I Will Not Look Away

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ANALYSIS

Pakistan versus Afghanistan: a year of strikes "in self-defence" and a massacre at a treatment centre in Kabul

27 October 2026 — Kabul, Afghanistan

In brief

The background

The Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan in August 2021. Since then Pakistan has accused their government of sheltering the Pakistani Taliban, a different movement that fights the Pakistani state. Kabul denies it and says terrorism is Pakistan's internal problem. In September we covered the other side of this rupture: the forced returns of Afghans from Pakistan.

Who is who

WhoWhat it isWhat it says or wants
Afghan TalibanThey have governed Afghanistan since 2021. Russia recognised them in July 2025.They deny hosting armed groups and accuse Pakistan of aggression.
TTP (Pakistani Taliban)A Pakistani armed group. According to the UN, it also operates from Afghanistan.It fights the Pakistani state.
Pakistan's government and armyThey carry out the strikes in Afghanistan.They ask Kabul for "concrete and verifiable" action against the armed groups.
Baloch separatists (BLA)An armed group in Balochistan, a Pakistani province bordering Afghanistan and Iran.Pakistan accuses the Taliban and India of backing them.
Islamic State KhorasanThe Afghan branch of the Islamic State, an enemy of the Taliban.It claimed the Islamabad bombing of 6 February 2026.

The facts

2025. In October, the first serious clashes along the border. Qatar and Turkey broker a truce in Doha. In November, the Istanbul talks fail (Al Jazeera, 16/10/2026).

2026, open war. On 6 February a suicide bomber kills 31 people in a Shia mosque in Islamabad. The Islamic State claims it, not the TTP (Arab News, 7/2/2026). On 16 February a car bomb kills eleven soldiers and a child in Bajaur: according to the UN, the TTP claims it and reportedly acted from Afghanistan (Security Council, S/2026/651). On 21 February the first Pakistani strikes in the provinces of Nangarhar and Paktika kill 13 civilians, according to the UN. On the 26th the Taliban attack Pakistani border posts. The next day Pakistan declares that it is acting "in exercise of its right to self-defence" (Pakistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 27/2/2026). The strikes reach as far as Kabul.

16 March. Shortly before nine in the evening three bombs hit the Omid centre in Kabul, where more than a thousand men are being treated for drug addiction. They are leaving evening prayers. The UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) has verified at least 269 dead and 122 injured, and writes that the real number may be higher because patient records were destroyed (UNAMA, civilians January-March 2026). The Kabul authorities speak of more than 400 dead. Pakistan says it hit drone and ammunition depots and that "no hospital" was a target.

Afterwards. On 18 March, at the request of Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey, the two sides agree to a pause for the end of Ramadan (Al Jazeera, 18/3/2026). The war does not end, but the strikes thin out: June, September, October. On the night between 30 September and 1 October they hit homes in the provinces of Helmand and Kunar: at least ten civilians killed, almost all of them children, according to the UN (AFP via Oman Observer, 1/10/2026). Mediation by China, Turkey and Russia has not produced an agreement.

The toll. From October 2025 to September 2026 UNAMA counted 512 Afghan civilians killed and 1,236 injured in the cross-border fighting, almost three deaths in four in the first three months of 2026 (Outlook, 17/10/2026). It attributes almost all of them to Pakistani forces (UNAMA, April-June 2026). UNAMA does not count victims in Pakistan, and no one else counts them independently. Pakistan's government speaks of more than 1,300 citizens killed in a year in attacks launched, it says, from Afghanistan (Afghanistan International, 26/10/2026). According to PICSS, a research centre in Islamabad, attacks by armed groups in Pakistan in September were the most numerous in twelve years (PICSS).

What they reply. The Pakistani army spokesman called UNAMA's July report "baseless": those killed, he says, were militants (Amu TV, 1/8/2026). The Foreign Ministry also rejects Kabul's accusations as "baseless" (The Nation, 27/10/2026). The Taliban deny hosting the TTP and accuse UNAMA of propaganda.

Legal commentary

The rule. The UN Charter prohibits the use of force against another state (Art. 2(4)). The exception is self-defence: a state may respond "if an armed attack occurs", in a necessary and proportionate way, and must immediately report it to the Security Council (Art. 51). We explained this in the Glossary, under Use of force and self-defence. Pakistan has invoked self-defence in its statements and at the Council, on 9 March and 16 September (Dawn, 17/9/2026). We have not found a formal letter from it to the Council, as Article 51 requires. Afghanistan's mission to the UN told the Council it had lodged a formal complaint on 22 February.

The crux: the attack comes from a group, not a state. The attacks in Pakistan are not carried out by the Afghan army but by the TTP. In 1986, in the Nicaragua case, the International Court of Justice said that sending armed bands against another state can be an armed attack; arming or helping them is not. In 2005 it rejected the self-defence claimed by Uganda in Congo, because the rebels' attacks were not attributable to the Congolese government. And it left open whether force may be used in response to an armed group acting on its own (ICJ, Congo v. Uganda; ASIL).

Pakistan's argument. Without using the formula, Pakistan reasons like those who hold that one may strike on the territory of a state "unwilling or unable" to stop the attacks. It is the argument the United States used in Syria in 2014. Some states support it; many do not.

What the UN says about the Taliban. The panel of experts that monitors the Security Council's sanctions writes that the Taliban "continued their support" to the TTP. It adds that they moved about 2,000 fighters and their families away from the border, and that their leader reportedly asked the TTP to stop the attacks (S/2026/651, paras 91 and 99). This is Pakistan's strongest argument. It does not settle the question: for the Court, supporting an armed group is unlawful, but on its own it does not amount to an armed attack.

Even when self-defence is lawful, the means have rules. The law that says when war may be waged and the law that says how it is fought are separate. The second always applies: distinguish between military and civilians, do not strike if the harm to civilians is disproportionate, take every feasible precaution. Hospitals and treatment centres lose their special protection only if used for military purposes and after a warning has gone unheeded. On Omid, Human Rights Watch found no evidence of military use and speaks of an unlawful attack and a possible war crime (HRW, 27/3/2026). Amnesty reached the same conclusion: it identified at least one precision-guided bomb, a sign of a deliberate choice of target, and no warning (Amnesty International, 21/7/2026). UNAMA gives no formal finding and calls for an investigation.

Who could investigate. The UN Secretary-General called for an independent and impartial investigation (UNAMA, 19/3/2026). We have found none. One route remains: Afghanistan has been a party to the Rome Statute since 2003, and the International Criminal Court is investigating crimes committed on its territory (ICC, situation in Afghanistan). The Court can try those who commit them there even if they are nationals of a state that, like Pakistan, has not joined (Rome Statute, Art. 12). It is the same investigation that led to the arrest warrants against the Taliban leaders.

Symmetry test

What worked

The truces reduced the death toll: after March civilian deaths fell from hundreds to a few dozen per quarter, then to a dozen. UNAMA has kept counting and publishing, despite protests from both sides. It is the only independent count we have.

Our assessment

This section expresses the site's position. It is separate from the facts set out above.

Pakistan has a real problem. Someone killed in a bombing in Bajaur or in a mosque in Islamabad is no less a victim than someone killed in Kabul. And a government that lets an armed group strike a neighbour from its own territory cannot ask the world to defend its sovereignty without answering for whom it shelters.

But self-defence is not a general licence. It is a narrow exception, with three conditions: an attack, a necessary response, a proportionate response. Two hundred and sixty-nine men leaving prayers in a treatment centre are not a proportionate response to anything. If Pakistan has evidence that the site was a military depot, it has a simple way to prove it: let someone independent look at it.

In 2024 Islamabad knew how to explain, in clear words, why a cross-border strike against an armed group is illegal. They were the right words. They still apply.

What to watch

Sources: Al Jazeera, 16/10/2026 · Arab News, 7/2/2026 · Security Council, S/2026/651 · Pakistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 27/2/2026 · UNAMA, civilians January-March 2026 · Al Jazeera, 18/3/2026 · AFP via Oman Observer, 1/10/2026 · Outlook, 17/10/2026 · UNAMA, April-June 2026 · Afghanistan International, 26/10/2026 · PICSS · Amu TV, 1/8/2026 · The Nation, 27/10/2026 · Dawn, 17/9/2026 · ICJ, Congo v. Uganda · ASIL · HRW, 27/3/2026 · Amnesty International, 21/7/2026 · UNAMA, 19/3/2026 · ICC, situation in Afghanistan · Rome Statute, Art. 12 · Dawn, 17/1/2024 · Dawn, 19/1/2024 · Afghanistan International, 22/10/2026 · Long War Journal, 26/10/2026

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