a change of majority.
The declarations never put to the test
(Reported as political-climate context, not as a fact established by the Court: after the Netanyahu warrant was issued, Argentina, the Czech Republic, Romania and Poland publicly stated they would not arrest him if he visited, while Italy and France argued for immunity on the grounds that he is head of government of a non-ICC-member state. None of these six cases involves an actual visit followed by a Court finding of non-compliance, unlike the three cases above.)
The symmetry test
The pattern is identical in the two principal warrants: a head of government under ICC warrant, a member state hosting him without arrest, the Court's only response a referral to the Assembly of States Parties with no coercive power whatsoever. The test holds in both directions: had Moscow received the same de facto impunity granted to Jerusalem, or vice versa, the judgment would not change. It is worth noting that Hungary runs through both cases from opposite fronts in the same stretch of time — hosting Netanyahu without arresting him while, in the same months, beginning its exit from the Court just as Moscow remains under warrant there — which makes it hard to read the affair as bloc alignment, and more consistent to read it as the structural absence of an enforcement mechanism, independent of whichever flag the fugitive flies.
Legal comment
The problem is not that two states chose to protect an ally. It is that the Court has no coercive instrument of its own: it depends entirely on the voluntary cooperation of member states for every arrest, every surrender, every enforcement of a judgment. A referral to the Assembly of States Parties is not a sanction: it is the formal record of a non-compliance that no one has the power to end. This is not an occasional gap — it is the structural absence of a police force behind the Rome Statute, the same gap already flagged in relation to the Netanyahu-Mamdani case and reiterated in the Moscow-Khan case.
Fonti: Human Rights Watch, "Tajikistan: Arrest Putin" (8 October 2025) · Courthouse News, "ICC calls out Tajikistan..." (7 May 2026) · Human Rights Watch, "Hungary: Arrest Netanyahu if He Visits" (20 March 2026) · Common Dreams, "ICC Demands Hungary Explain..." (16 April 2025) · Al Jazeera (20 April 2026) · ICC, official record ICC-01/22 (19 March 2026)