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Sudan and Ethiopia, the war of the consulates: drones launched from Assosa and the risk of a war between states

5 November 2026 — Assosa, Ethiopia – Gedaref, Sudan

Series “Ethiopia” · 4 of 5

In brief

Assosa is a small town in western Ethiopia, a few dozen kilometres from the Sudanese border. Until a week ago it hosted a small Sudanese consulate. According to the Sudanese government, it also hosts something else: the runway from which, since February, drones have taken off to strike Sudanese power stations, fuel depots and cities. This week the consulate is gone. The accusations remain, and with them the risk that Sudan's civil war and Ethiopia's become a war between the two states.

The facts

The power stations go dark (26–27 October). On 26 October drones attributed to the RSF hit six power stations in the states of Al-Jazira, White Nile, Sennar and Gedaref, leaving millions of people without electricity. The next day it was the turn of the Al-Markhiyat transformer station on the outskirts of Omdurman, which supplies much of the capital (AFP, via Ahram Online). According to a UN count reported by the same agency, in the first three weeks of October drones killed more than 300 people in Sudan. That figure covers all drones, from all parties and wherever they take off.

The report and the complaint (1 November). On Sunday the Sovereignty Council, the army-led body that governs Sudan, published a report entitled "Launched from Ethiopia". It lists 70 attacks between 15 February and 27 October, with 187 "kamikaze" drones, the kind that crash into their target, and 82 munitions dropped by larger drones. It names three launch sites: Assosa airport, the Kurmuk and Geissan border area, and the Bahir Dar air base in Ethiopia's Amhara region. In October alone there would have been 28 attacks, with 97 drones (Arab News). As its main evidence, the report presents the onboard memory of a drone shot down on 20 September near Damazin, in Blue Nile state: the programmed route started from a point which, according to the Sudanese analysis, lies 1.7 kilometres inside Ethiopia. It also cites wreckage of Turkish-made Bayraktar Akinci drones said to have taken off from Bahir Dar (Middle East Monitor). There would be 484 civilian victims; the sources reporting on the document disagree on one point: whether they are all dead, or dead and wounded together (Euronews Arabic). The report also counts 176 soldiers killed. Among the incidents it cites, on 9 October in Wad al-Mahi, Blue Nile state, an attack on displaced families allegedly killed 30 civilians, 26 women and 4 children. Sudan asks Ethiopia to stop the attacks, to close the facilities used by the RSF and to pay compensation for the damage (same source).

The same day the foreign ministry filed the complaint with the UN and the African Union. The use of Ethiopian territory by the RSF, it writes, "is a hostile act" that places Ethiopia in violation of international law (AFP, via Kuwait Times). The report has not been published in full, and the flight data have not been examined by independent experts.

The consulates (2–4 November). According to a Sudanese official quoted by AFP, on 2 November Ethiopia declared the six staff of the Sudanese consulate in Assosa "persona non grata" and gave them 48 hours to leave (AFP, via Kahawatungu). A senior Ethiopian official confirmed the closure to Reuters without explaining the reason (Reuters, via TimesLIVE). On Wednesday 4 November Sudan responded with the same measure against the Ethiopian consulate in Gedaref. The two foreign ministries have not issued statements on the expulsions (Sudan Tribune). Amjad Farid, political adviser to the Sovereignty Council, said Sudan remains determined to defend its territory but "is making every possible effort to avoid an open war with Ethiopia" (Reuters, via Arab News).

Ethiopia's version. Addis Ababa denies supporting the RSF. Its last detailed official response dates from May, when Sudan made similar accusations. The Ethiopian foreign ministry called them "baseless" and turned the argument around: it is Sudan, it wrote, that violates Ethiopia's territorial integrity by hosting "mercenaries" of the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), and Sudan has become a base for forces hostile to Ethiopia (Addis Media Network, Ethiopian state media). The Sudanese army, it added, gives those fighters "arms and financial support" (Al-Monitor). Since September, when the Tigrayan fighters resumed their offensive against the federal army, Ethiopia has also accused Egypt and Eritrea of supporting them (Al Jazeera, 28/9/2026). All three deny it.

How we got here

The quarrel did not start this week. On 2 March Sudan reported for the first time drones entering from Ethiopian territory, without saying who was flying them (SUNA, via allAfrica). In May, after a drone attack on Khartoum airport, it recalled its ambassador from Addis Ababa, accusing Ethiopia and the United Arab Emirates (Fides).

The RSF camp. On 10 February Reuters published an investigation, based on fifteen sources and on satellite imagery, into a training camp for the RSF in Ethiopia's Benishangul-Gumuz region, the same region as Assosa. The images showed hundreds of tents; a note by the Ethiopian security services, seen by the agency, spoke of 4,300 fighters in training in early January, with supplies provided by the Emirates. At Assosa airport the images showed works begun in August 2025: a hangar, new aprons and a ground control station for drones (Reuters, via TimesLIVE; The EastAfrican). Reuters said it could not independently verify the role of the Emirates or the purpose of the works at the airport; the Emirates denied it (The National). A few days later Ethiopia refused to renew the accreditation of three Reuters journalists (CPJ).

The Tigrayan fighters. Ethiopia's accusation also has a documented basis. During the Tigray war, between 2020 and 2022, thousands of Tigrayan fighters took refuge in Sudan's Gedaref state; some were trained soldiers, former UN peacekeepers (The New Humanitarian). According to Sudanese and Ethiopian sources interviewed by the independent Egyptian outlet Mada Masr, they formed a group called "Army 70", with thousands of men, which fights alongside the Sudanese army against the RSF; in August one of its units reportedly crossed the border into Ethiopia near Humera before being pushed back (Mada Masr). These are anonymous sources, and one of the two is an Ethiopian military officer, that is, a party to the dispute.

The region. On 1 October Ethiopia expelled ten Eritrean diplomats and Eritrea broke off relations (Sudan Tribune). The same day Ethiopia expelled an Egyptian diplomat without giving a reason, and Egypt responded in kind (Ahram Online). Meanwhile Sudan's civil war, which began in April 2023, has forced more than 14 million people to flee, according to the UN (Reuters, via The National). For the Norwegian Refugee Council, Sudan's is the most neglected displacement crisis in the world (NRC, June 2026). We wrote about the supply network that feeds this war in "Sudan, the war at a distance"; about the war in Ethiopia, in the "Ethiopia" series.

Legal commentary

What the law forbids. The UN Charter forbids every state to use force against another state (Article 2, paragraph 4; see use of force). A state does not need to send its own army to violate it. In 1986, in Nicaragua v. United States, the International Court of Justice ruled that arming and training another country's rebels is an unlawful use of force and a prohibited intervention (ICJ). The Friendly Relations Declaration, adopted by the General Assembly in 1970 and regarded as an authoritative interpretation of the Charter, adds a second prohibition: a state must not even tolerate armed activities organised on its territory against a neighbour (resolution 2625). As early as 1949, in the Corfu Channel case, the Court said that no state may knowingly allow its territory to be used against the rights of another (ICJ).

What would need to be proven. If the drones really take off from Assosa, the legal question is what Ethiopia knew and what it did. Letting drones take off from one's own airport, with infrastructure built for the purpose, can hardly be an activity the state knows nothing about. But it is an "if": today it is asserted by a party to the war, with evidence no third party has examined, and made plausible by a press investigation, not an international inquiry.

The rule also applies the other way. If the Sudanese army hosts, pays and arms Tigrayan fighters who cross the border to fight in Ethiopia, it violates exactly the same rules. Using them against the RSF inside Sudan is another matter; letting them leave for Ethiopia is not.

Self-defence. Sudan says it reserves the right to defend itself. The Charter allows this against an "armed attack" (Article 51), but here the attack comes from an armed group, not from the Ethiopian army. In 2005, in the case between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda, the Court rejected the self-defence claimed by Uganda against rebels operating from Congolese territory, because their attacks were not attributable to Congo (ICJ). Striking Ethiopia on its own territory, without proof of a direct Ethiopian role, would put Sudan in the wrong and open a war between states.

Power stations and civilians. A power station that serves a city is a civilian object, unless it is used for military purposes; even then, an attack must not cause disproportionate harm to civilians. Leaving millions of people in the dark is harm that has to be weighed before striking. Whoever launches the drones bears first responsibility. Whoever supplies or hosts them knowing how they are used cannot claim to be uninvolved.

Who judges. Almost no one. The UN arms embargo covers only Darfur. On 8 October the Security Council extended it until 11 December, but Russia and China blocked the US proposal to extend it to the whole of Sudan (Al Jazeera, 9/10/2026): drones striking Blue Nile, Kordofan or Omdurman fall outside it. In 2025 Sudan took the Emirates to the International Court of Justice, but the case was struck off because the Emirates, when joining the Genocide Convention, had excluded the Court's jurisdiction (ICJ, 5/5/2025). The African Union's Peace and Security Council sits in Addis Ababa, the capital of the accused country, and Sudan has been suspended from the Union since the 2021 coup (Sudan Tribune).

Symmetry test

The evidence. We apply the same yardstick to both accusations. Against Ethiopia: the Sudanese government's figures, from a party to the war that has not had them verified, and the Reuters investigation, with satellite imagery and internal documents but also anonymous sources. Against Sudan: the statements of the Ethiopian government, also a party to the war, and reports by The New Humanitarian and Mada Masr on Tigrayan fighters alongside the Sudanese army, with largely anonymous sources. On one point the two accusations are alike: the least proven part is the most serious. No one has shown that Ethiopia authorises the drone launches, nor that Sudan arms the Tigrayans to attack Ethiopia.

The embargo. Sudan asks the UN to stop the weapons reaching the RSF from abroad. But in October its ambassador to the UN opposed extending the embargo to the whole country, arguing that it would violate the right to self-defence (same Al Jazeera source). An embargo for everyone would also have hit the army's weapons.

The drones. Sudan denounces RSF drones over its power stations. But the Sudanese army also uses drones, and its drones also kill civilians, as we documented in "Sudan, the war at a distance". Whoever asks the UN to stop other people's drones is implicitly asking it to look at their own as well.

The press. A government that disputes an investigation answers with evidence, not by withdrawing the accreditation of those who wrote it.

Our judgement

This section expresses the site's position. It is separate from the facts set out above.

Closing a consulate costs little and kills no one. But in this region it is the gesture that usually comes before the ones that cost and kill. Sudan and Ethiopia are each fighting a civil war, and each helps, or is accused of helping, the other's enemies. If the two accusations are true even in part, the road leads to a war between states, right where there is already the largest and most neglected displacement crisis in the world.

Sudan did the right thing: instead of responding on its own, it turned to the UN and the African Union. Now it is up to them. An independent commission to examine the flight data, the wreckage and Assosa airport, and with the same mandate the camps of Tigrayan fighters in eastern Sudan, would cost little. Not setting one up would mean leaving the truth to those who use it as a weapon.

What to watch

Sources: AFP, via Ahram Online · Arab News · Middle East Monitor · Euronews Arabic · AFP, via Kuwait Times · AFP, via Kahawatungu · Reuters, via TimesLIVE · Sudan Tribune · Reuters, via Arab News · Addis Media Network, Ethiopian state media · Al-Monitor · Al Jazeera, 28/9/2026 · SUNA, via allAfrica · Fides · Reuters, via TimesLIVE · The EastAfrican · The National · CPJ · The New Humanitarian · Mada Masr · Sudan Tribune · Ahram Online · Reuters, via The National · NRC, June 2026 · ICJ · resolution 2625 · ICJ · ICJ · Al Jazeera, 9/10/2026 · ICJ, 5/5/2025 · Sudan Tribune

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