
IWILLNOTLOOKAWAY.ORG
ANALYSIS
The rules they wrote: how the United States built the 1945 order, and the first exceptions
10 November 2026 — Washington / New York
In brief
- After the Second World War the United States led the building of the new order's rules: the UN Charter, the Nuremberg trial, the economic institutions of Bretton Woods.
- From the start it kept a way out: the veto in the Security Council, and a reservation that left Washington to decide which cases the International Court could hear.
- During the Cold War the exceptions came: the coup in Iran, then Grenada, Nicaragua and Panama. The UN condemned them in words almost identical to those it used for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
- There are also cases in which Washington applied the rules to its allies (Suez, 1956) or sought a legal basis before acting (Cuba, 1962; Kuwait, 1990). Today the difference is another one: the exception is no longer hidden, it is declared as doctrine.
In September 2026 the US Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, told the UN that the United States will never put the international order above its own interests. We wrote about it in "Interests first, order second". The sentence weighs more than it seems, because that order was not imposed on the United States by others: they designed it. This series starts here. What do other countries learn when the most powerful democracy breaks the rules it wrote, and what do we Europeans do about it? Before today's cases, we need to know how those rules were born and when the exceptions began.
The rules they wrote
The UN Charter. The idea of a world organisation to prevent new wars came from Franklin D. Roosevelt. In the spring of 1945 fifty countries drafted the Charter in San Francisco, and the US Senate approved it almost unanimously (Office of the Historian, US State Department). The heart of the text is Article 2, paragraph 4: no state may use or threaten force against another, except in self-defence or with the authorisation of the Security Council (we explain it in the entry Use of force and self-defence). The same Charter, however, gives the five permanent members of the Council, the United States included, the power of veto: no binding decision can pass against any of them (entry on the Security Council).
Nuremberg. To try the Nazi leaders, the four victorious powers set up an international tribunal, the first to put rulers on trial for starting a war of aggression. The chief US prosecutor, Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson, opened the trial with a sentence that already contains the question of this series: passing the defendants a poisoned chalice "is to put it to our own lips as well" (opening address, Avalon Project, Yale). If the rules apply to the defeated, they also apply to those who judge them.
The economy. At Bretton Woods, in 1944, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank were born; in 1947 in Geneva the GATT was signed, the trade agreement from which the World Trade Organization would come (Office of the Historian). We will come back to it in the episode on tariffs.
The Court, with a clause. In 1946 the United States accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice: any state that had done the same could take it to court. But the Senate added a reservation: excluded are matters within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States "as determined by the United States" (Senate resolution, 2 August 1946). It was called the Connally reservation, after the senator who proposed it, and the American Bar Association opposed it from the first day (American Journal of International Law). Whoever decides alone whether a case concerns them accepts the judge only as long as it suits them.
The first exceptions
Iran, 1953. Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq had nationalised Iranian oil, until then in the hands of a British company. In August 1953 he was overthrown in a coup. For decades Washington denied it. In 2013 an internal CIA document put it in writing: the coup was carried out "under CIA direction as an act of U.S. foreign policy" (National Security Archive). A year later, in Guatemala, the CIA organised the fall of the elected president Jacobo Árbenz (Office of the Historian).
Suez, 1956: the rule applied to allies. When Egypt nationalised the Suez Canal, the United Kingdom, France and Israel attacked it under a plan agreed in secret. President Dwight Eisenhower, who had not been told, opposed it and pressed the International Monetary Fund to deny aid to London. The invaders withdrew (Imperial War Museum). This is the case in which the rules of 1945 worked as promised: against two allies of the United States, by the will of the United States.
Cuba, 1962: the rule taken seriously. After the failed Bay of Pigs landing, which we reconstructed in the piece on the embargo, the Soviets installed nuclear missiles on the island. The Kennedy administration set aside the argument of pre-emptive defence and asked the Organization of American States to authorise a naval blockade, called a "quarantine". According to the State Department's legal adviser at the time, Abram Chayes, it did so largely because it believed it had a legal obligation to do so (Just Security). Many lawyers consider that basis fragile all the same. But Washington felt it had to justify the use of force before the law.
Grenada, 1983. After Prime Minister Maurice Bishop was murdered by a military faction, the United States invaded the island. The UN General Assembly condemned the intervention as a "flagrant violation of international law" (resolution 38/7), after a similar text had been blocked by the US veto in the Security Council.
Nicaragua, 1984-1986: when the judge says you are wrong. Sandinista Nicaragua took the United States to the International Court over its support for the Contra rebels and the mines in its ports. Washington argued that the Court had no jurisdiction; when the Court decided otherwise, it stopped taking part in the case and withdrew its acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction. In 1986 the Court found the United States guilty of the unlawful use of force. The United States rejected the judgment and vetoed the Council resolution calling for compliance (Britannica).
Panama, 1989. The United States invaded Panama to capture General Manuel Noriega, who had annulled the elections and was indicted in the United States for drug trafficking. The General Assembly again spoke of a "flagrant violation of international law" (resolution 44/240). Thirty-seven years later, a similar pattern repeated itself with Venezuela: we will discuss it in episode 1.
Kuwait, 1990: the system that works. When Iraq invaded Kuwait, Washington did not act alone. It built a majority in the Security Council, which authorised the use of "all necessary means" to free the country (resolution 678). It was the moment when the order of 1945, with the United States in the lead, seemed to do what it had been written for.
Legal commentary
What the rules prohibit. The ban on the use of force applies to everyone, even to those with good reasons or a hateful enemy. In the Nicaragua judgment the Court added that a state may not intervene in the internal affairs of another, by arming rebels or trying to change its government. A coup organised from outside falls under the ban even if no soldier crosses a border.
The weak point. To enforce the rules you have to go through the Security Council, where each permanent member can block any decision concerning it. When the violator is one of them, only the General Assembly remains, and it can condemn but not compel. Grenada, Panama, Nicaragua: three condemnations, no consequences. The same was true for the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. It is not a flaw discovered later: the veto was a choice made by those who wrote the Charter, the United States included.
Hiding or declaring. Were the legal justifications of the Cold War sincere or just for show? For the law it matters less than it seems. A state that denies, hides or looks for a legal argument recognises that the rule exists. A state that declares it puts its own interests above the rule treats it as if it no longer existed.
Washington's version
The central argument must be set out in full. The rules of 1945 assumed that the great powers would cooperate, and the Soviet Union did not. Without American power, on this reading, there would have been no order to defend, and leaving room to Moscow would have meant handing it entire countries. The CIA document on 1953 says so itself, speaking of the risk of leaving Iran open to Soviet aggression.
For each intervention, Washington also offered a legal basis. In Grenada: the request of the neighbouring states of the Eastern Caribbean, an appeal from the island's governor-general and the protection of about a thousand American citizens, mostly students (Christian Science Monitor, 1983). In Nicaragua: the collective defence of El Salvador, which accused the Sandinistas of arming the guerrillas. In Panama: self-defence, the protection of American citizens and the return of democracy; the US delegate accused the Assembly of turning a blind eye to Noriega's repression (Deseret News, 1989). Some American lawyers considered these arguments valid. Most states, at the UN, rejected them.
Symmetry test
The same words. In January 1980 the General Assembly "deplored" the Soviet armed intervention in Afghanistan, by a large majority that included the United States (International Legal Materials). Moscow said it had been invited by the Afghan government. Three years later the same Assembly used almost the same formula for Grenada, where Washington said it had been invited by the governor-general. Already then some American experts noted that Grenada had cost the United States the advantage it had gained over Afghanistan (Christian Science Monitor, same source). If an invitation was not enough for Moscow, it could not be enough for Washington.
In the same autumn. In November 1956, while Eisenhower was forcing London and Paris to withdraw from Suez, the Soviet Union was crushing the Hungarian revolution. In those days Washington applied the rules to its allies better than Moscow applied them to itself. The test works in both directions: the Cold War is not a story of American hypocrisy alone.
What remains. The comparison absolves no one, but it says something about credibility: whoever asks others to respect a rule must be able to say they respect it. It is the same question raised today when Moscow cites Kosovo or Iraq to justify Ukraine.
What about Europe?
Europe does not come out of this story any better. At Suez the violators were the United Kingdom and France, and it was Washington that stopped them. On Grenada, a former British colony, Margaret Thatcher opposed the invasion before it began; then the United Kingdom abstained on the condemnation (Declassified UK). On Panama, the United Kingdom and France cast their vetoes together with the United States in the Security Council and voted against the condemnation in the Assembly (United Nations University; Deseret News, same source). On Afghanistan, by contrast, Western Europe voted as one to condemn Moscow. The same act, judged differently depending on who committed it.
Our assessment
This section expresses the site's position. It is separate from the facts set out above.
The rules of 1945 are not an invention against America: they are largely American. That is what makes what is happening today serious. Jackson knew that one day they would also be applied to those who had written them, and he said so before the world. From the start Washington kept a way out, the veto and the Connally reservation, and during the Cold War the exceptions were many and serious. But for the most part they were hidden, denied or covered by a legal argument, and at some decisive moments, at Suez and in Kuwait, the United States defended the rules even when it was costly. Vice still paid tribute to virtue.
Today that tribute is over. When the Secretary of State says that interests come before order, he is not looking for an excuse for an exception: he is saying that the exception is the rule. From Moscow, from Beijing or from any other capital the lesson reads clearly, and it is the reason for this series. The same yardstick must be used for everyone, Europe included, which at Suez and in Panama chose not to see.
The next episodes
- Tariffs as sanctions: the trade rules written in 1947 and their use as a weapon.
- Venezuela: capturing a president, from Panama to Caracas.
- Greenland: threatening an ally.
- The piece on Cuba, already online, is part of the series: Cuba in the dark.
Sources: Office of the Historian, US State Department · opening address, Avalon Project, Yale · Office of the Historian · Senate resolution, 2 August 1946 · American Journal of International Law · National Security Archive · Office of the Historian · Imperial War Museum · Just Security · resolution 38/7 · Britannica · resolution 44/240 · resolution 678 · Christian Science Monitor, 1983 · Deseret News, 1989 · International Legal Materials · Declassified UK · United Nations University
Related pieces: Interests first, order second. And no nuclear power is pushing back · Cuba in the dark: the embargo, the oil cut-off and the vote the UN has repeated for thirty years · For the Non-Recognition of the Conduct of the United States of America