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ANALYSIS
The law that defines antisemitism: what it says, what it leaves out
18 November 2026 — Italy
In brief
- On 17 November 2026 the Italian Parliament passed the law against antisemitism. It adopts the IHRA definition with its eleven examples, seven of which concern Israel.
- It creates no crimes and allocates no money. It gives the force of law to tools the government has used since 2020 and carries them into the police database, the universities and RAI, the public broadcaster.
- Its supporters have serious reasons: antisemitism is rising and often hides behind codes that police and magistrates must learn to recognise.
- The weakest point is the database: a 1981 law forbids keeping files on citizens for their political opinions, and some IHRA examples are opinions, not crimes.
What happened
Antisemitism in Italy is rising, and nobody disputes the numbers. In 2025 the Observatory of the CDEC Foundation recorded 963 incidents, two thirds of them online. Physical assaults rose to 18, from 8 the year before (CDEC Report 2025).
On 17 November 2026, after almost three years of debate, the Chamber of Deputies gave final approval to the text passed by the Senate in March, with 147 votes in favour, 93 against and 5 abstentions (ANSA). The governing majority, Azione and Italia Viva voted in favour; M5S, AVS and the Democratic Party voted against, with some of the Democrats' reformist wing abstaining (Treccani). No opposition amendment was accepted.
The law has five articles and refers to many other rules. We have gathered them into a single document that can be read straight through. It exists only in Italian: we chose not to translate a state law ourselves, to avoid introducing errors. It can be read through an automatic translation, which is only indicative (consolidated text, automatic translation).
What the law says
A definition. Article 1 adopts the definition of the IHRA, the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance, "including its related indicators". The definition is one sentence: antisemitism is "a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews". The indicators are eleven examples. The first four concern conduct nobody defends: calling for the killing of Jews, the myth of a Jewish conspiracy, Holocaust denial. The other seven are about Israel, including "applying double standards" to Israel and "drawing comparisons of contemporary Israeli policy to that of the Nazis" (IHRA).
A strategy and a coordinator. Articles 2 and 4 give statutory status to the National Coordinator against antisemitism, appointed by the Prime Minister, and to a National Strategy to be renewed every three years.
Where it applies. Article 3 lists the lines of action: the police database, the internet, schools, universities, training for soldiers, police officers, prefects and magistrates, campaigns on RAI, sport.
What is not there. There are no new crimes and no new penalties, and the ban on demonstrations in the first draft was removed in the Senate. There is no money either: everything is to be done with existing resources.
What already existed
Almost everything. The second Conte government adopted the IHRA definition in January 2020, with the same examples. The Coordinator and the Strategy date from the same year (Chamber of Deputies dossier). Since 2022 schools have had guidelines against antisemitism based on the IHRA (Ministry of Education).
There was also the criminal code. Articles 604-bis and 604-ter punish propaganda for and incitement to racial, ethnic and religious hatred, and Holocaust denial used as propaganda, and they make any crime committed out of hatred more serious (art. 604-bis). The gravest examples on the IHRA list were already crimes. The others were not, and they do not become crimes now.
So what changes? A government decision becomes a decision of Parliament, which a future government cannot undo on its own. And the definition reaches, by law, places it did not reach before.
The case for the law
Those who voted for the law have serious arguments.
The first is practical. Antisemitism today rarely presents itself as such. It often says "Zionists" when it means Jews, or applies old myths, such as the conspiracy myth, to Israel. A police officer or magistrate who does not know these codes will miss the motive, and a hate crime will be treated as an ordinary one. The European Parliament asked member states to adopt the IHRA definition precisely to help investigators "identify and prosecute" antisemitic attacks (2017 resolution).
The second is that Italy is not alone: according to the European Commission, all EU member states apply the IHRA definition (Chamber of Deputies dossier). The third is the IHRA text itself, which excludes criticism of Israel similar to that levelled against any other country. This is the argument of Liliana Segre, the Holocaust survivor and life senator, who has sharply criticised the Israeli government and holds that the law has no "real critical issues", because the criminal provisions and the bans were removed in the Senate (Quotidiano.net). The fourth is that the law punishes no one.
These arguments are true. The problem is that the law does not stop where they stop.
Where the law does not hold up
The police database. The law wants the police database to monitor antisemitic incidents "as defined" by the law, that is, examples included. But the 1981 law governing that database says: "it is forbidden to collect information and data on citizens solely on account of their race, religious faith or political opinion" (Law 121/1981, art. 7). Comparing Israeli policy to Nazism can be distasteful, wrong, offensive. But it is a political opinion, not a crime. If only criminally relevant incidents enter the database, the reference to the examples is pointless. If opinions enter too, the 1981 law is breached. The text does not choose.
Examples that become rules. The IHRA presents its definition as "non-legally binding", and its examples as cases to be assessed "taking into account the overall context". The law calls them "indicators" and declares them "necessary for the purposes of application". A tool meant to guide becomes a tool for deciding. An analysis by the Swiss government also notes that it is unclear what states adopted in 2016: for some only the opening sentence, for others the whole text (Swiss Confederation).
The missing sentence. The IHRA document states that "criticism of Israel similar to that leveled against any other country cannot be regarded as antisemitic". The law does not repeat it, and does not say whether its reference includes it. The opposition had asked for the law to state that "the expression of free criticism of the political actions of the Government of the State of Israel is not considered antisemitism" (Senate amendments). Even Liliana Segre, who thought it superfluous, had urged openness to "the inessential amendment" in order to obtain a unanimous vote (Avvenire). The majority said no. Tomorrow a judge may read that refusal as a deliberate choice of the legislator.
Universities. The law says universities "shall adopt" measures against antisemitic acts and may appoint an officer, in line with their code of ethics. The code of ethics opens the way to disciplinary proceedings. The limit is Article 33 of the Constitution: "The arts and sciences are free, and teaching them is free". The risk is not a court ruling. It is the rector who, in doubt, refuses a room for a conference on boycotts.
Schools and the bullying law. Schools will report through the bodies set up by the 2017 law on cyberbullying (Law 71/2017), created for repeated aggression among young people. A student's opinion on Israel is not bullying, but it may fall under an IHRA example, and so end up in the same channel.
Promises without money. The law promises "adequate security measures" for Jewish communities, but rules out new spending. The bullying law, by comparison, allocates 150,000 euros a year for information campaigns alone (Law 71/2017, art. 3). This one allocates nothing, not even to protect synagogues.
How the definition is already used
In Italy we found no court rulings applying the IHRA definition. But the definition is already at work, outside the courts.
The CDEC report uses it to classify incidents. Among the 2025 cases are posts by the politician and activist Alessandro Di Battista, such as "Zionists are worse than Nazis", and a sketch by the comedian Maurizio Crozza portraying Netanyahu as a new Hitler. The report warns that criticising Israeli governments is not antisemitism, and singles out antisemitic myths applied to Israel: it is serious work. But it shows how a joke or a political post can end up in the same statistic as a swastika on a grave. In the same report the demographer Sergio Della Pergola calculates that 66.8% of the hostile acts and speech recorded concern the State of Israel, and observes that no definition of antisemitism has won consensus: who has the authority to define it has itself become part of the conflict (CDEC Report 2025).
The Observatory itself writes that it works "in close coordination with the IHRA" and collaborates with OSCAD, the police's inter-force observatory, and with the office of the National Coordinator. Now the CDEC also sits, by law, in the group that drafts the Strategy. Those who produce the data help decide the policy. In that group, alongside the ministries, the law seats seven bodies linked to the IHRA or to Italian Jewry. Neither the Data Protection Authority nor UNAR, the office against racial discrimination, has a seat: precisely the bodies that should watch over the risks described above.
Since December 2025 the online training platform of the police forces has offered two courses on antisemitism produced with the Union of Italian Jewish Communities and funded by the European Union. According to an investigation by Altreconomia, they equate the boycott of Israeli universities and products with the racial laws of 1938 (La Notizia, citing Altreconomia). We could not see the materials or the original investigation: we report it as a claim still to be verified.
Not everyone follows the same path. On 31 March 2026 the National Council of the Italian journalists' professional body voted to adopt the Jerusalem Declaration instead of the IHRA (Moked, portal of Italian Jewry). The Declaration, written in 2021 by scholars of the Holocaust and Jewish studies, defines antisemitism as "discrimination, prejudice, hostility or violence against Jews as Jews". And it says that evidence-based criticism of Israel and boycotts are not antisemitic in themselves (Chamber of Deputies dossier). Today the journalists' body uses one definition, and RAI will have to promote another.
Why this is not only an Italian story
According to the IHRA's own list, 48 states have adopted or endorsed the definition, from Europe to the Americas to South Korea (IHRA). The question raised by the Italian law therefore concerns everyone: can a state, by law, make criticism of another state suspect?
The definition has already been used that way. In February 2022 Amnesty International published a report accusing Israel of apartheid. The Israeli foreign ministry replied that the report was antisemitic under the IHRA definition, because it allegedly denied Jews the right to self-determination (Algemeiner). In that case the definition did not serve to recognise hatred against people, but to fend off an accusation aimed at a government.
The same pattern can be seen in the American election campaign. In August 2026 President Trump accused Abdul El-Sayed, the Democratic Senate candidate in Michigan, a Muslim and a critic of the Israeli government, of hating Jews and Israel (Jerusalem Post). El-Sayed rejects the charge (The National Desk). A few days later Trump said that "jihadists" are being elected all over the United States (Mediaite). The accusation of antisemitism becomes a weapon against an opponent, while hostility towards Muslims becomes a campaign theme.
And there is a precedent that shows the limit. In 2017 Munich decided not to grant municipal rooms to events on boycotting Israel. In 2022 Germany's Federal Administrative Court ruled that refusing a room solely because of the topic violates freedom of opinion (BVerwG). The court stopped the administration. That may happen in Italy too, but afterwards, and case by case.
The symmetry test
The law opens by invoking Article 3 of the Constitution: all citizens are equal "without distinction of sex, race, language, religion, political opinions". It is the right principle, but here it is applied to a single group.
The criminal code protects everyone in the same way: a hate attack against a Jew, a Muslim or a Roma person is aggravated in the same way. This law, instead, builds for one group alone a definition, a coordinator, a strategy, a database and a national campaign. For Roma and Sinti there is a national strategy entrusted to UNAR, but with no statutory definition and no government coordinator (UNAR, Strategy 2021-2030). For hatred against Muslims there is not even that.
Some people are left outside the criminal code altogether. The aggravating circumstance in Article 604-ter covers ethnic, national, racial and religious hatred, but not hatred based on sexual orientation, gender identity or disability: Italy has no specific aggravating circumstance for homophobia and transphobia (Domani). The Zan bill, which was meant to introduce it, was stopped in the Senate on 27 October 2021 by a secret vote, 154 to 131 (Pagella Politica). The same Parliament that could not find the votes for that criminal protection has passed this law, which adds no criminal protection at all.
The test is simple. If an Italian law treated historical comparisons about China's policy in Xinjiang or Russia's in Ukraine as "indicators" of hatred, we would read it as protecting those governments from criticism. The same yardstick applies to Israel.
What to watch over the next twelve months
This analysis can be proved wrong. These are the facts that will show whether the risks we describe are real or exaggerated.
- The new National Strategy: whether it will separate, in the database, criminally relevant incidents from opinions.
- Universities: how many will appoint an officer, and whether disciplinary proceedings for opinions on Israel will follow.
- The courts: whether there will be a first appeal to an administrative court against a room refused or a march banned in the name of the definition.
- The numbers: whether the share of Israel-related incidents grows in the next CDEC report, and how many concern opinions rather than attacks.
- The Data Protection Authority: whether it will step in on the use of the database.
Our assessment
This law sends no one to prison, and those who call it a "gag" exaggerate. But it is not useless either. It brings a contested definition into the police, schools, universities and public television, without the safeguards that even its supporters ask for. ECRI, the Council of Europe's commission against racism, regards it as useful but non-binding, to be used for collecting data and for education. The UN Special Rapporteur Ahmed Shaheed recommends its use in training public officials, but always together with explicit guidance protecting freedom of expression (IHRA). The Italian law does the opposite: it makes the definition binding and rejects the explicit safeguard, even after Liliana Segre had said she was open to writing it in.
The real risk is not a conviction. It is silence: the rector who refuses a room out of caution, the teacher who avoids a topic, the student who does not write for fear of ending up in a register. These are choices that leave no trace: no trial, no appeal, no number to count.
Italian Jews have the right to be protected from a hatred that is growing. That protection already exists in the criminal code, and it could be strengthened with real resources, which this law does not provide. Mixing the defence of people with the defence of a government helps neither.
Open questions
- Who decides, in the police database, whether a post is an opinion or an antisemitic incident?
- Why did the majority reject a clarification that the IHRA itself writes, and that even Liliana Segre was willing to accept?
- How will a definition promoted by RAI under the law coexist with the one chosen by the journalists' professional body?
- Why does the protection of Jewish sites, promised by the law, come without a single euro?
- When will there be an equal instrument against hatred of Muslims and Roma, and an aggravating circumstance for hatred of LGBT people and people with disabilities?
Sources: CDEC Report 2025 · ANSA · Treccani · IHRA · Chamber of Deputies dossier · Ministry of Education · art. 604-bis · 2017 resolution · Quotidiano.net · Law 121/1981, art. 7 · Swiss Confederation · Senate amendments · Avvenire · Law 71/2017 · Law 71/2017, art. 3 · La Notizia, citing Altreconomia · Moked, portal of Italian Jewry · IHRA · Algemeiner · Jerusalem Post · The National Desk · Mediaite · BVerwG · UNAR, Strategy 2021-2030 · Domani · Pagella Politica
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