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ANALYSIS
Mozambique, Cabo Delgado: the gas has restarted, the war has not
29 October 2026 — Cabo Delgado, Mozambique
In brief
- Northern Mozambique has been at war for nine years. On one side is an armed group linked to the Islamic State; on the other, the Mozambican army, helped by Rwandan troops. More than 6,600 people have died. In all, more than a million people have fled their homes.
- In the middle of the war lies one of Africa's largest gas fields. The project led by France's TotalEnergies, halted since 2021, restarted in January. It is guarded by a military force that the company itself helped to fund.
- Those soldiers face grave accusations: a massacre of civilians locked in shipping containers in 2021, sexual violence documented in a UN report that was never published, fishermen killed at sea this year. In France, TotalEnergies faces a judicial investigation and a complaint for complicity in war crimes. The company rejects every accusation.
- Europe trains and equips this army. Until May it also paid part of the cost of the Rwandan troops, the same troops the United States has sanctioned over the war in Congo. By 31 December the EU must decide whether to renew its military mission in Mozambique.
Background
Cabo Delgado is Mozambique's northernmost province, on the border with Tanzania. It is one of the poorest in the country. Beneath its sea lie huge gas reserves, and inland there are ruby and graphite mines.
On 5 October 2017 an armed group attacked Mocímboa da Praia, a port on the coast. People call it al-Shabaab, but it has nothing to do with the Somali group of the same name. Since 2018 it has pledged allegiance to the Islamic State, which now calls it "Islamic State Mozambique". According to the researchers who follow it closely, the group grew mainly out of local causes: young people without work, land and resources taken from communities, a distant government accused of shutting the north out of the country's wealth (ISS, October 2025). Jihadist ideology came later, and served to recruit.
It is a crisis almost nobody reports. The Norwegian Refugee Council has placed it, two years running, among the ten most neglected displacement crises in the world (NRC, June 2025; June 2026). For 2026 the UN asked for 348 million dollars to help 1.1 million people, and by the end of March it had received about a third of that (UN humanitarian plan, reported by ACLED, 8/4/2026).
Who's who
| Who | What it is | What it says or wants |
|---|---|---|
| Islamic State Mozambique (al-Shabaab) | Armed group active since 2017, affiliated with the Islamic State. | Wants to impose its religious law. Attacks villages, churches, soldiers. |
| Government of Mozambique | President Daniel Chapo, since January 2025. The Frelimo party has governed since independence (1975). | Asks for international help against "terrorism"; rejects the accusations against its soldiers. |
| Mozambican armed forces (FADM) | Fight the group; a special unit guards the gas area. | Deny the abuses. |
| Rwandan army | About 2,000 soldiers, in Cabo Delgado since July 2021 at Mozambique's invitation. | Says it defends African security; asks those who benefit to pay for the mission. |
| TotalEnergies | Leads the Mozambique LNG consortium (26.5%): about 20 billion dollars, among the largest private investments in Africa. | Rejects every accusation; says it had no staff on site in the months of the alleged events. |
| European Union | Has trained and equipped units of the Mozambican army since 2021. | Says it supports the protection of civilians and respect for humanitarian law. |
The facts
Palma, March 2021. The armed group attacks Palma, the town next to the gas site. The government speaks of some thirty dead. The journalist Alex Perry, after five months of research, counted 1,402 dead or missing, including 55 workers of the site's contractors (AFP, 15/3/2025). TotalEnergies evacuates its staff and in April halts everything, declaring "force majeure".
The containers of Afungi, summer 2021. Since 2020 an agreement between TotalEnergies' subsidiary and the government had entrusted the protection of the site to a special army unit, the Joint Task Force, to which the company provided material and logistical support (ECCHR, 18/11/2025). In September 2024 Perry wrote in Politico that, between July and September 2021, those soldiers locked between 180 and 250 men in metal shipping containers at the entrance to the site. They were civilians fleeing the war, accused of siding with the rebels. Many were beaten, starved, killed or disappeared. In September Rwandan soldiers found 26 of them alive and freed them (Politico, 26/9/2024). In October 2023, on the advice of a report commissioned by TotalEnergies itself, the agreement had been changed: no more direct payments to the soldiers, but a contribution to the State (Clingendael, November 2025).
What they say. TotalEnergies says that between April and November 2021 none of its employees was on site, and that its internal checks found nothing to confirm the account (Mozambique LNG, November 2024). It asked the Mozambican authorities to investigate. Mozambique's attorney general opened a criminal inquiry in March 2025. The National Human Rights Commission, in a statement on 17 March 2026, wrote that so far it had found no evidence of torture or executions within the project's perimeter, and that the inquiry continues (Lusa, 17/3/2026). President Chapo denies there were any violations. On the other side is the report by the Dutch institute Clingendael, commissioned by the Dutch Ministry of Finance, which guaranteed the loan through its export credit agency. The researchers conducted more than 80 interviews in the districts of Palma and Mocímboa da Praia. They do not establish the individual details, but they judge the account credible as a whole: four independent local sources confirm that many civilians were detained and mistreated by the security forces in front of the site (Clingendael, November 2025). TotalEnergies objected that the authors did not go to the site in person and relied on information gathered by third parties (TotalEnergies, 2/12/2025).
In France. Two proceedings concern TotalEnergies. The first, opened by investigating judges in Nanterre in March 2025, stems from a complaint by survivors and relatives of the victims of Palma: involuntary manslaughter and failure to assist the contractors' workers (Reuters, 15/3/2025). The second is a complaint filed on 17 November 2025 by the European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR), a German organisation: complicity in war crimes, torture and enforced disappearances over the container events. We have found no report of an investigation opened on this second complaint. TotalEnergies "categorically" rejects the accusations.
The gas restarts. On 7 November 2025 the consortium lifted force majeure, and on 29 January 2026 it fully resumed work (TotalEnergies, 29/1/2026). First gas is expected in 2029. Not all the lenders stayed. On 1 December 2025 the United Kingdom withdrew a public loan of 1.15 billion dollars, saying the risks had grown (statement by minister Peter Kyle, 1/12/2025). The Dutch export credit agency did the same. The United States, by contrast, had approved a 4.7 billion loan in March 2025 (EXIM, 19/3/2025). Off the same coast, Italy's Eni has produced gas from a floating platform since 2022, and in October 2025 it decided to build a second one (Eni, 2/10/2025). Some UN human rights experts criticised the African Development Bank's loan to this second project, because it risks worsening human rights violations and the climate crisis (OHCHR, March 2026).
The report the UN did not publish. In June 2026 Forbidden Stories, a network of investigative journalists, revealed a 2024 report by the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) that had been left in a drawer. It gathers testimony from women and girls in Cabo Delgado. It describes rape and sexual violence by the armed group and also by army soldiers, even against minors, almost always unpunished. It describes women forced to trade sex for humanitarian aid. And it reports that some men linked to the gas site, including employees and subcontractors, allegedly sexually exploited women who had come to Palma looking for work (Forbidden Stories and Zitamar, 18/6/2026). In the report, TotalEnergies' name was almost always replaced with the phrase "a multinational energy company". The UN says conditions on the ground did not allow the text to be brought up to the standards required for publication. TotalEnergies rejects the accusations and says its reporting system has never received such complaints. An internal project report obtained by the Italian organisation ReCommon shows, however, that in 2022 the project had been informed of "several cases" of misconduct by the Joint Task Force in nearby villages.
The fishermen. To fight the rebels, who also move by sea, the army has banned fishing along some stretches of coast. Many fishermen go out anyway, because they have nothing else. On 15 March 2026 a navy patrol boat opened fire on six boats off Mocímboa da Praia: at least 13 dead (Zitamar, March 2026; Human Rights Watch, 30/3/2026). According to ACLED, similar incidents have killed about 70 fishermen since 2024. On 25 March, at a meeting with the community of Mocímboa da Praia, military and police commanders admitted responsibility and apologised (Zitamar, 26/3/2026). The armed forces' official position, however, has not changed: they deny it, and blame the killings on rebels in uniform (Zitamar, 19/10/2026).
And the rebels. The armed group remains the main perpetrator of the violence: of about 2,400 incidents recorded by ACLED since 2017, more than nine in ten involve it (ACLED, June 2026). It beheads civilians, burns villages and churches, abducts children. In 2025 Human Rights Watch counted at least 120 abducted children, used as porters, forced labourers, fighters or brides (HRW, 24/6/2025). In August and September this year it targeted civilians more and more often, in the districts of Mocímboa da Praia, Muidumbe and Macomia (ACLED and Zitamar, 6/10/2026). Between late September and early October another 4,445 people fled the districts of Macomia and Mocímboa da Praia (IOM, 6/10/2026).
Who pays the soldiers. Rwanda sent its troops in July 2021, at Mozambique's invitation. They are considered the most effective force on the ground, and many are deployed around the gas area. Since 2022 the European Union has paid part of the mission: 40 million euros in two tranches, through the European Peace Facility (EU Council, 2024). On 2 March 2026 the United States sanctioned the Rwandan army and four of its generals for supporting the M23 rebels in eastern Congo (US Treasury sanctions, 2/3/2026), whose background we set out in the DR Congo country profile. Rwanda rejects the sanctions as "unjust". In May the European funds ran out, without renewal. Since then, Rwanda has said, Mozambique pays (Lusa, 29/5/2026). The EU, meanwhile, has spent 89 million euros to equip eleven rapid reaction companies of the Mozambican army, trained by an EU military mission led by Portugal (Lusa, 2/9/2026). That mission's mandate expires on 31 December 2026 (Lusa, 14/5/2026).
Legal commentary
It is a war, not just terrorism. The government speaks of a fight against terrorism. For international law, what counts is something else: how intense the fighting is and how organised the armed group is. The Geneva Academy's research centre that classifies conflicts (RULAC) considers Cabo Delgado a non-international armed conflict (Geneva Academy, RULAC). The rules of humanitarian law therefore apply, in particular Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions. They protect those who do not fight and those who have been captured: no killing, no torture, no cruel treatment, no disappearances. The rules bind all parties, the armed group and the army alike. Calling the enemy "terrorists" does not suspend them.
The children. In 2004 Mozambique ratified the UN Protocol that forbids armed groups from recruiting anyone under 18. Conscripting or using children under 15 in hostilities is a war crime. The first duty to protect them, search for them and reintegrate them lies with the State.
The fishermen. A State may restrict fishing in a war zone. It may not fire on unarmed civilians simply because they broke a ban. The right to life, protected by the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and by the African Charter, also requires an investigation into every suspicious death. The apology is a step. An investigation with public results would be the next one.
Who can judge. Mozambique signed the Rome Statute in 2000 but has never ratified it (PGA). So the International Criminal Court cannot investigate, unless Mozambique accepts its jurisdiction or the Security Council refers the case. That leaves Mozambican courts: for the containers and for the fishermen, no soldiers have been tried so far. It also leaves the courts of other countries, where there is a link to them. France is such a case: TotalEnergies is a French company, and the Paris anti-terrorism prosecutor's office also has jurisdiction over war crimes.
Companies. A company is not an army. But the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (2011) ask companies not to contribute to violations, including through those who protect them. If a company pays or equips an armed force, it must know how that force behaves and react when serious warning signs arrive. In France this duty has been law since 2017: the law on the "duty of vigilance" of large companies. The ECCHR complaint claims that TotalEnergies knew of the accusations against the Mozambican army as early as 2020. The company says it did not. A judge will decide, if someone opens an investigation.
Europe. The decisions by which the EU funded the Rwandan soldiers require the beneficiary to respect humanitarian law and human rights, and to report regularly on how it uses the support (CFSP Decision 2022/2354). The problem is checking it. According to the Institute for Security Studies, the EU has no concrete way of making sure that the money does not also help Rwanda's operations in Congo (ISS, April 2026). The same goes for the Mozambican army: equipping it only makes sense if those who do wrong are held to account.
Symmetry test
- The armed group. It is the main party responsible for the deaths and the mass flight. It beheads, abducts children, attacks people of other faiths. None of the accusations against the soldiers makes it any less guilty.
- The government. It has a real enemy and a population to protect. It accepted 284 of the 292 recommendations of its latest UN human rights review (Zitamar, 19/10/2026). But on the container events it denies everything. On the fishermen, local commanders apologised, while the official version still denies. We have found no report of soldiers convicted for abuses against civilians in Cabo Delgado.
- TotalEnergies. It is entitled to the presumption of innocence. The gravest accusations come from journalistic investigations and from a complaint, not from a verdict. But whoever pays an army for its own security must answer for how that army provides it.
- Those who want the gas. The African Energy Chamber called the British withdrawal an example of Western priorities overriding the needs of Africa, where many people have no electricity (bne IntelliNews, 3/12/2025). It is a serious argument: Mozambique has the right to use its resources to grow. But Cabo Delgado's gas is destined mainly for export, to Europe and Asia.
- Rwanda. The same army that is praised in Cabo Delgado for bringing back some security is sanctioned in Congo for supporting an armed group. Rwanda rejects the sanctions. But Europe cannot judge it differently depending on the country.
- Europe. In Ukraine it demands that those who commit war crimes answer for them. In Mozambique it pays and equips armies accused of abuses, without publicly asking for an account of those accusations. And it needs the gas from that coast.
What has worked
Rwandan troops and the trained units have retaken many areas the rebels had occupied, and in Cabo Delgado alone about 670,000 displaced people are recorded as having returned home (IOM, June 2026). Part of the truth has come out thanks to local and foreign journalists, Human Rights Watch, ACLED and Zitamar, who count the incidents one by one. And in the case of the fishermen, the community's protests led the commanders to apologise in front of the families, and according to ACLED the navy then scaled back its operations against boats (ACLED, 8/4/2026). It is little, but it is not nothing.
What we don't know
- How many men really died in the containers of Afungi. The figures come from a journalistic investigation and from testimony. No authority has confirmed them.
- What TotalEnergies knew, and when. Only an independent investigation or a trial can establish that.
- Who will pay for the Rwandan troops, and for how long. Mozambique has said it will, but not how.
- Whether the EU will renew its military mission after 31 December.
Our judgement
This section states the site's position. It is separate from the facts set out above.
In Cabo Delgado the word "security" has two meanings. For the gas site it means fences, soldiers, protected investments. For those who live there it means being able to go back to their village, go out to sea to fish, and fear neither the rebels nor those who are supposed to defend them. So far the first meaning has fared better than the second.
Nobody here defends the armed group. It has killed thousands of people and abducted children. Fighting it is the government's duty. But an army fighting terror cannot become another terror for those around it. And whoever pays it, arms it or trains it, be it a company or the European Union, cannot say they did not know.
By 31 December the EU will decide whether to keep training that army. We are not asking for Mozambique to be left alone. We are asking for one simple condition: that every euro spent comes with a public question about what happened in the containers of Afungi and at sea off Mocímboa da Praia. And that the question gets an answer.
What to watch
- The EU Council's decision on the military mission in Mozambique (mandate expiring on 31/12/2026).
- The ECCHR complaint in Paris: whether the anti-terrorism prosecutor opens an investigation.
- The Nanterre investigation into Palma.
- The final findings of the National Human Rights Commission and of Mozambique's attorney general.
- New population movements recorded by IOM and ACLED's monthly data.
Sources: ISS, October 2025 · NRC, June 2025 · June 2026 · UN humanitarian plan, reported by ACLED, 8/4/2026 · AFP, 15/3/2025 · ECCHR, 18/11/2025 · Politico, 26/9/2024 · Clingendael, November 2025 · Mozambique LNG, November 2024 · Lusa, 17/3/2026 · TotalEnergies, 2/12/2025 · Reuters, 15/3/2025 · TotalEnergies, 29/1/2026 · statement by minister Peter Kyle, 1/12/2025 · EXIM, 19/3/2025 · Eni, 2/10/2025 · OHCHR, March 2026 · Forbidden Stories and Zitamar, 18/6/2026 · Zitamar, March 2026 · Human Rights Watch, 30/3/2026 · Zitamar, 26/3/2026 · Zitamar, 19/10/2026 · ACLED, June 2026 · HRW, 24/6/2025 · ACLED and Zitamar, 6/10/2026 · EU Council, 2024 · US Treasury sanctions, 2/3/2026 · Lusa, 29/5/2026 · Lusa, 2/9/2026 · Lusa, 14/5/2026 · Geneva Academy, RULAC · PGA · CFSP Decision 2022/2354 · ISS, April 2026 · bne IntelliNews, 3/12/2025
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