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GLOSSARY

Ethiopia: its peoples, its history, who is fighting and why

Updated 22 October 2026

The news from Ethiopia talks about Tigray, the TPLF, Fano, Eritrea and access to the sea, but rarely explains who the peoples involved are, why a country that came out of a war in 2022 is at war again, and who profits from it. This profile gathers the essential background. We keep it updated: every change is logged at the bottom, with its date and source.

Land and peoples

Ethiopia is a highland plateau crossed by the Rift Valley and surrounded by arid lowlands to the east and west. The Blue Nile rises on the plateau and carries most of the Nile's water to Egypt. The country has had no outlet to the sea since 1993, when Eritrea became independent and took the whole coastline with it (Britannica). The capital, Addis Ababa, in the centre, is also the seat of the African Union. Tigray is in the far north, on the border with Eritrea; Amhara lies west and south of Tigray; Oromia, the largest region, surrounds the capital; the lowlands of Afar and the Somali region are in the east.

A warning about the numbers. Official data on the country's peoples still come from the 2007 census, which counted 95 ethnic groups (IRB Canada, via ecoi.net). The percentages below come from that census, as reported by Minority Rights Group (MRG), and should be read as orders of magnitude: the population has since grown to about 135 million (UNFPA), and not every people has grown at the same rate. More recent estimates from other sources give similar shares: Oromo between 34% and 35%, Amhara between 26% and 27%, Tigrayans around 6% (Britannica and the Bertelsmann Stiftung, as reported by IRB Canada, cited above). For some small peoples there is no reliable figure, and we say so.

• Oromo — 34.4% (2007 census), the largest people. They live mainly in Oromia, the largest region, with about 40 million inhabitants (AP, via UNB), and speak Oromo. They have long complained of marginalisation by a government dominated by Tigrayans; from 2015 they protested against plans to expand Addis Ababa onto their farmland (MRG, cited above). Since 2018 the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) has been fighting in Oromia (AP, cited above).
• Amhara — 27% (2007 census). They live on the north-central plateau. Their language, Amharic, is the federal official language. Together with the Tigrayans they historically dominated politics: under Haile Selassie, Amhara language and culture were the model of Ethiopian identity, at the expense of other peoples. Under ethnic federalism they have demanded more autonomy for their region, with protests in Gondar in 2016 (MRG, cited above). Since 2023 the region has been the scene of a war between the army and the Fano militias (our analysis).
• Somali — 6.2% (2007 census). Muslim herders of the eastern lowlands, in the Somali region (the Ogaden), which Somalia contested in the war of 1977-1978 (MRG, cited above). The Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) fought there for many years.
• Tigrayans — 6.1% (2007 census). They live in Tigray, which has about 7 million inhabitants (our analysis), and speak Tigrinya, like most Eritreans. Most are Orthodox Christians. Although a small minority, through the TPLF they led the federal government from 1991 to 2018, and their presence in the security forces fed the idea of a "Tigrayan" government (MRG, cited above).
• Sidama — 4% (2007 census). They live in the south. For decades they demanded a region of their own and obtained it in 2020 after a referendum marked by delays and clashes (Rift Valley Institute, via ecoi.net). After them, other southern peoples demanded and obtained new regions (same source).
• Afar — 1.7% (2007 census). They live in the Afar lowlands, in the east, crossed by the road to Djibouti, through which almost all the country's trade passes (our analysis). Under the Derg the government exploited divisions between the Afar and the Somalis (MRG, cited above).
• Gurage, Wolayta, Hadiya, Gamo, Gedeo and the other peoples of the south — between 1.3% and 2.5% each (2007 census). They are dozens of peoples speaking different languages.
• Kunama, Irob and the other small peoples — together, 8.8% (2007 census). No reliable estimate for the individual groups. In the Gambella region and the Lower Omo, indigenous peoples have been displaced by villagisation programmes, plantations and dams (MRG, cited above).

Religion: about 43.5% are Orthodox Christians and 33.9% Muslims; the rest are Protestants, Catholics or followers of traditional religions (MRG, cited above; 2007 census). Ethiopian Christianity is among the oldest in the world: in the fourth century King Ezana of Aksum proclaimed it the state religion (National Geographic).

Resources and economy: agriculture, coffee, gold, river water. Between July and December 2025 gold exports reached $2.56 billion, and coffee $1.3 billion in a single quarter (UNDP). Public debt stands at $68.8 billion, which the IMF considers unsustainable; according to the World Bank, poverty rose from 33% in 2016 to 39% in 2021 (same source). In September 2025 Ethiopia inaugurated the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Blue Nile: 5,150 megawatts at full capacity, $5 billion, financed almost entirely at home (Khaleej Times). More than 95% of imports and exports pass through Djibouti, at a cost of over $1 billion a year (IBA).

A short history

The empire. In the first century AD the kingdom of Aksum arose on the northern plateau; in the fourth century, under King Ezana, it became Christian, and between the third and sixth centuries it was one of the powers of the Red Sea (National Geographic, cited above). The Ethiopian empire descends from that Christian core on the plateau, and remained a monarchy until 1974.

Adwa (1896). Italy, which had held the colony of Eritrea since 1890 (Britannica, cited above), tried to extend its rule. On 1 March 1896, at Adwa, Menelik's army defeated it: it was "the first crushing defeat of a European power by African forces during the colonial era" (Britannica). Ethiopia remained independent.

The Italian occupation (1935-1941). In October 1935 Fascist Italy invaded Ethiopia; on 5 May 1936 it took Addis Ababa. Mussolini and Badoglio authorised the use of gas (The Reporter, drawing on Richard Pankhurst). Emperor Haile Selassie appealed to the League of Nations, which did nothing (same source). On 19 February 1937, after an attack on the viceroy Rodolfo Graziani, the Italians laid waste to Addis Ababa for three days: estimates of the dead range from about 3,000 (Del Boca) to about 19,200 (Ian Campbell) to 30,000 (Ethiopian sources) (Domani). On 20 May 1937, on Graziani's orders, the monks of the Debre Libanos monastery were shot: 297 monks and 23 lay people according to Fascist records, up to 1,500-2,000 according to other estimates. In Italy, a bill to create a day of remembrance for the African victims of Italian colonialism has been stuck in parliament for years (Domani, cited above). On 5 May 1941 the British army and Ethiopian partisans liberated the country (The Reporter, cited above).

Haile Selassie (1941-1974). The emperor returned to the throne. In 1952 the former Italian colony of Eritrea was federated with Ethiopia; in 1962 it became an Ethiopian province, and a guerrilla war for independence began that would last thirty years (Britannica, cited above).

The Derg (1974-1991). In 1974 a communist military junta, the Derg, led by Mengistu Haile Mariam, overthrew the emperor (Al Jazeera). From 1976 the "Red Terror" targeted opponents (HRW): up to 30,000 dead according to the most conservative estimates by Africa Watch (University of Pennsylvania). The famine of 1983-1985 killed hundreds of thousands of people, worsened by the war and by government policies (Al Jazeera, cited above); the regime forcibly moved hundreds of thousands of peasants from north to south, and Médecins Sans Frontières, which reported at least 50,000 deaths during the transfers, was expelled (MSF). According to Human Rights Watch, the Derg's actions caused 500,000 or more civilian deaths (HRW, cited above).

The TPLF in power (1991-2018). In 1991 the EPRDF coalition, led by the TPLF, entered Addis Ababa; Mengistu fled to Zimbabwe (HRW, cited above). The Tigrayan leader Meles Zenawi governed until his death in 2012. In 1993 Eritrea became independent (Al Jazeera, cited above). The 1995 Constitution created a federation of ethnically based regions and recognised the peoples' right to self-determination, including secession (Article 39); but power remained highly centralised in the EPRDF, which in 2015, with its allies, won every seat in parliament (MRG, cited above). From 1998 to 2000 Ethiopia and Eritrea fought a border war around the village of Badme, with tens of thousands of dead (Al Jazeera, cited above); the commission set up under the Algiers agreement awarded Badme to Eritrea, but Ethiopia did not accept the decision and the two countries remained for eighteen years in a state of "no war, no peace" (Gulf News).

Abiy Ahmed and the Tigray war (2018-2022). After years of Oromo and Amhara protests, Abiy Ahmed became prime minister in April 2018. Within months he accepted the agreement with Eritrea and travelled to Asmara; in 2019 he received the Nobel Peace Prize (Gulf News, cited above). The TPLF lost federal power and remained in government in Tigray (our analysis). In November 2020 Abiy ordered an offensive against Tigrayan forces, after an attack on a federal military base (Eye Radio). Eritrean troops and Amhara militias fought alongside the army; in Axum, at the end of November 2020, Eritrean soldiers killed hundreds of civilians according to Amnesty International, in a massacre that may amount to a crime against humanity (Amnesty International). A joint investigation by the UN and the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission documented violations by all parties (OHCHR). On 2 November 2022 the Pretoria agreement ended the war (our analysis). The African Union mediator, Olusegun Obasanjo, spoke of around 600,000 dead; the head of the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission urged caution about all estimates (Eye Radio, cited above).

After Pretoria (2023-2026). In 2023 the government tried to dissolve the Amhara regional special forces: the Fano militias, which had fought alongside the army, rebelled (our analysis). On 1 January 2024 Abiy signed a memorandum with Somaliland, Somalia's breakaway region, to lease about 20 km of coastline for fifty years in exchange for future recognition; Somalia considers it a violation of its sovereignty (IBA, cited above). In 2025 the TPLF lost its registration as a party; in April 2026 it removed the interim administration created by Pretoria and reinstated Debretsion Gebremichael at the top (our analysis). In the June 2026 elections, which were not held in Tigray, the Prosperity Party won 438 seats (Reuters, via Polity).

The new war (since September 2026). On 20 September seven armed groups announced an alliance to overthrow the government. From 23 September the TPLF took the airports of Mekelle, Axum and Shire and attacked towards Amhara and Afar (our analysis). On 1 October Ethiopia closed its embassy in Asmara and Eritrea broke off diplomatic relations (Political.org). On 4 October the federal army re-entered Mekelle without a fight (Al Jazeera); on the 5th Abiy was sworn in for a second term (our analysis). From 7 October the monitoring centre ACLED reported Eritrean troops entering Tigray at Zalambessa; Ethiopia struck them with drones and demanded their withdrawal; Eritrea neither confirmed nor denied it (Political.org, cited above). On 16 October Abiy appointed a caretaker administration for Tigray for six months, with the aim of holding elections (Reuters, via Daily Maverick), entrusted to men close to Getachew Reda and the Tigray Peace Force (Critical Threats). Tigrayan forces have announced a counteroffensive in central Tigray; in Amhara, the Fano are advancing in northern Shewa (same source). No ceasefire has been announced.

Who governs, and how

Ethiopia is a federal parliamentary republic: power lies with the prime minister, Abiy Ahmed, in office since 2018, and his Prosperity Party. In the June 2026 elections the party won 438 seats, about 90% of those declared; there was no vote in Tigray, nor in at least eight constituencies in Amhara. The opposition accuses the government of arresting its leaders; the government denies it. In February the authorities did not renew the accreditation of Reuters journalists in Addis Ababa (Daily Monitor, from Reuters).

The Swedish institute V-Dem, in its 2026 report, classifies Ethiopia as an "electoral autocracy": people vote, but elections are neither free nor fair (V-Dem). We explain what distinguishes an autocracy from a democracy in the entry Autocracy.

The Constitution is federal and the federalism is ethnic: each region has its own government, its own police and, until 2023, its own special forces. In Tigray, since 16 October 2026, the federal government has installed a caretaker administration, while the TPLF continues to claim authority over the region (Critical Threats, cited above).

Who's who

Where the conflict comes from

We use the four levels of our piece "Are the world's wars 'Muslim'?". Here religion is not the front line: the Tigrayans, Amhara and most of the Oromo who are fighting one another are mostly Christian.

The ground: an empire turned federation. The empire governed from the centre, making Amhara language and culture the model of Ethiopian identity; the Derg recognised regional autonomy only on paper (MRG, cited above). The TPLF turned that model upside down with ethnic federalism: each people its own territory, with the right, on paper, to secede. But the boundaries between regions left contested lands between Tigray and Amhara, which remained under Amhara control even after Pretoria (our analysis); and those who live in "someone else's" region feel like foreigners in their own home.

This does not absolve those who govern today. The TPLF governed for 27 years with a centralised system that won every seat (MRG, cited above). Abiy's government took the war to Tigray with the help of a foreign army, Eritrea's, and then broke with the Amhara militias that had helped it. All armed parties are accused by the UN of crimes against civilians.

The spark: the succession of 2018. The war stems from the TPLF's loss of power. In 2018 the party that had governed for almost three decades was left in control of Tigray alone; in November 2020 the war began. The Pretoria agreement stopped the fighting but did not resolve the core issues: disarmament, the return of the displaced, the contested lands (our analysis).

The flag: unity versus autonomy. The government fights for the unity of the state and calls the war in Amhara a "security problem" (same source). The opposition alliance says it is fighting for the "survival" of the peoples it represents and demands Abiy's fall. Both flags are political; neither makes it lawful to strike a school or recruit a child.

The external multiplier: the sea and the Nile. The internal war has fused with a regional confrontation. Ethiopia wants an outlet to the sea, and its neighbours fear it will seek one by force, at Assab or in Somaliland; Egypt, which depends on the Nile for about 90% of its fresh water, considers the Ethiopian dam an existential threat (Khaleej Times, cited above). Every enemy of Addis Ababa has an interest in weakening it, and Addis Ababa has an interest in presenting every rebellion as directed from abroad.

Who profits

We document declared or verifiable interests, not motives. If an actor denies something, we say so.

Abiy's government. Retaking Tigray allows it to install a friendly administration and to settle accounts with the TPLF, whose registration as a party it had already revoked. Abiy was sworn in for his second term promising to work towards an outlet to the sea (our analysis); a war with Eritrea, if it comes, would revolve around that port. The government denies having military designs on Eritrea: in March Abiy said Ethiopia would not go to war over the sea (Africanews).

The TPLF. It is fighting to return to power in Tigray, from which it was excluded by the elections and now by the caretaker administration. In its alliance with Fano and the OLA it has sought allies among peoples who were until recently its adversaries.

Eritrea. It fought against TPLF-led Ethiopia in 1998-2000, remained for eighteen years in a state of "no war, no peace", and in 2020 sent its troops into Tigray alongside Abiy (Gulf News, cited above). Today, according to the Ethiopian government, it finances the rebel alliance; Asmara denies it (Reuters, via Daily Maverick). Its declared interest is to prevent Ethiopia from gaining "sovereign access to the sea" at its expense (Political.org, cited above). On 13 October the Ethiopian army showed foreign diplomats weapons it says it seized from the TPLF, including Iranian-made and Turkish-Pakistani drones, as well as Eritrean uniforms and documents (Critical Threats, cited above).

Egypt and Sudan. For Cairo, a weak Ethiopia is an Ethiopia less able to manage the Nile dam on its own; together with Sudan it has for years demanded a binding agreement on the filling and operation of the dam (Khaleej Times, cited above). Both deny backing the rebels. Ethiopia and Sudan accuse each other of interfering in each other's wars (Al Jazeera).

Those who sell weapons. During the 2020-2022 war the United Arab Emirates organised an air bridge of more than 90 flights to Ethiopia, and satellite images showed Chinese Wing Loong drones at an Ethiopian base; in August 2021 Ethiopia signed a military cooperation agreement with Turkey (Al Jazeera). Since then the government has used drones, above all Turkish Bayraktar TB2s but also Chinese and Iranian models, in Tigray, Amhara and Oromia, with hundreds of civilian victims (The New Humanitarian).

Somalia and Somaliland. The 2024 memorandum with Somaliland pushed Mogadishu towards Cairo and Asmara. Today the Somali president says he does not object to Ethiopia having commercial access to Somali ports, provided it is agreed with Mogadishu (same source).

Who intervenes from outside

• The African Union. It mediated the Pretoria agreement in 2022 (our analysis); its headquarters are in Addis Ababa.
• The United States, the European Union, the United Kingdom, Canada. On 13 October 2026 Abiy's adviser Getachew Reda met the EU special envoy for the Horn of Africa; on the 14th US Secretary of State Rubio asked Abiy to respect sovereignty and end cross-border incursions; on the 15th Canada and the United Kingdom called for restraint (Critical Threats).
• The UN. Ethiopia has asked the Security Council to respond to the presence of Eritrean troops; Eritrea has asked the same against Ethiopia (Al Jazeera).

The human cost. There is no death toll for the current war. About 750,000 Tigrayans were still displaced in February 2026 from the previous war (UNHCR, cited by Reuters, via Daily Maverick). Across the country there are 1.9 million internally displaced people, and Ethiopia hosts 1.1 million refugees; malnutrition affects 4.4 million children and pregnant or breastfeeding women, and because of funding shortfalls emergency food aid covers 60% of the ration (WFP). In Tigray the regional administration has been unable to pay the salaries of about 137,000 civil servants since March, and the region also faces drought (Al Jazeera).

International law

The treaties. According to the University of Minnesota database (HRL Minnesota) and the UN (OHCHR), Ethiopia:

• has been a party to the Genocide Convention since 1949;
• has been a party to the Geneva Conventions since 1969 and to the two Additional Protocols since 1994;
• has been a party to the Convention against Torture since 1994 and to the Protocol on children in armed conflict since 2014;
• has not signed the Rome Statute: the International Criminal Court can act only on a referral from the Security Council, where such a decision can be blocked by the veto of a permanent member.

Eritrea, Egypt and Sudan are bound by international law just as Ethiopia is; the TPLF, the Fano and the OLA, as armed groups, are bound by humanitarian law just as the army is.

The internal conflict. Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and the Second Protocol apply: they prohibit attacks on civilians and on civilian objects such as schools and hospitals, require that aid be allowed through, and prohibit recruiting children under 15; the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child raises the limit to 18 for armed groups (our analysis).

Eritrea. If Eritrean troops operate on Ethiopian territory without the consent of the government in Addis Ababa, that is a use of force between states, prohibited by the UN Charter except in self-defence. Likewise, an Ethiopian attack on Eritrea to obtain a port would be an act of aggression. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea recognises a right of access to the sea for landlocked states, but the terms of transit must be agreed with the transit states (IBA, cited above): the sea is negotiated, not conquered.

Justice denied. No one has been tried internationally for the crimes of the 2020-2022 war. The Pretoria agreement, as we have written, is not a treaty with a judge but a political commitment (same source). For the Italian occupation, in 1946 Ethiopia raised the question of war crimes at the Paris Peace Conference without receiving an answer (Domani, cited above).

Timeline

Change log

• 22 October 2026: first version.

Sources: Britannica · IRB Canada, via ecoi.net · MRG · UNFPA · AP, via UNB · Rift Valley Institute, via ecoi.net · National Geographic · UNDP · Khaleej Times · IBA · Britannica · The Reporter, drawing on Richard Pankhurst · Domani · Al Jazeera · HRW · University of Pennsylvania · MSF · Gulf News · Eye Radio · Amnesty International · OHCHR · Reuters, via Polity · Political.org · Al Jazeera · Reuters, via Daily Maverick · Critical Threats · Daily Monitor, from Reuters · V-Dem · Africanews · Al Jazeera · The New Humanitarian · Al Jazeera · WFP · HRL Minnesota · OHCHR

Related pieces: Ethiopia, the war no one is covering: a guide to understanding it · Ethiopia: the peace signed in South Africa that no one defended · Ethiopia: the war the government still calls a “security problem”

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