
IWILLNOTLOOKAWAY.ORG
ANALYSIS
Haiti's vote slips to 2027. Meanwhile, two thousand of Bukele's soldiers arrive
1 November 2026 — Port-au-Prince, Haiti
In brief
- Haiti was due to vote again on 13 December. On 6 October the electoral council postponed everything indefinitely; on 28 October it set the first round for 18 July 2027. In early October one voter in eight was on the rolls.
- On the same day voters are supposed to approve some changes to the Constitution, which nobody has published yet. The 1987 Constitution expressly forbids amending it by referendum. The Council of Europe's experts accept this route as an exception, because there is no parliament, but warn that changes decided by unelected authorities have "very limited" legitimacy.
- The new electoral decree removed the rule excluding candidates sanctioned by foreign countries. Among those registered for the presidency is former president Michel Martelly, sanctioned by the United States and Canada on accusations of financing armed gangs.
- Since 18 October, after four of its servicemen were abducted, El Salvador has brought more than two thousand soldiers to Haiti: as many as the entire UN-authorised international force. Who commands them, how long they will stay and under what rules has not been said.
The context
Haiti has had no president since July 2021, when Jovenel Moïse was assassinated, and no elected parliament since January 2023. The last national elections were held in 2016. Since then the country has been governed by transitional authorities that nobody voted for.
The gangs filled the vacuum. The strongest coalition, Viv Ansanm, controls almost the whole capital and has spread towards the centre of the country. Nearly one and a half million people have fled their homes, and about half of them are children (UN, 19/10/2026).
On this site we covered the international force against the gangs as it was about to go into action, in June (Haiti: a "suppression force"), and its six-month renewal at the end of September, with the question of who investigates if one of its soldiers kills a civilian (Who controls who shoots?). Here we look at the other half of the problem: the vote, that is the way Haitians should take back the right to choose who governs them, and the new foreign soldiers who arrived just as that vote slipped away.
Who is who
| Who | What it is | What it says or wants |
|---|---|---|
| The gangs (Viv Ansanm and others) | A coalition formed in 2023, led among others by Jimmy Chérizier, known as "Barbecue". According to UN experts it is now riven by "violent fractures". | They live off kidnapping, extortion and control of the roads. Ahead of the vote, according to the UN, each leader is seeking political deals on his own. |
| The government | Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aimé, unelected, has been sole head of the executive since 7 February 2026, under a pact signed with parties and civil society. The pact has no end date. | Says elections will be held as soon as security allows and has asked ministers to stay neutral. |
| The Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) | The body that organises the vote. It is called "provisional" because the permanent one provided for by the Constitution has never been created. | Says the dates depend on security and funding. |
| The international force (GSF) | Authorised by the UN Security Council, but not commanded by the UN. On 12 October it had 1,563 troops out of the 5,550 planned. Mandate until 31 March 2027. | To fight the gangs together with the Haitian police and army. |
| El Salvador | Had just over a hundred servicemen in the GSF. Since 21 October it has sent more than two thousand. | President Nayib Bukele says he only wants to bring his four technicians home, "the easy way or the hard way". |
| The candidates | As of 24 October at least sixteen presidential candidates, including former president Michel Martelly and former prime minister Claude Joseph. | The CEP has yet to decide who is admitted. |
| The UN | In Haiti it has a political office (BINUH), which counts victims and documents violations, and an office that supplies the GSF. | Warns that setting new dates without assessing their feasibility is not enough. |
The facts
A vote that keeps receding. At the end of July the electoral council had set the first round of the presidential and legislative elections for 13 December 2026 (France 24, 27/7/2026). On 6 October it postponed it without giving a new date. On 28 October it published a new calendar: first round on 18 July 2027, second round and local elections on 4 October 2027 (Juno7, 28/10/2026). It is the third calendar in less than a year. The International Observatory for Democracy and Governance, a Haitian think tank, writes that the calendar was published without any explanation and that the string of missed dates amounts to a de facto extension of the transition (OIDG, via Le National, 29/10/2026).
Who can vote. As of 5 October there were 759,257 people on the electoral rolls, out of an estimated electorate of 6.5 million (UN, 19/10/2026). The reason is not just lack of interest. In several gang-controlled municipalities there is not even a registration centre, and gangs often close the roads (AFP, via Jamaica Observer, 29/10/2026). Displaced people often no longer have their documents, or an address. The CEP has also opened online registration.
A Constitution to change. On 18 July voters are also supposed to vote on a "popular ratification" of some changes to the Constitution, provided for by the electoral decree (HPN, 28/10/2026). The problem is twofold. First: the 1987 Constitution, written after the fall of the Duvalier dictatorship, in Article 284-3 explicitly forbids any popular consultation that amends the Constitution by referendum (Venice Commission of the Council of Europe). The drafters wanted it because in 1964 François Duvalier had himself proclaimed president for life through a rigged referendum (US Library of Congress, Haiti: a country study). Second: the text of the changes has not yet been published. At the end of September a civic association, ITIYAyiti, asked the government to make public both the changes and the legal reasoning by which it intends to distinguish this "ratification" from a prohibited referendum (ITIYAyiti, 28/9/2026). We found no reply. A year ago the transitional government had abandoned the plan for a new Constitution precisely because of criticism of its legality (ConstitutionNet, 13/10/2025). Now the idea is back, smaller and under another name.
There is, however, an authoritative opinion that complicates the picture. In 2024 the Venice Commission, the Council of Europe's body of constitutional experts, consulted through the Organization of American States, wrote that in Haiti the ordinary amendment procedure cannot be followed until elected institutions return. If it is decided to change the Constitution before the vote, it concluded, the changes should be approved by the people in a referendum, even though the current Constitution does not provide for it. But it added two conditions: changes decided by authorities that nobody elected would have "very limited" democratic legitimacy, and for that reason they must be kept to what is necessary and discussed as openly as possible (Venice Commission, opinions CDL-AD(2024)017 and CDL-AD(2024)042).
The candidates and the gangs. On 6 October the government published the third version of the electoral decree in four months. Among other things, the new text removed the rule excluding candidates sanctioned by foreign governments: only those sanctioned by the UN remain excluded (AP, via La Nación, 9/10/2026). On 23 October former president Michel Martelly filed his candidacy, followed by hundreds of supporters (AP, via Africanews, 24/10/2026). Canada sanctioned him in 2022 and the United States in 2024, accusing him of facilitating drug trafficking and sponsoring several gangs (US Treasury, 20/8/2024). Martelly has not been convicted by any court, and sanctions are not a judgment. The same applies to former Senate president Youri Latortue, sanctioned by the United States, Canada and the EU.
In early October the final report of the panel of experts assisting the UN sanctions committee on Haiti was made public: 94 pages on the ties between gangs, politicians and businesspeople (UN, S/2026/714). According to the experts, as the vote approaches those ties are being reactivated: gangs can offer territory, access to voters and "security" at polling stations in exchange for protection and rewards after the vote. The report accuses former deputy Alfrédo Junior Antoine of supplying weapons, ammunition and money to Viv Ansanm (AP, via Washington Times, 7/10/2026).
Bukele's soldiers. On 18 October in Croix-des-Bouquets, north-east of the capital, an armoured vehicle carrying Salvadoran GSF servicemen was attacked (UN, 19/10/2026). Four air force technicians went missing. On 21 October Salvadoran president Nayib Bukele threatened the gangs, in Creole, on X: if they do not release them, he will destroy them. On 24 October he said the human remains handed to his troops were not those of his men (CBC Barbados, 30/10/2026). Before the ambush El Salvador had at least 124 servicemen in Haiti, according to a UN report. On 27 October it had about a thousand, carried in part by US military aircraft (Reuters, 27/10/2026). On 28 October the Salvadoran government announced more than two thousand soldiers, "as part of a large-scale operation supported by various countries and international organisations". Bukele says El Salvador will pay 90% of the costs and that this is not an invasion.
Two thousand soldiers are more than the entire Haitian army and about as many as the entire UN-authorised international force (CNN, 29/10/2026). But who commands them has not been said, nor how long they will stay (Reuters, 27/10/2026). It is unclear whether they will join the GSF or operate on their own (Al Jazeera, 29/10/2026). The Haitian government has said only that the two countries will strengthen cooperation. A Salvadoran analyst interviewed by Reuters expects at least some of the soldiers to operate outside the GSF chain of command and to coordinate with Erik Prince's private military company, which already works for the Haitian government.
In El Salvador, since March 2022, the state of exception imposed by Bukele against the gangs has led to the arrest of tens of thousands of people, many with no established link to gangs. Socorro Jurídico Humanitario, a Salvadoran organisation that assists detainees' families, has counted at least 554 deaths in prison up to August 2026, almost all of people awaiting trial (EFE, via Diario Libre, 3/8/2026). The Salvadoran government has not commented. Pierre Espérance, who heads Haiti's main human rights network (RNDDH), welcomed the rapid arrival of the Salvadorans, but pointed out that not everyone living in gang-held neighbourhoods is a gang member (Reuters, 27/10/2026).
Who is shooting. Between July and early October gang-related violence killed 1,123 people. In the West and Artibonite departments gangs killed 241 people accused of resisting their control, and in July and August they raped 689 women and girls. But more than half of those killed and injured (52%) fell during operations by the security forces, and 148 of them had no links to gangs (UN, 19/10/2026). The UN experts' report also reports summary executions of children accused of being with the gangs, by security forces and self-defence groups (Security Council Report, 2026). This is the figure to keep in mind as new soldiers arrive.
Legal commentary
The right to vote. Haiti acceded in 1991 to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Article 25 guarantees every citizen the right to vote in periodic and genuine elections. The UN Human Rights Committee, which interprets the Covenant, asks states to take effective measures so that those entitled can actually vote, to facilitate registration and to overcome obstacles such as impediments to freedom of movement (General Comment No. 25, § 11). Postponing a vote amid violence is not in itself a violation: voting under gang control would not be a free vote. But the longer the postponement, the more it needs public, verifiable reasons and a plan. Ten years without elections, and three calendars in a year without explanation, are not that.
The Constitution. Article 284-3 is clear: any popular consultation that amends the Constitution by referendum is prohibited. The Constitution provides another route, long and difficult: two successive legislatures, two-thirds majorities in both chambers. Today there is no parliament, and that makes the ordinary route impossible. This is the argument of necessity, which the Venice Commission accepted: when institutions do not exist, one may step outside the Constitution to rebuild them. But necessity justifies only what is truly needed, and whoever invokes it must prove it. The Haitian government has not done so: it has published neither the text of the changes nor the legal reasoning. Calling the vote a "ratification" instead of a "referendum" does not change its substance. Without a public, limited and debated text, a Constitution amended by a government nobody elected would be contestable from birth, and so would the power of whoever is elected under it.
Foreign soldiers. A state may send soldiers onto another's territory in three cases: if the Security Council authorises it, if the receiving state consents, or in self-defence. For Salvadorans who join the GSF the basis is clear: Security Council resolutions 2793 and 2829. For those who stay outside it, the only possible basis is the consent of the Haitian government. The Fils-Aimé government is not elected, but it is the one the UN and other states recognise, and under international law its consent counts. Consent, however, is not a blank cheque: it covers what the government has accepted, and nobody has made that public.
It also matters where the rules end. Resolution 2793 asks states taking part in the GSF for a mechanism to prevent, investigate and publicly report abuses. A contingent outside the GSF is not covered by it. Its soldiers answer to their own country's courts. El Salvador nonetheless remains bound by the human rights treaties it has signed, including the American Convention on Human Rights, even when its soldiers operate abroad, in the places and over the people they control. If a Salvadoran soldier kills a civilian in Port-au-Prince outside the GSF, today the question "who investigates?" has only one answer: Salvadoran justice, that is, the justice of the state of exception.
The gangs. Kidnapping, rape, killing those who resist, recruiting children: these are crimes under Haitian law and grave human rights violations. The UN has a sanctions regime against those who lead and finance them, renewed on 14 October by resolution 2831: 14 votes in favour and Russia abstaining (Security Council Report). It is the only one the new electoral decree considers for excluding a candidate.
Symmetry test
- The gangs. They are the primary cause of all this: they have killed, raped and driven hundreds of thousands of people from their homes, and today they prevent many from registering to vote. Nothing we say about the others makes them less guilty.
- The security forces. They are fighting a real enemy. But according to the UN more than half of the victims in recent months fell in their operations. The same yardstick applies to everyone who shoots: gangs, police, GSF, contractors, and from now on the Salvadorans.
- The government. The reasons for the postponement are real: violence, the money that is lacking. But the postponement also suits those who govern without a mandate and without an end date. And the government has changed the voting rules three times in four months, once removing a filter against candidates tied to gangs.
- Bukele. He has a duty to search for his men, and the speed of the response has convinced even some Haitian human rights defenders. But a rescue operation does not need two thousand soldiers, and if it becomes a campaign against the gangs it must have a public mandate and rules of oversight. We used the same yardstick for the Rwandan soldiers in Mozambique, who arrived at the government's invitation and were praised for their effectiveness (Mozambique, Cabo Delgado).
- The United States and the other partners. They sanctioned Martelly and designated the two main gang coalitions as terrorist organisations. They also provided the aircraft for the Salvadoran soldiers, without it being said under what mandate. Those who call for credible elections in Haiti must also demand clear rules from those who send or carry soldiers.
What has worked
The electoral council has registered more than 35 parties and groupings and some 3,500 candidates for the various offices, and has opened online registration. Registration on the rolls, though low, has grown: from about half a million in early September to just under nine hundred thousand at the end of October, according to the Miami Herald as cited by Al Jazeera. The UN experts' report named those accused of arming the gangs. And the UN sanctions regime has been renewed. These are small steps, but in the right direction.
What we do not know
- Who commands the Salvadoran soldiers, under what rules of engagement and until when they will stay. Neither the Haitian nor the Salvadoran government has said.
- What has happened to the four Salvadoran technicians.
- Which changes to the Constitution are to be voted on 18 July.
- Which of the registered candidates the electoral council will admit.
- What will happen to the GSF after 31 March 2027, almost four months before the vote.
Our judgement
This section expresses the site's position. It is separate from the facts set out above.
Haiti is a country where for ten years nobody has chosen who governs it. In that vacuum others have decided in the place of Haitians: the gangs with weapons, politicians with the gangs, foreign governments with their soldiers. The vote is the only way to put the choice back in Haitians' hands. That is why the way it is reached matters as much as the date.
Postponing may be necessary. Voting at a gang's gunpoint is not voting. But those who postpone without explaining, change the rules every season, remove the filter on candidates tied to gangs and meanwhile prepare a change to the Constitution without publishing a single line of it, are not preparing an election. They are extending a transition that nobody voted for.
And if Haiti cannot yet choose, those who decide for it must answer more, not less. That applies to the Haitian government, which must publish the text of the constitutional changes and the terms of the agreement with El Salvador. It applies to Bukele, who has brought two thousand soldiers into a foreign country saying only that it is not an invasion. And it applies to the Security Council, which in March must decide whether to renew the GSF: it cannot pretend that a second foreign army, with no public mandate, has not sprung up beside it.
What to watch
- The final list of admitted candidates and the decision on Martelly's candidacy.
- Publication of the text of the constitutional changes and of their legal basis.
- The status of the Salvadoran soldiers: agreement with Haiti, integration into the GSF, rules of engagement, duration.
- The fate of the four Salvadoran technicians.
- The next UN (BINUH) report on victims, with the share attributed to the security forces.
- The renewal of the GSF by 31 March 2027.
Sources: UN, 19/10/2026 · France 24, 27/7/2026 · Juno7, 28/10/2026 · OIDG, via Le National, 29/10/2026 · AFP, via Jamaica Observer, 29/10/2026 · HPN, 28/10/2026 · Venice Commission of the Council of Europe · US Library of Congress, Haiti: a country study · ITIYAyiti, 28/9/2026 · ConstitutionNet, 13/10/2025 · Venice Commission, opinions CDL-AD(2024)017 and CDL-AD(2024)042 · AP, via La Nación, 9/10/2026 · AP, via Africanews, 24/10/2026 · US Treasury, 20/8/2024 · UN, S/2026/714 · AP, via Washington Times, 7/10/2026 · CBC Barbados, 30/10/2026 · Reuters, 27/10/2026 · CNN, 29/10/2026 · Al Jazeera, 29/10/2026 · EFE, via Diario Libre, 3/8/2026 · Security Council Report, 2026 · General Comment No. 25, § 11 · Security Council Report
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