Ethiopia

1/3 · ANALYSIS · 6 October 2026

Ethiopia, the war no one is covering: a guide to understanding it

On 3 October, in Mekelle, residents watched the Tigrayan fighters leave the city. A few hours later came first the militiamen of a Tigrayan formation allied with the government, then the federal army (Al Jazeera). There was no battle. For the third time in six years the capital of Tigray, in northern Ethiopia, changed hands; for days communications were cut and the people who live there feared looting (AP). In Italy the news went almost unnoticed. Yet in 2020-2022 Ethiopia fought one of the deadliest wars of this century, and today that war is starting again, wider than before. This guide tries to explain who is fighting, why, and what is at stake beyond Ethiopia's borders too.

The country in three minutes

Ethiopia has about 135 million inhabitants, according to UN estimates for 2025 (UNFPA): it is the second most populous country in Africa after Nigeria, with more than twice the population of Italy. Tigray alone, where the war began, has about 7 million. The country hosts the headquarters of the African Union and has no access to the sea: it lost it in 1993, when Eritrea became independent and took the whole coastline with it, including the port of Assab. Since the 1995 Constitution it has been a federation of regions drawn largely along ethnic lines: Tigray, Amhara, Oromia, Afar, Somali and others. It is a country of about 80 ethnic groups, and its political fault lines often follow identity lines.

Abiy Ahmed has governed since 2018. In 2019 he received the Nobel Peace Prize for ending the conflict with Eritrea. A year later he was at war in Tigray, with Eritrea as an ally. On 5 October 2026 he was sworn in for a second five-year term.

How we got here

• 2018. The Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), which had dominated the federal government for 27 years, loses power after years of protests. Abiy becomes prime minister.
• 2020-2022. War between the federal government and the TPLF. Eritrean troops and Amhara militias fight alongside the army. Estimates of the dead range from fewer than 100,000 (Ethiopian officials) to about 600,000 (the African Union mediator Olusegun Obasanjo). On 2 November 2022 the Pretoria agreement, signed in South Africa, ends the war: we covered it here.
• 2023. The government tries to disarm Amhara's regional forces. The Fano militias, which had fought alongside the army, rise up (the war in Amhara).
• 2025. The TPLF's registration as a party is revoked. Tigray is excluded from the national elections of June 2026 (The Conversation).
• April 2026. The TPLF removes the interim administration set up under the Pretoria agreement and reinstates the former regional president, Debretsion Gebremichael (Crisis Group).
• Summer 2026. Federal drone strikes on Tigray. The TPLF denounces a blockade of funds, fuel and access to banks; recruitment and mobilisation resume in the region.
• 20 September. Seven armed groups announce an alliance to overthrow the government (Africanews).
• 22-23 September. Between 15 and 17 drone strikes hit Alamata, in southern Tigray, including schools and a hospital, according to the monitoring group ACLED. The next day the TPLF takes the airports of Mekelle, Axum and Shire and attacks towards Amhara and Afar. It calls it a "defensive war".
• 28 September - 4 October. Federal counter-offensive: Alamata, then Mekelle's airport, then the city.

Who is fighting

The government side

• ENDF: the Ethiopian National Defense Force, the federal army. It has an air force and drones.
• Tigray Peace Force (TPF): a Tigrayan militia born from a split in Tigray's forces, now allied with the government. It was the first to enter Mekelle.
• Regional police forces and local militias.

The opposition alliance (the "Ethiopian People's Forces Alliance for Survival", 20 September 2026). Stated goal: to remove Abiy's government and open a transition.

• TPLF: the Tigray People's Liberation Front, with its armed forces. The strongest member.
• Fano (AFNM): Amhara nationalist militias, unified in the Amhara Fano National Movement. Their leader, Zemene Kassie, chairs the alliance.
• OLA: the Oromo Liberation Army, waging a guerrilla war since 2018 in Oromia, the most populous region.
• The Afar front: an armed group from Afar, the region crossed by the road and railway to Djibouti. Sources name it differently (ANURF, or Ugugumo, the historical name of the Afar insurgency).
• ONLF: the Ogaden National Liberation Front, in the Somali region. A faction abroad has joined; the leaders inside Ethiopia deny being part of it.
• BPLM and GPDM: two movements from the Benishangul-Gumuz region, on the border with Sudan.

Two caveats for reading this list. First: on paper there are seven members, but according to ACLED, as of 26 September only three of them were actually fighting: the TPLF, the Fano and the Afar group Ugugumo (Al Jazeera). The second is a paradox: the Fano now fighting alongside the TPLF are the same ones who in 2020-2022 fought against it alongside the federal army. And they remain divided on a decisive question: both Tigrayans and Amhara claim western Tigray, which the Amhara call Wolkait. The alliance unites groups that share an enemy, not a project.

Why they are fighting

Each side tells the story of this war differently, and the versions must be kept apart.

For the federal government, the TPLF violated the Pretoria agreement: it did not complete disarmament, overthrew the interim administration and attacked first on 23 September, with the help of foreign countries.

For the TPLF, it is Addis Ababa that hollowed out the agreement: Tigray was not reintegrated into federal institutions, the party was struck off, the region was excluded from the vote and strangled economically, and the drones struck before the offensive.

On some points independent sources agree. The question of the disputed territories, western and southern Tigray, was never resolved, and hundreds of thousands of displaced people have been unable to return home. The political mechanisms set up after the war have broken down. And the other insurgencies, in Amhara and Oromia, stem from grievances of their own, which the conflict in Tigray did not create but has made easier to weld together.

What is at stake beyond Ethiopia

The sea and Eritrea. For Abiy, access to the Red Sea is an existential question. In September 2025 he called the loss of the sea a historic mistake that "will be corrected", and the return of the Eritrean port of Assab "a matter of time" (The Reporter). In 2026 he repeated that Ethiopia does not intend to invade anyone, but will not stop asking for a port (Africanews); on 5 October, being sworn in for his second term, he said he would work to secure an outlet to the sea (Al Jazeera). Eritrea fears precisely an invasion, and accuses Ethiopia of waging war to reach the sea. On 29 September Ethiopia's army chief, Field Marshal Birhanu Jula, accused Eritrea, Sudan and Egypt of backing the armed groups, describing Eritrea as the go-between linking foreign powers and the rebels. The three countries rejected the accusations (Al Jazeera). On 1 October Ethiopia closed its embassy in Asmara and expelled ten Eritrean diplomats and one Egyptian; Eritrea responded by severing diplomatic relations, Egypt by expelling an Ethiopian diplomat (Al Jazeera).

Sudan. The accusations mirror each other. Ethiopia accuses Sudanese forces of backing the TPLF and the other armed groups; the Sudanese army calls this "baseless" and in turn accuses Ethiopia of helping the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which it has been fighting since 2023. Addis Ababa denies it.

The Nile. On 9 September 2025 Ethiopia inaugurated the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Blue Nile, the largest hydroelectric plant in Africa, with more than 5,000 megawatts. Egypt and Sudan, which depend on the river's waters downstream, see it as a threat and contest Addis Ababa's unilateral decisions. Negotiations between the three countries are stalled (Al Jazeera).

Somaliland. In January 2024 Ethiopia signed a memorandum with Somaliland, Somalia's breakaway region, to obtain access to the sea in exchange for possible recognition. Somalia considered it a violation of its sovereignty, and the memorandum was later shelved. On 26 December 2025 Israel became the first state to recognise Somaliland (The EastAfrican); Ethiopia has not done so and has taken no official position.

Djibouti. Almost all of Ethiopia's foreign trade, fuel included, passes through the port of Djibouti, along the road and railway that cross Afar. That is where part of the fighting has moved.

El Alamein. On 4 October, as the army was entering Mekelle, the leaders of Egypt, Sudan, Eritrea and Somalia met in Egypt. In their final declaration they reject any interference in the internal affairs of the region's states, any recognition of Somaliland, any unilateral measure on the Nile that harms Egypt and Sudan, and they claim the governance of the Red Sea for the coastal states alone (text of the declaration). They also set up a permanent consultation mechanism. They do not name Ethiopia, but every point concerns it. It is a snapshot of a regional bloc that has closed ranks against Addis Ababa.

Legal reading

1. The protection of civilians applies to everyone. In an internal armed conflict, Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II, which Ethiopia ratified in 1994, apply. They prohibit attacks on civilians, protect schools and hospitals and prohibit pillage (Protocol II, Article 4). The obligations apply equally to the federal army, to the militias fighting alongside it and to the alliance's armed groups. The drone strikes on schools and a hospital in Alamata, and any looting in Mekelle, must be measured by this standard, whoever is responsible.

2. Helping another country's rebels is prohibited. International law prohibits states from intervening in the internal affairs of another state by arming or funding rebel groups (the prohibition of the use of force, UN Charter, Article 2(4), and the principle of non-intervention, as clarified by the International Court of Justice in Nicaragua v. United States in 1986). If Ethiopia's accusations against Eritrea, Sudan and Egypt were proven, that would be a violation. But the same applies to Sudan's accusation that Ethiopia is backing the RSF. Today these are accusations, all denied, and they must be treated as accusations.

3. Asking for a port is lawful, taking one is not. A landlocked state may negotiate access and corridors. It may not threaten the use of force against the territorial integrity of another state (Article 2(4)). Assab is Eritrean territory. Abiy's words swing between historical claim and the promise not to use force: it is actions, not speeches, that decide which side of the line he falls on.

4. The Nile has two principles, not one. Customary law on international rivers holds together the equitable and reasonable use of waters, which Ethiopia invokes, and the obligation not to cause significant harm to other riparian states, which Egypt and Sudan invoke. On 23 March 2015 the three countries signed in Khartoum a Declaration of Principles that refers to both (principles III and IV) and commits them to settle disputes through negotiation (principle X). None of the three, however, has joined the 1997 UN Convention on international watercourses, which codifies the same rules: in the General Assembly vote Ethiopia and Egypt abstained, while Sudan voted in favour but has never ratified it. Neither principle prevails on its own: that is why negotiations are needed, and why their deadlock is a problem.

5. Somalia's territorial integrity. Recognising a breakaway region without the consent of the state it belongs to is considered, in prevailing practice, an interference with that state's territorial integrity. Ethiopia's 2024 memorandum and Israel's 2025 recognition must be measured against this principle.

The symmetry test

The four leaders at El Alamein invoked sovereignty, non-interference and international law. These are sound principles, and they apply to everyone, including them. In November 2021 a joint investigation by the UN Human Rights Office and the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission attributed to Eritrean troops unlawful killings, torture and sexual violence against civilians in Tigray (OHCHR). The Sudanese army led by Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, a signatory of the declaration, is accused by a UN fact-finding mission of drone strikes on hospitals and markets, as we have documented. Invoking legality does not absolve those who invoke it.

The same goes for the Ethiopian government, which demands respect for its own sovereignty while claiming someone else's port and is accused of backing a militia in Sudan. And it goes for the alliance, which presents itself as the defence of Ethiopia's peoples. The same 2021 investigation documented serious violations by all the parties to the war: the federal army, Eritrean troops, Amhara forces and militias, Tigrayan forces. Those who fight together today have a past of reciprocal violence against the civilians of each other's communities.

Editorial judgement

This section expresses the site's position. It is separate from the facts set out above.

The war in Ethiopia has every feature that, elsewhere, would guarantee front pages: a country of enormous size, an international peace agreement collapsing, a concrete risk of war between states, a strategic trade route under threat. In Italy it arrives in a few lines. Part of the reason is complexity: too many acronyms, too many unfamiliar place names. But complexity is a reason to explain, not to stay silent.

There is also a lesson for the African Union and for every peace agreement. Pretoria stopped the fighting, but left open the questions that had caused it: the disputed territories, disarmament, Tigray's political representation. A peace that postpones the hard questions is a truce. When no one, neither the parties nor the guarantors, defended the agreement on its uncomfortable points, the war came back.

Finally, a caution that applies to us and to our readers. Around this war circulate readings that attribute everything to outside direction, to secret designs of distant powers. Foreign interests exist, and we document them when there is evidence. But explaining a war with a conspiracy is a way of not explaining it: it takes responsibility away from those who, in Ethiopia and in the region, make the decisions.

What to watch

• Whether Mekelle holds, and the TPLF's strategy after the withdrawal: guerrilla war in the mountains or a new front.
• The fighting in Afar, along the road and railway to Djibouti.
• The accusations against Eritrea, Sudan and Egypt and any independent evidence; the risk of a direct clash between Ethiopia and Eritrea.
• The follow-up to the El Alamein declaration and Ethiopia's response.
• Reports from the UN Human Rights Office and OCHA on civilians and humanitarian access in Tigray, Amhara and Afar.

Sources: Al Jazeera (4/10/2026) · AP (3/10/2026) · AFP, The Africa Report (4/10/2026) · UNFPA, UN data 2025 · The Conversation (9/2026) · Crisis Group (25/9/2026) · Africanews (21/9/2026) · Al Jazeera, ACLED data (2/10/2026) · The Reporter (6/9/2025) · Africanews (4/3/2026) · Al Jazeera (5/10/2026) · Al Jazeera (29/9/2026) · Al Jazeera (1/10/2026) · Al Jazeera (9/9/2025) · The EastAfrican (27/12/2025) · El Alamein Declaration, text (4/10/2026) · Addis Standard (5/10/2026) · Declaration of Principles, Khartoum (23/3/2015) · OHCHR (3/11/2021)

Verification note: the military facts come from news agencies (AFP, AP, Reuters) reported by Al Jazeera and The Africa Report, and from the monitoring group ACLED; with fighting under way, individual claims remain hard to verify independently. Accusations between states are reported together with the denials. The text of the El Alamein declaration is the one published by Eritrea's Ministry of Information. Looting in Mekelle is reported only as a fear expressed by residents, not as an established fact. Situation as of 5 October 2026.

2/3 · CURRENT AFFAIRS · 26 September 2026

Ethiopia: the peace signed in South Africa that no one defended

On 2 November 2022, in Pretoria, South Africa, the Ethiopian government and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) signed, under African Union mediation, an agreement for a permanent cessation of hostilities, known ever since as the “Pretoria agreement”. It ended one of the bloodiest wars of the century: two years of fighting in the north of the country, whose toll remains disputed. The African Union mediator, former Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo, spoke in January 2023 of about 600,000 dead; a Ghent University study estimated up to 500,000, while some Ethiopian officials put the figure below 100,000. In recent days that agreement has collapsed, and the people paying the price are once again the same.

Facts

On 21 September 2026 seven armed groups, including the TPLF and forces active in Amhara and Afar, announced an alliance against the government of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. From 23 September an offensive was launched on several fronts; Tigrayan forces took control of three local airports, including Lalibela's. The federal army says it killed at least 272 TPLF fighters in Amhara: this is a partisan figure that no independent source has so far verified.

On 25 September the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, described a rising civilian toll. According to his office, on 22 September federal army airstrikes, some carried out with drones, hit five schools in Tigray, causing deaths and injuries; a mortar strike attributed to the army killed civilians in the town of Kobo, in Amhara (on 23 September according to the High Commissioner, on 24 September according to UN News: the sources differ on the date). The same office denounces the forced mass recruitment of civilians, children included, by the TPLF across Tigray, with reprisals against those who refuse and their families, and reports cases of arbitrary conscription by government forces as well.

The Secretary-General's spokesperson added that a drone hit a truck carrying food for displaced people in north-western Tigray, that phone and internet services are cut in the region, and that armed groups in Amhara have seized humanitarian vehicles. All this is happening where the IOM already counts some 750,000 internally displaced people left homeless by the previous war.

Why the agreement collapsed

The November 2022 agreement rested on a few precise commitments: the disarmament of Tigrayan fighters, the restoration of humanitarian aid, the return of the displaced and, later, a solution for the territories disputed between Tigray and Amhara. According to the analysis published by the International Crisis Group on 25 September, none of these knots was ever truly untied: disarmament was not completed, the contested lands remained under Amhara control, preventing many Tigrayans from returning, and outside diplomatic pressure to reach a compromise was insufficient.

Meanwhile the Tigrayan camp split. Between April and May 2026 the TPLF ousted the interim administration created by the agreement and reinstated Debretsion Gebremichael at the head of the region; his predecessor, Getachew Reda, now an adviser to Abiy, accuses the TPLF of starting the hostilities.

Then there is Eritrea. In the 2020-22 war its troops fought alongside the Ethiopian army and were accused of some of the worst atrocities of that conflict. Asmara never signed the Pretoria agreement. Today the Ethiopian government accuses it of financing the new alliance, and Eritrea denies it; according to Crisis Group's assessment, it has quietly moved closer to its former enemy. These are a partisan accusation and an analysis, not established facts, and we report them as such.

Legal reading

The frame of reference is international humanitarian law governing non-international armed conflicts. Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II, which Ethiopia has ratified, bind the federal army and every armed group in the same way: they prohibit attacks on civilians and on civilian objects such as schools, and require the passage of humanitarian aid to be allowed. The same Protocol prohibits recruiting children under fifteen; the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, also ratified by Ethiopia, raises to eighteen the limit for recruitment by armed groups.

The limit already pointed out on this site for the war in Amhara remains: Ethiopia has not ratified the Rome Statute, and the International Criminal Court can act only on a referral by the Security Council. Finally, the Pretoria agreement is not a treaty with a judge: it is a political commitment mediated by the African Union, whose survival depended on the will of the parties and on pressure from those who had promoted it.

Implications — symmetry test

The symmetry test takes no effort here, because the source itself applies it: the UN High Commissioner's office attributes violations to the federal army (the strikes on schools, the mortar on Kobo, arbitrary conscription) and to the TPLF (the forced recruitment of children). Neither side can present itself as the only victim, and neither of the political causes at stake, the unity of the state or the autonomy of Tigray, makes it lawful to strike a school or enlist a child.

This site's judgment is that the collapse of Pretoria shows the same problem we see elsewhere: an agreement without guarantors and a rule without anyone to enforce it hold only as long as they suit everyone. When Ethiopia slipped out of international attention, no one watched over disarmament, returns and the contested borders. The price of that distraction is being paid again today by the civilians of the north, the same ones as four years ago.

Sources: Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, statement by Volker Türk (25/9/2026) · Spokesperson for the UN Secretary-General, briefing of 25/9/2026 · UN News (25/9/2026; 2/11/2022) · International Crisis Group (25/9/2026) · Al Jazeera (24/9/2026) · IOM, data on displaced people in Tigray · The National (16/1/2023)

3/3 · ANALYSIS · 21 July 2026

Ethiopia: the war the government still calls a “security problem”

The facts

For more than two years, in Ethiopia's Amhara region, a national army and a militia born to defend its own community have fought each other with the same methods: summary executions, forced disappearances, attacks on hospitals. The government in Addis Ababa still calls it a public-order problem, managed first through a state of emergency and then through a military command answering directly to the prime minister. The conflict broke out in April 2023, when the announced dissolution of regional special forces was read by the ethnic-Amhara Fano militia as a forced disarmament.

Since then, fighting between the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) and the militia has never stopped. Human Rights Watch, in its World Report published on 4 February 2026, records that throughout 2025 warring parties continued committing war crimes and other serious abuses, including reports of drone strikes harming civilians in Amhara. The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, updating its dossier on 6 May 2026, reports that since 2023 the UN and independent monitors have repeatedly documented extrajudicial killings, arbitrary detentions, forced displacement, destruction of property and attacks on healthcare. Hundreds of thousands of displaced people still live in formal and informal camps across Amhara and Tigray: in June 2025 some staged a three-day protest outside regional government offices demanding a safe return home — something no one can currently guarantee them.

Legal commentary

The most solid legal framing, given the documentation currently available, is international humanitarian law applicable to non-international armed conflicts: Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions prohibits any party to a conflict, state or non-state, from killing, torturing or cruelly treating those not taking part in hostilities. Ethiopia has signed but not ratified the Rome Statute: the International Criminal Court therefore has no automatic jurisdiction over the country, barring a UN Security Council referral — a structural limit that leaves individual accountability for these events almost entirely to Ethiopia's own domestic justice system. Some advocacy organisations, including the Lemkin Institute, have described the situation in Amhara as an ongoing genocide: we report this as an advocacy position, not an established fact — no international judicial body or UN organ has so far qualified the conflict in those terms.

Implications — the symmetry test

The symmetry test applies directly here: the sources cited attribute violations to both actors on the ground, not to one alone. The Ethiopian government frames its operations as restoring law and order against an irregular militia — a position we report, even as human rights organisations dispute the methods used. Ethiopia appears among the 20 countries on the IRC's 2026 Emergency Watchlist, the annual list of contexts at greatest risk of humanitarian deterioration worldwide — yet it remains at the margins of international coverage, overshadowed by Gaza, Sudan and Ukraine. This site had not written about it at all, until today.

Sources: Human Rights Watch — World Report 2026, Ethiopia chapter · Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect — Ethiopia · IRC — 2026 Emergency Watchlist