IWILLNOTLOOKAWAY.ORG

GLOSSARY

The Sahel (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger): its peoples, its history, who is fighting and why

Updated 22 October 2026

The news from the Sahel talks about juntas, jihadists, Wagner and the Africa Corps, Kidal and blockades around Bamako, but rarely explains who the peoples involved are, why three countries threw out France and the UN, and why the war, instead of ending, has spread. This profile covers Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger together, the "central Sahel": three countries that share the same colonial history, are ruled by military juntas allied with one another and fight the same armed groups, across borders those groups ignore. It can be updated: every change is logged at the bottom, with date and source.

Land and peoples

The Sahel is the semi-arid belt south of the Sahara that crosses Africa from west to east. Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have no access to the sea. The north of Mali and Niger is desert; the south is savannah, where most people live. The Niger river crosses Mali and Niger and flows past Bamako, Timbuktu, Gao and Niamey. The heart of the war is Liptako-Gourma, the border zone between the three countries (CFR).

The population. According to UN estimates (World Population Prospects 2024, reported by Worldometer), in 2026 Niger has about 28.8 million inhabitants, Mali 25.9 million and Burkina Faso 24.6 million.

A warning about the numbers. None of the three countries publishes recent, reliable data on ethnic groups. The percentages below come from different estimates, from different years, and should be read as orders of magnitude; for many small peoples there is no reliable figure, and we say so.

Mali (estimates reported by Minority Rights Group, MRG):

• Bambara, Malinke and the other Mande peoples — almost half the population. Bambara is spoken by about 80% of Malians as a common language (MRG, cited above).
• Fulani (Peul) — 14.7%. Herders and livestock breeders. In central Mali they have been accused as a group of supporting the jihadists and targeted by militias from other peoples: in March 2019, in the village of Ogossagou, about 160 Fulani were killed (MRG, cited above).
• Senufo — 10.5% (MRG, cited above).
• Dogon — 8.9%. They live in the centre of the country, where Dogon militias and Fulani armed groups fight each other; in 2020 violence in central Mali killed at least 400 people (MRG, cited above).
• Tuareg — 7.7%. A Berber people of the Sahara, in the north, who speak Tamasheq. Since the 1990s Tuareg movements have demanded independence or autonomy for "Azawad", the north of the country (MRG, cited above).
• Bozo — 2.9%; Songhai — 1.6% (MRG, cited above).

Burkina Faso (2021 estimates reported by EBSCO):

• Mossi — 53.7%. The largest people, on the central plateau around Ouagadougou. Their roots go back to the 10th century, and before the French arrived they were the undisputed rulers of the region (EBSCO, cited above).
• Fulani (Peul) — 7.8%. They live mainly in the north and east, the areas hit hardest by the war. Together with the Tuareg they were pushed to the margins as the Mossi came to dominate the state (MRG); today they are the main victims of reprisals by the army and the militias, as in Solenzo in 2025 (see below).
• Gurunsi 5.9%, Dioula 5.7%, Gurma 5.2%, Bobo 3.4%, Bissa 3.3%, Senufo 2.2%, Lobi 1.5% (EBSCO, cited above). For the other peoples there are no reliable figures (MRG, cited above).

Niger (estimates reported by MRG, based on 2006 data):

• Hausa — 53.1%. They live in the south, along the border with Nigeria.
• Zarma-Songhai — 21.2%. They live in the west, around Niamey.
• Tuareg — about 11% (other estimates give 8.3%). In the desert north, where the uranium mines are. They rebelled in 1990 and again in 2007-2009, with the Niger Movement for Justice, which also demanded a share of uranium revenues (MRG, cited above).
• Fulani (Peul) — 6.5%; Kanuri — 5.9% (MRG, cited above).
• Descent-based slavery still exists in Niger, affecting mainly people of slave descent in Tuareg, Arab and Fulani communities: it has been a crime only since 2003 (MRG, cited above).

Religion: the great majority is Muslim: about 95% in Mali (MRG, cited above), 98% in Niger (MRG, cited above), 64% in Burkina Faso, where Catholics are 20% and Protestants 6% (EBSCO, cited above). In a region that is almost entirely Muslim, the victims of the jihadists are also overwhelmingly Muslim.

Resources and economy: farming and herding, gold, uranium. In 2023 Mali was Africa's second-largest gold producer: gold accounts for about three-quarters of exports and a quarter of state revenue (The East African). In Burkina Faso industry, mostly mining and mostly gold, accounts for about 30% of gross domestic product (EBSCO, cited above). Niger has uranium: the Somair mine, 63% owned by French capital, was taken over by the junta (The East African, cited above) in June 2025 (our analysis). Artisanal gold areas are also a source of income for the armed groups (Anadolu).

A short history

The empires. For centuries the Sahel was the region of trade across the Sahara, of gold and salt. In the 15th and 16th centuries the Songhai empire flourished there, one of the great trading states of West Africa, centred on the middle Niger, in today's Mali, and stretching into today's Niger and Nigeria (Britannica). Further south, on the plateau of today's Burkina Faso, the Mossi kingdoms remained independent until the French arrived (EBSCO, cited above).

The French colony (1895-1960). At the end of the 19th century France conquered the region and brought it into French West Africa, the grouping of colonies that existed from 1895 to 1958. Today's Mali was then called French Sudan; Upper Volta, the future Burkina Faso, was created as a colony in 1909, broken up among the neighbouring colonies in 1932 and re-established in 1947 (Britannica). In 1960 the three countries became independent (same source).

From independence to 2012. The three countries went through single parties, military regimes and democratic openings. In Burkina Faso, in 1983, Captain Thomas Sankara took power and in 1984 renamed the country "Burkina Faso", "land of upright people"; in 1987 he was assassinated, and his deputy Blaise Compaoré, "closely implicated", took power (MRG). Compaoré ruled for twenty-seven years, until the protests of October 2014 (EBSCO, cited above). In Mali and Niger the Tuareg rebelled several times, in the 1990s and the following decade (MRG, cited above).

The war in Mali (since 2012). In 2011 the collapse of the Libyan state spread weapons and fighters across the region. In 2012 the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) rebelled in northern Mali; a coup overthrew the government in Bamako; the jihadist groups pushed the Tuareg aside and took control of the north (CFR). In all, the rebels came to control about two-thirds of the country (MRG, cited above). In 2013 France intervened with Operation Serval, later Barkhane, which reached about 5,100 troops; the UN deployed the MINUSMA peacekeeping mission (CFR, cited above). In 2015 the Algiers agreement between the government and the armed groups of the north promised local autonomy and the integration of fighters into the army (Africanews), but left out the jihadist groups (CFR, cited above). In 2017 the main groups linked to al-Qaeda merged into JNIM (Anadolu); the Islamic State has its own branch in the region (CFR, cited above). The war spread to Burkina Faso and Niger and became entangled with conflicts between communities, such as the one between Fulani and Dogon in central Mali (MRG, cited above).

The coups (2020-2023). In Mali the military seized power in 2020 and again in 2021; in Burkina Faso twice in 2022, in January and in September, when Captain Ibrahim Traoré took power (EBSCO, cited above); in Niger, on 26 July 2023, the military overthrew the elected president Mohamed Bazoum (CFR, cited above). The juntas broke with France, which withdrew its troops; in June 2023 Mali demanded the departure of MINUSMA (CFR, cited above). From late 2021 the Russian mercenaries of the Wagner Group arrived in Mali (Arab News). On 16 September 2023 the three countries signed a mutual defence pact, the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), and in January 2025 they left the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) (CFR, cited above).

Mali without an agreement (2023-2025). In November 2023 the Malian army and Wagner retook Kidal, the stronghold of the Tuareg rebels (ACAPS). On 25 January 2024 the junta declared the "immediate" end of the Algiers agreement, accusing Algeria of hosting groups it calls "terrorists" (Africanews). In June 2025 Wagner left Mali and in its place the Africa Corps stayed, the paramilitary force under the direct command of the Russian defence ministry (Arab News, cited above). Since September 2025 JNIM has been blocking the roads around Bamako, causing a fuel crisis across the country (Anadolu).

The 2026 offensive. On 25 and 26 April 2026 JNIM and the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA), the Tuareg separatist movement, struck together at Bamako and Kati, Gao, Sévaré, Mopti, Bourem and Kidal. Defence Minister Sadio Camara was killed in Kati; on 26 April the FLA announced it had taken Kidal, while the army and the Africa Corps withdrew; on 29 April JNIM announced a new blockade around Bamako (ACAPS). On 6 October the Malian army and the Africa Corps re-entered Kidal without a fight; the FLA spoke of a "controlled withdrawal" (The Sahel Brief). On 18 October 2026 an attack that local leaders attributed to the Islamic State killed at least 40 people in a village in the Menaka region (CFR, cited above). In Burkina Faso, in February 2026, a series of JNIM attacks in the north and east killed more than 130 soldiers, auxiliaries and militants in a few days (Arab News). In Niger, on 29 January 2026, the Islamic State attacked Niamey airport with drones (ADF).

Who governs, and how

All three countries are ruled by military juntas, which have postponed elections and dissolved the political parties. The Swedish institute V-Dem, in its 2026 report, classifies all three as "closed autocracies", that is, countries where no multi-party elections are held for the head of government (V-Dem). We explain what separates an autocracy from a democracy in the entry Autocracy.

• Mali. General Assimi Goïta has been in power since the coups of 2020 and 2021. In May 2025 the junta dissolved all political parties and banned meetings; in July 2025 the transitional parliament gave him a five-year term, renewable "as many times as necessary", without elections (Al Jazeera).
• Burkina Faso. Captain Ibrahim Traoré has ruled since September 2022. In May 2024 the transition was extended by 60 months from July 2024, and Traoré will be allowed to stand in future elections (Al Jazeera). In February 2026 the junta dissolved all political parties (our analysis).
• Niger. General Abdourahamane Tiani (Tchiani) was sworn in as transitional president on 26 March 2025, for five "flexible" years that can be extended depending on security; the junta dissolved all political parties; former president Bazoum is still detained (IDEA). In December 2025 the junta decreed a "general mobilisation", with broad powers to requisition people and property (ADF).

Who's who

Where the conflict comes from

We use the four levels of our piece "Are the world's wars 'Muslim'?". Here religion is the banner of the jihadist groups, but the victims are overwhelmingly Muslim, and the war is fought among Muslims.

The ground: weak states over huge territories. The borders drawn by France put together desert peoples and savannah peoples, herders and farmers, governed from capitals far from the north. The Tuareg have rebelled in every generation since independence (MRG, cited above); the Fulani, mobile herders, were pushed to the margins in Burkina Faso as the Mossi came to dominate the state (MRG). The jihadist groups recruit on these injustices and on conflicts between communities over land and water.

This excuses no one. No government, civilian or military, has resolved the rebellions of the north; the juntas, which took power promising security, have not delivered it, as ADF writes about Niger (ADF); the jihadist groups kill civilians and extort them; and the armies, with their Russian allies and the militias, punish entire villages for the crime of belonging to the "wrong" people.

The spark: Libya, 2011. The collapse of the Libyan state spread weapons and fighters across the Sahel; the following year came the Tuareg rebellion, the coup in Bamako and the jihadist takeover of the north (CFR).

The banner: sovereignty against terrorism, jihad against the state. The juntas present their war as a fight against terrorism and the break with France as the recovery of sovereignty. The jihadist groups present it as a war on "apostate" governments and their foreign allies. The Tuareg separatists fight for Azawad. None of these banners makes it lawful to kill a herder because he is Fulani or because he is Tuareg.

The outside multiplier: Russia, gold, the neighbours. France and the UN have left; Russia came in with Wagner and then with the Africa Corps. Algeria, which had mediated the 2015 agreement, was accused by Mali of hosting the rebels (Africanews), and broke with Niger in 2025 before mending ties (The Sahel Brief). Gold and uranium give the juntas resources to fight over with multinationals, and the armed groups resources to fight over with the state.

Who profits

We document declared or verifiable interests, not motives. If an actor denies something, we say so.

The juntas. The war justifies suspending elections: in all three countries the transitions have been extended and the parties dissolved, on security grounds (see above). The juntas have also rewritten their relations with foreign mining companies. Mali's 2023 mining code allows the state to take up to 30% of new mines (The East African); after a standoff that included seized gold and detained employees, in February 2025 Canada's Barrick signed an agreement to pay about $438 million (Daba Finance). In Niger the junta took over the Somair uranium mine, controlled by French capital (The East African, cited above).

Russia. With Wagner and then the Africa Corps, Moscow has taken France's place alongside the juntas. According to the monitoring centre ACLED, the switch from Wagner to the Africa Corps gives the Kremlin more control and fewer legal and reputational risks, with the aim of stabilising the regimes, protecting infrastructure and gaining influence (ACLED).

The jihadist groups. JNIM controls smuggling routes, artisanal gold-mining areas and livestock, and with the blockade around Bamako it uses fuel shortages as a weapon (Anadolu). The north and east of Burkina Faso, where it attacks most, are home to gold sites and smuggling routes (Arab News).

The United States and Italy. They have declared interests in staying: for Washington, the uranium stuck in Niamey and containing Russia; for Rome, migration control, with the MISIN mission in Niger, authorised for up to 550 troops (our analysis). Cooperation continued even after a Nigerien army drone struck the market in Kokoloko, killing 17 civilians in January 2026 (same source).

Who intervenes from outside

• France. With Serval and Barkhane it deployed up to about 5,100 troops from 2013; it left after the coups (CFR).
• UN. The MINUSMA mission left Mali after the junta demanded its departure in June 2023 (CFR, cited above).
• Russia. Wagner in Mali from late 2021, then the Africa Corps from June 2025 (Arab News), also present in Burkina Faso (our analysis) and in Niger (ADF).
• United States. After the coup in Niger it suspended more than $500 million in aid (CFR, cited above) and in 2024 left the drone base in Agadez; in 2026 it resumed non-lethal supplies to Niger's army (our analysis).
• Italy. It stayed in Niger with the MISIN mission and about 350 Carabinieri (same source).
• Algeria. Mediator of the 2015 agreement, accused by Mali of hostility (Africanews).
• ECOWAS. The three countries left it in January 2025 (CFR, cited above).

The human cost. According to the CFR, the Liptako-Gourma border zone accounts for more than half of the world's terrorism deaths and about 2.6 million displaced people; in the first seven months of 2023 ACLED counted at least 7,800 civilians killed in the region (CFR). Burkina Faso is, for the second year running, the country most affected by terrorism in the world (our analysis). In Niger, in 2025, the Tillabéri region alone accounted for more than 1,200 of the 1,939 deaths recorded in the country (ADF). In the area the UN refugee agency calls the "Sahel Plus" there are about 2.9 million internally displaced people, three-quarters of them in Burkina Faso, and about 1.1 million refugees; Mali hosts more than 251,000 refugees, nearly twice as many as in 2024, most of them fleeing Burkina Faso (UNHCR).

Documented massacres. We recall some of them, attributed to different sides:

• Moura, Mali, March 2022: according to the UN human rights office, over five days the Malian army and "foreign military personnel" killed more than 500 people, almost all summarily executed, and raped at least 58 women and girls; the Malian authorities denied investigators access (UN).
• Solenzo, Burkina Faso, March 2025: at least 100 Fulani civilians killed by the special forces and the VDP, according to Human Rights Watch; the government denied it. After the soldiers withdrew, JNIM reportedly killed residents it accused of collaborating with the army (Africanews).
• Kokoloko and Tillabéri, Niger, January 2026: 17 civilians killed by an army drone in a market; in the same month the Islamic State executed 30 civilians in the same region (our analysis).
• Mali, 2023-2026: on 29 September 2026 Amnesty International accused Malian soldiers and Wagner men of killing at least 34 civilians, between June 2023 and December 2025, in seven incidents in the Mopti, Ségou and Timbuktu regions: war crimes, according to Amnesty. On 19 October Human Rights Watch documented indiscriminate drone strikes by Malian forces and the Africa Corps (CFR).

International law

The treaties. The three countries:

• are parties to the Geneva Conventions (Burkina Faso since 1961, Niger since 1964, Mali since 1965) and to both Additional Protocols (Niger since 1979, Burkina Faso since 1987, Mali since 1989) (list of states parties, Wikipedia, based on data from the Swiss depositary);
• Mali (since 1974) and Burkina Faso (since 1965) are parties to the Genocide Convention; Niger is not (UN Treaty Collection);
• joined the Rome Statute and in September 2025 announced their withdrawal from the International Criminal Court (Jurist). They deposited their notifications with the UN between 18 and 24 June 2026: the withdrawal will take effect on 23 June 2027 (Amnesty International).

The International Criminal Court. Withdrawal does not erase the Court's jurisdiction over crimes committed while the three countries were members, that is, until June 2027. In Mali the Court has been investigating since 2013, and the investigation continues (Amnesty International, cited above).

The internal conflict. Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and the Second Protocol apply: they prohibit attacks on civilians, summary executions, collective punishment and outrages on personal dignity, including that of the dead. They apply equally to the armies, to their Russian allies, to militias such as the VDP and to armed groups such as JNIM, the Islamic State and the FLA (our analysis). Striking a crowded market with a drone without distinguishing between fighters and civilians violates the principle of distinction (our analysis).

The mercenaries. The Africa Corps reports to the Russian defence ministry (Arab News): its acts, if committed by forces under Moscow's control, can engage the responsibility of Russia, as well as that of individuals.

Justice denied. No one has been tried for Moura: more than a year later the Malian authorities were still denying any responsibility pending an internal inquiry (UN). For Solenzo, Burkina Faso's government denied it (Africanews). For Kokoloko, Niger's junta did not reply to Human Rights Watch (our analysis).

Timeline

Change log

• 22 October 2026: first version.

Sources: CFR · Worldometer · MRG · EBSCO · MRG · MRG · The East African · Anadolu · Britannica · Britannica · Africanews · Arab News · ACAPS · The Sahel Brief · Arab News · ADF · V-Dem · Al Jazeera · Al Jazeera · IDEA · Africanews · Daba Finance · ACLED · UNHCR · UN · Wikipedia, based on data from the Swiss depositary · UN Treaty Collection · Jurist · Amnesty International

Related pieces: Mali: army and Russian Africa Corps mercenaries arrange a corpse into a swastika after killing four civilians · Burkina Faso leaves the International Criminal Court while remaining the world's country most affected by terrorism · Niger leaves the International Criminal Court while the United States and Italy continue military cooperation

← All news and manifestos