Anatomy

1/2 · ANALYSIS · 27 September 2026

Anatomy of an alarm: Russian drones, an anonymous source and two stories without proof

The facts

On the morning of 24 September a Spanish newspaper reported that Russia was preparing a drone attack against Italy, France or Spain, launched from merchant ships in the Mediterranean. Within hours the story had spread across Europe, and by evening two of the three governments named had denied it. The next day another newspaper, in Italy, used it as proof of the opposite: not Russia, but a NATO ally was supposedly fabricating false alarms to drag us into war.

This piece does not set out to decide who is right about Moscow. It tries to do something simpler and rarer: to set what is documented next to what is not, and to apply the same yardstick to two opposite narratives.

On 24 September 2026 El Mundo, in an article by Xavier Colás, wrote that US intelligence had allegedly shared with some European governments a warning about a possible Russian drone operation against Spain, France or Italy. According to the paper, a CIA report had circulated among European foreign ministries in August, shortly after CIA Director John Ratcliffe's surprise visit to Moscow on 25 August. The trip is documented; what was discussed has not been made public.

The scenario described is precise: Gerbera drones about two metres long, with a range of up to 600 kilometres and 4-5 kilos of explosive, hidden in containers on commercial ships and launched 200-300 kilometres off the coast — not to destroy, but to shut down a port or an airport for a few hours. Two sources are cited: anonymous sources linked to the Lithuanian Ministry of Defence, and “several defence analysts” who say they know of the report. No document has been shown.

How governments responded

In Italy, Defence Minister Guido Crosetto wrote the same day that the alarm “helps no one and has no confirmation whatsoever”, urging people not to pour “more fuel on the fire”. On 25 September he was blunter: “It doesn't exist, we have no knowledge of it, and neither do the other governments mentioned.” Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani said there was “no confirmation” and that Italians should not fear Russian military attacks.

In France, on the evening of 24 September, live on TF1 and France 2, President Emmanuel Macron said “we can deny this information”: the CIA had not informed France. In the same interview, however, he called the situation “worrying” and said it was credible that France could suffer an attack like the one in Leipzig, discussed below.

The Spanish Ministry of Defence, contacted by Euronews, did not comment. There are no public statements from either the CIA or the Lithuanian government. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte said the Russian threat “exists and is long-term” and asked Europeans to stay calm.

In short: nobody has shown the report cited, and two of the three governments named as recipients say they never received it.

The context: what is documented

The alarm did not come out of nowhere. In the preceding weeks there had been real incidents in Europe, and very different ones.

Leipzig, 4 August 2026. On the evening of 4 August, at Leipzig-Halle airport, a drone was found near a Ukrainian cargo aircraft carrying, according to Germany's Federal Prosecutor, “professional explosives and a detonator”. The device did not explode. A cargo plane forced to abort its landing struck an object in flight, presumably a second drone. There were no casualties. On 6 August the Federal Prosecutor took over the investigation, describing a “serious attack” on transport infrastructure, without naming suspects or states.

On 1 September Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt and Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul formally attributed the attack to Russia. According to Dobrindt, “taken together, police investigations, the patterns of the offences and intelligence findings establish Russian responsibility”. It is worth separating, however, what in this attribution is public and what is not.

The description of the device is public. Dobrindt said the drone's configuration, components, explosive and triggering technique match known Russian operations, and pointed to the high technical level and the use of “low-level agents” to shield those behind them as typical features. These are indications of method, not direct proof of who gave the order.

Other elements have circulated only in the press, from anonymous sources. A US intelligence source told ABC News on 26 August that the explosive and the drone's structure were “typical” of the GRU, Russian military intelligence. ZDF reported two suspects with links to Russia, now at large. German media wrote about DNA traces allegedly leading to a 2024 attack at the same airport, without official confirmation.

The decisive part remains classified: the intelligence findings cited by the government, the identity of the person believed to be linked to Russian services, the investigation files. Security sources told ARD that “not everything can be made public while the network behind the attempt is still active”. No arrest has been confirmed. Moscow rejects everything: Russia's foreign intelligence service accused Berlin of drawing conclusions “without even waiting for the preliminary results of the investigation”, and Putin spoke of fabricated evidence.

The attack, then, is proven. Russian responsibility is asserted by a government that states its basis, but that basis is not public and cannot today be verified from outside. There may be a legitimate reason of investigative confidentiality; the fact remains that, for now, the public has to trust it. We had already written this on this site at the time, in an opinion piece on 2 September.

Lithuania, 15 September 2026. Italian fighter jets from NATO's air policing mission, based at Šiauliai, shot down a drone that had entered Lithuanian airspace from Belarus near the Kruonis hydroelectric plant. Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda said it was most likely a Russian Gerbera “intended for Ukraine”, diverted by Ukrainian electronic warfare. No damage was reported.

In Leipzig there is a real device, a target linked to Ukraine and a formal attribution based on largely classified evidence. In Lithuania there is an airspace violation that the Lithuanian president himself attributes to a course deviation caused by Kyiv, not to a deliberate attack.

The symmetry test: two stories, one yardstick

The alarmist story

The first story says: Russia is preparing an attack from the sea against Southern Europe, and the CIA has warned us. It rests on a real context of hybrid attacks and on some anonymous sources. It lacks the document, an identifiable source and confirmation from any of the governments involved; indeed, Rome and Paris deny having received the information. Its weak point is presenting as a “CIA alert” what, in the article's own words, is what an anonymous Lithuanian source says about a report nobody has seen. Many European headlines dropped the conditional.

The opposite story

The second story is Marco Travaglio's editorial in Il Fatto Quotidiano of 25 September, «“Ibrido” sarà lei», whose full text can be read on the paper's website. Here we set out all of its arguments, in the order in which they appear, with a check for each.

1. Everyone wages hybrid war. Travaglio defines it as an attack “without leaving fingerprints” and notes that it is practised by the United States, NATO, the European Union, Israel and Ukraine on one side, and China, Russia and Iran on the other. This is correct as a principle, and it is the same principle behind this site's symmetry test.

2. A TV series explains things better than the media. He cites the third season of Lioness, in which the CIA first suspects Moscow and then two allies, Ukraine and Israel. It is a rhetorical device: fiction can illustrate a hypothesis, not prove it.

3. The media present hybrid war as a Russian exclusive while waging it themselves on behalf of “friends”. This is a judgement on the information system, not backed by documented cases.

4. Every border incursion becomes a Putin “hybrid attack”, even when it comes from Ukraine and causes no deaths, injuries or damage. This is partly well founded: the Lithuanian case is precisely an incursion that the Lithuanian president attributes to an error caused by Kyiv. But the generalisation overlooks Leipzig, where the absence of casualties is due to a device that failed to explode, not to the absence of an attack.

5. “Putin is testing our defences” makes no sense, because he already knows them. This is debatable: according to a widely held reading, such probes serve not to find out where the defences are, but to measure reaction times, coordination among allies and political response. That too, however, remains an interpretation rather than an established fact, as we noted about Leipzig.

6. Hysteria makes us ridiculous or strengthens Putin. Travaglio lists Ukrainian missiles mistaken for Russian ones, flocks of birds taken for drones, flight delays read as sabotage. The episodes are not referenced in the text and would need to be checked one by one. The underlying argument — that alarmism inflates the adversary — matches the conclusion of this piece.

7. Three motives. Propping up discredited governments by justifying “censorship, annulled elections and parties outlawed”; getting hundreds of billions in military spending accepted; having an alibi to sabotage negotiations on Ukraine. These are asserted as facts, without sources. “Annulled elections” almost certainly refers to Romania: on 6 December 2024 the Romanian Constitutional Court unanimously annulled the first round of the presidential election after documents of the Supreme Defence Council were declassified. It is a contested decision, but a reasoned one, not an arbitrary one. The other two motives are legitimate political arguments, not established facts.

8. The El Mundo case. There is “no trace” of the report; the story allegedly went from a Lithuanian minister to the paper “without anyone warning the three target countries”; Crosetto denies it, while Paris, Madrid and the European Union say nothing. In substance this is confirmed: the report has not been shown, and Rome and Paris say they did not receive it. There are two inaccuracies. El Mundo refers to anonymous sources in the Lithuanian ministry, not to a minister. And Paris did not stay silent: Macron issued a denial on television on the evening of the 24th, probably after the editorial was written. Madrid, indeed, did not comment.

9. The conclusion. “Lithuania, like Ukraine, launches false hybrid alarms to wage hybrid war”, that is, to drag into war allies that have no interest in fighting Russia. This is where the argument does not hold. It moves from “an anonymous source close to the Lithuanian ministry spoke to a newspaper” to “Lithuania, as a state, is conducting a deliberate operation”. An anonymous source is not a government, and unconfirmed information is not an intentional provocation. For this conclusion the text offers no proof at all.

On the El Mundo story, then, Travaglio's scepticism is borne out by the facts. The problem is what he does with it: he asks the media for proof that he does not then provide for his own thesis.

What they have in common

The two stories perform the same operation: they take unverified information and turn it into confirmation of what their author already thought. The first derives from it an imminent Russian threat, the second an allied plot. Neither has, today, the evidence for the conclusion it draws.

Legal commentary

International law does not regulate what newspapers write. It does, however, address very precisely the question at the heart of this affair: when can an attack be said to be the work of a state?

Every state has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory: a customary principle, restated in Article 1 of the 1944 Chicago Convention. In its 1986 judgment in Nicaragua v. United States, the International Court of Justice held that unauthorised overflight directly infringes the sovereignty of the state overflown. The drone shot down over Lithuania is therefore an objective violation; establishing who is responsible, if the drone was diverted by a third party's electronic warfare, is another matter.

Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of another state. An explosive attack on an airport, if attributed to a state, at the very least violates territorial sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention; whether it also amounts to a “use of force” is debated among scholars.

The crux, in hybrid warfare, is attribution. Under Article 8 of the International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility (2001), the conduct of persons or groups is attributable to a state if they act on its instructions, or under its direction or control. That is exactly what has to be proven when intermediaries are used precisely so as to leave no fingerprints.

And the proof has to be solid. In the Corfu Channel case (1949) the International Court of Justice accepted indirect evidence only on condition that it leaves “no room for reasonable doubt”. In Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia (2007) it required, for charges of exceptional gravity against a state, evidence that is “fully conclusive”.

These standards apply to a court, not to a newspaper or a minister. But they indicate a measure, and that measure must be applied to everyone. On Leipzig, Germany has stated a basis, but the decisive part remains classified: today that attribution can be verified only in part, and will be fully verifiable only through a trial or the publication of the files. El Mundo's alarm and the “false Lithuanian alarm” thesis, by contrast, point to no verifiable basis at all.

Editorial judgement

Hybrid war thrives on ambiguity: its purpose is to confuse, and every unverified alarm does it a favour, whichever direction it goes. Those who amplify a threat they cannot prove spread fear and make the adversary look more powerful than it is. Those who dismiss everything as invention blind themselves to real attacks, like the one in Leipzig.

We are not asking for the public to be kept in the dark: the right of citizens to receive information, protected by Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, applies in crises too. We are asking for something else: that those who communicate, governments and newspapers alike, always say clearly what is established, what is suspected and what is unconfirmed. And that an accusation against a state come together with its basis, not before it.

There is also a political question, which we state as our own position. A climate of constant alarms makes diplomacy harder, and makes it more costly for any government to sit down at a table. We believe that Europe's security also depends on negotiation, and that negotiation needs verified facts, not fears. The tools to reduce ambiguity exist, from technical deconfliction channels to a shared attribution mechanism within the OSCE, as we wrote in July. None of the actors in this affair, on either side, should pursue their aims through ambiguity.

Sources: Il Fatto Quotidiano — the El Mundo story (24/9) · Euronews — El Mundo's sources, Rutte, Spanish Defence (24/9) · Il Sole 24 Ore — Crosetto (24/9) · Il Post — Crosetto (24/9) · Adnkronos — Crosetto and Tajani (25/9) · Sky TG24 — Macron on TF1 and France 2 (24/9) · Euronews — Macron · CNN — Ratcliffe in Moscow (25/8) · German Federal Prosecutor — statement of 6/8 · Al Jazeera — German attribution (1/9) · Stuttgarter Nachrichten — the evidence cited by the government · ABC News — US intelligence source (26/8) · ZDF — the two suspects · ComplexDiscovery — public and classified evidence · Euronews — the DNA trail (11/8) · LRT — Nausėda on the downed drone (16/9) · Il Fatto Quotidiano — Marco Travaglio's editorial (25/9) · Agenzia Nova — the Romanian Constitutional Court · ICJ — Nicaragua v. United States, 1986, §251 · ILC — Articles on State Responsibility, 2001 · ICJ — Corfu Channel, 1949 · ICJ — Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia, 2007, §209

Verification note: the CIA report cited by El Mundo has not been made public by any party; all information about its content comes from anonymous sources. The evidence supporting Germany's attribution of Leipzig is largely classified: what is reported here is what was public as of 27 September 2026. Travaglio's editorial is not reproduced in full for copyright reasons; quotations are brief and for the purpose of criticism.

2/2 · ANALYSIS · 28 September 2026

Anatomy of an interview: the American plan, Zelensky and a defeat presented as inevitable

The facts

On 28 September the Italian online daily Il Sussidiario published an interview by Paolo Rossetti with Gianandrea Gaiani, editor of Analisi Difesa, which we invite readers to read in full before this piece. The thesis is clear-cut: the United States has relaunched a peace plan that provides for the cession of the territories claimed by Russia, a demilitarised strip, Ukrainian neutrality and elections within one hundred days. Zelensky would reject it for fear of losing the vote; Europe would be keeping the war going with a «bombardment of fake news»; and for Kyiv the alternative would be between accepting a defeat, «not a rout», and risking that the front gives way and the Ukrainian state ceases to exist. Accepting the plan, he concludes, would allow Ukraine to be rebuilt «at our expense»: a bill we tried to calculate in our previous piece.

A few days ago we applied the standard of proof to an alarm pointing the opposite way: the announcement of a Russian drone attack against Italy, France or Spain, and the editorial that turned it into proof of an allied plot. Here we do the same thing, in the other direction. Not to establish who is right about the war, but to separate what is documented from what is not.

The central thesis: is the front about to give way?

It is the gravest claim in the interview, and the one everything else rests on: if Kyiv does not negotiate, the front may suddenly give way and the Russians «pour through».

The available data describe a different dynamic. According to monitoring by the Ukrainian organisation DeepState, reported by Harvard University's Russia Matters project, between September 2025 and September 2026 Russia gained about 2,170 square kilometres in total, less than 0.4% of Ukraine's territory. In the four weeks to 22 September the net gain was about 96 square kilometres according to DeepState, while the Institute for the Study of War records a roughly zero balance. Moscow today controls about 19% of Ukraine, including Crimea and the parts of Donbas occupied before 2022.

It is a slow and costly advance, not a front that is crumbling. That does not rule out a collapse: wars of attrition can break suddenly when units run empty, which is why the mobilisation data further below matter. But anyone who claims collapse is near should say what data it is based on. The interview does not.

The claims, one by one

The plan with elections within one hundred days. It exists, but it is not new. The Trump administration's 28-point plan, made public in November 2025, did provide for elections in Ukraine within one hundred days, a constitutional ban on joining NATO and a neutral buffer zone in the part of Donetsk now held by Kyiv, to be ceded de facto to Russia. That the plan was «relaunched» with CIA Director Ratcliffe's visit to Moscow on 25 August is an interpretation: the main American outlets gave different accounts of the purpose of that trip. And the strip «guarded by the UN» does not appear in the text of the plan reported by CBS.

The Moscow summit rejected by Zelensky. On 25 September Bloomberg wrote that Trump, at the 22 September meeting in New York, had suggested Zelensky go to Moscow to see Putin, and that Zelensky refused. The Ukrainian president's office denied it. The interview acknowledges this, but omits one point: according to Axios, after Ratcliffe's visit the Americans proposed a three-way summit again, an idea Zelensky had accepted in the past and Putin had rejected.

Parliament and president «fallen». The Rada's ordinary mandate expired in 2023 and the president's in May 2024, and elections are suspended under martial law. But saying they have «fallen» does not match Ukrainian law: the Constitution expressly extends parliament's powers until the first sitting of the new one (Art. 83) and provides that the president remains in office until his successor is sworn in (Art. 108). One can debate whether it is wise to vote in wartime; one cannot say the institutions have lapsed.

Zaluzhny would beat Zelensky. It depends on the poll. According to Sociopolis (16-21 September 2026), the two are tied at 19% in the first round, but Zaluzhny would win a runoff with 62% of valid votes. According to the International Republican Institute (late May to early June 2026), by contrast, Zelensky was ahead both in the first round (32% to 16%) and in a runoff (42% to 39%). The claim is supported by one recent survey, not by a consistent picture.

The «fake news» about drones from the Mediterranean. On one point the interview is right, and we documented it: the alarm about a Russian attack with drones launched from ships relied on anonymous sources and was denied by Rome and Paris. But a single unverified alarm does not show that the whole Russian threat is «a flood of inventions». The explosive drone attack at Leipzig airport on 4 August, formally attributed to Russia by the German government, is a fact established by the federal prosecutor, even if much of the evidence remains classified.

Baltic bills up 60-70%. The data do not support it. After disconnecting from the Russian grid on 8-9 February 2025, wholesale prices rose for a few days, but regulators attributed this mainly to the failure of the EstLink 2 cable to Finland, low renewable output and gas prices. The cost of the disconnection for an Estonian household was estimated by public broadcaster ERR at about 15 euros a year.

Tusk and 27,000 men a month. The figure exists, but it is reported inaccurately. Tusk did not say it at a private meeting but in a public speech to the Sejm on 17 September, citing Ukrainian sources. And it refers to 27,000 killed and wounded a month, not men lost for good. It is a grave record, but different from what the interview suggests.

«Total» draft evasion and half of conscripts deserting. The problem is real and large: according to Defence Minister Fedorov, in January about 200,000 soldiers were absent without leave, and in October 2025 more than 21,000 cases were registered in a single month. But we found no source for the claim that half of recruits desert before reaching their units, nor for «total» evasion. The prosecutor general's office stopped publishing the data in November 2025, which makes any precise figure unverifiable.

The «New York Times report» about Ukraine selling everything. We could not find it. What is documented is different: in 2026 Kyiv opened a controlled mechanism for arms exports, mainly drones, to partner countries, with blacklists and case-by-case authorisation. It is a debatable policy choice, not a sell-off of everything not «cemented to the ground».

Patriot deliveries delayed by 2-3 years. Broadly consistent with the available data. After the war against Iran, which began in February 2026, the United States warned several allies of delays, of up to five years in some cases, for systems including Patriot interceptors, in order to rebuild its own stocks.

Patriots with a success rate below 5%. This is a methodological error. The known figure, reported by the Financial Times, is the drop in the share of ballistic missiles intercepted by Ukraine from 37% to 6% within a month in 2025, after upgrades to Russian missiles. That percentage measures how many incoming missiles are shot down, not how many interceptors fired hit their target: when interceptors are short, many missiles are not even engaged. The interview's calculation, according to which only five of every hundred Patriots fired would hit and the rest would be money thrown away, mixes two different quantities.

Putin has «no reason» to attack Europe. Putin did say it, on 25 September. It is a statement by a party at war and should be treated as such: neither proof of good intentions nor proof of the opposite.

The political opinions. The judgement of a «two-speed» Europe, the positions attributed to Marine Le Pen and the AfD, the idea that the war is wearing down Europe above all: these are legitimate political assessments, not facts to be checked, and we do not treat them as such.

The sum the interview does not do

Before the invasion Ukraine's statistics office counted 41.1 million inhabitants, excluding Crimea. Today estimates range from 29 million by the Institute of Demography of the Academy of Sciences to 22-25 million cited by Social Policy Minister Uliutin. The gap between the two figures shows how uncertain the data are in a country at war with no census since 2001; but in either case the fall is a quarter or more.

Before the war there were about 9.3 million men aged 25 to 59, according to the World Bank. A model published in September 2025 by the Ukrainian organisation Intention, based on an analysis by Texty, estimates that once serving soldiers, those abroad, the exempt and those entitled to deferment are removed, the mobilisable reserve is between 2.8 and 4.9 million men. The authors themselves warn that the starting data are uncertain.

At the record rate cited by Tusk, 27,000 killed and wounded a month, that is about 324,000 a year. Divided by this rate, the reserve would last between 8 and 15 years. But the calculation is misleading. The front does not give way when the reserve runs out: it gives way when each month's losses exceed the men who can be mobilised. And here the numbers are close. Zelensky said in February that Ukraine mobilises 30,000-34,000 people a month; in August the head of his office, Kyrylo Budanov, said at least 30,000 are needed. With 27,000 killed and wounded a month, new arrivals barely replace losses, let alone rebuild reserves or rest those who have been fighting since 2022. In an online questionnaire by the Lobby X initiative, cited in the same study and filled in by volunteers rather than a representative sample, only 23% of participants said they were willing to serve under current conditions.

Then there is the cost that remains after the war. The men aged 25 to 60 whom the war consumes are those who would be needed for reconstruction. Ukraine's Ministry of Economy already estimated in 2024 that the recovery would be short of 4.5 million workers. About 5.2 million Ukrainian refugees live in Europe: according to UN projections, under a fragile peace up to 3 million would stay in the EU, and even with full victory 1.67 million would not return. To the dead must be added the wounded, 400,000 according to Kyiv, some of whom will remain disabled. Kyiv is already discussing opening the country to labour immigration.

Russia is also paying an enormous demographic price. CSIS estimates Russian losses at over 1.4 million killed and wounded; according to an analysis by the Carnegie Endowment, about 650,000 people, largely young professionals, left the country after the invasion, and fertility has fallen to 1.4 children per woman. But Russia starts from a population of about 144 million, five times Ukraine's today, and from a pool of military-age men estimated in early 2024 at 3.7 times Ukraine's. It mobilises more: according to Zelensky, about 10,000 men a month more than Ukraine. And it draws on foreigners: North Korea confirmed in April 2025 that it had sent troops to the Kursk region, and according to Ukrainian intelligence Moscow plans to recruit about 18,500 foreigners in 2026, mainly among migrants from Central Asia and Africa.

Legal commentary

At the heart of the interview is a proposal: Ukraine should accept the cession of territory in exchange for surviving as a state. It is a legitimate political assessment. But international law places limits on it that the interview does not mention.

The Charter of the United Nations prohibits the use of force against the territorial integrity of a state (Art. 2(4)), and from this prohibition flows the obligation of all states not to recognise as lawful the acquisition of territory by force: it is the basis of the non-recognition of Russia's conduct that this site advocates. The General Assembly affirmed it in general terms in 1970 and, for the four Ukrainian regions annexed by Russia, in resolution ES-11/4 of 12 October 2022, adopted with 143 votes in favour and 5 against. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties adds that a treaty concluded under the threat or use of force in violation of the Charter is void (Art. 52).

A peace agreement can freeze a front line, establish a ceasefire, postpone territorial questions: many wars have ended that way. The 28-point plan went further, asking the United States and others to recognise those territories as Russian «de facto». The distinction matters: the obligation of non-recognition forbids treating the conquest as lawful, while acknowledging who controls a territory is a grey area that jurists debate. But recognition, even only de facto, granted as the price of an aggression comes very close to what that obligation seeks to prevent.

As for elections in wartime, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights protects the right to vote (Art. 25) but allows states to suspend its exercise in a public emergency threatening the life of the nation (Art. 4); the right to vote is not among those that cannot be suspended. Ukraine's postponement is therefore compatible with its Constitution and with international law. It remains a political choice open to criticism, not an illegality.

The symmetry test

In the previous piece we asked those announcing a Russian attack to show the evidence, and those deducing an allied plot from it to do the same. Here the question is the same. When the interview reports a verifiable fact, such as the plan with elections within one hundred days or the Patriot delays, it does so substantially correctly. When a fact goes against its thesis, such as Kyiv's denial about Moscow or Zelensky's willingness to hold a three-way summit, it softens or omits it. When a fact serves to strengthen it, such as the 27,000 men, the Baltic bills or the 5% of Patriots, it amplifies it beyond what the source says.

It is the same pattern we criticised in the drone alarm, reversed: there, anonymous sources confirming the Russian threat were taken at face value; here, Putin's word is taken at face value and every contrary signal is dismissed as false.

The same yardstick applies to us. Many of the sources used here are Ukrainian, including estimates by Kyiv's intelligence, and we have labelled them as such. Where they existed, we preferred independent sources or sources from the countries concerned: the Estonian public broadcaster on energy prices, an American research centre for the frontline data, international institutes for demography.

Editorial judgement

Inside the interview there is a core that deserves to be taken seriously: time is not on Kyiv's side. Ukraine's negotiating position is weakening, losses are at record levels, air defences are short of interceptors, and the American delays will not be resolved before winter. And there is an argument stronger than any the interview uses, and which it does not use: every month of war takes from Ukraine a soldier today and a worker tomorrow, in a country that was already losing population. For Moscow the war is a drain; for Kyiv it risks becoming a haemorrhage. Those who support aid to Kyiv should confront these data instead of ignoring them.

But an argument that needs inflated data to stand up grows weaker precisely where it wants to be strongest. Above all, presenting the cession of territory as the only realistic path hides its legal price: rewarding an aggression with recognition of its conquests does not close a war, it makes the next one more profitable. A negotiated peace is necessary; the question is whether it must pass through the violation of the rules that should protect us all. On this, an interview that presents itself as realism says nothing.

Sources: Il Sussidiario — Gaiani (28/9/2026) · Russia Matters — War Report Card, DeepState/ISW (23/9/2026) · CBS News — 28-point plan (11/2025) · Kyiv Post — Bloomberg report denied (25/9/2026) · Axios — Ratcliffe (29/8/2026) · CFR — Ratcliffe's trip (8/2026) · Verfassungsblog — Art. 83, 108 · Interfax-Ukraine — Sociopolis (9/2026) · LIGA.net — IRI/Rating (6/2026) · Generalbundesanwalt (6/8/2026) · VoxUkraine — Baltic prices · ERR (2025) · EUobserver — Tusk (9/2026) · Ukranews — Tusk in the Sejm (9/2026) · Kyiv Independent — AWOL (2026) · Euronews — arms exports (1/7/2026) · Kyiv Post — US delivery delays (9/2026) · National Interest — FT data on interceptions · RTÉ — Putin (25/9/2026) · Meduza — Putin (26/9/2026) · OPORA — population 2022 · PRM — Libanova, Uliutin (5/2026) · Russia Matters — military-age men (1/2024) · Intention / Texty (3/9/2025) · RBC-Ukraine — Zelensky (27/2/2026) · Kyiv Independent — Budanov (28/8/2026) · Kyiv Post — 4.5 million workers · UA.NEWS — UN refugee projections · Mezha — labour migration · Politics Today — CSIS · Carnegie Endowment (26/9/2025) · Radio Free Asia — North Korea (28/4/2025) · Ukrainska Pravda — foreign recruits (28/4/2026) · UN — A/RES/ES-11/4 (12/10/2022)

Verification note: the interview is not reproduced in full for copyright reasons; quotations are short, for the purpose of criticism, and were checked against the original text. Frontline data are as of 22 September 2026. The calculation of how long the reserve would last is this site's, on the data cited.