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GLOSSARY

Mozambique: its peoples, its history, who is fighting and why

Updated 1 November 2026

News from Mozambique talks about an armed group linked to the Islamic State, about gas, Rwandan soldiers and disputed elections, but rarely explains who the peoples of the north are, why one party has governed without interruption since 1975, and why a province so rich in resources is among the poorest in the country. This entry tries to provide that background. We keep it up to date: every change is logged at the bottom, with date and source.

In brief

Land and peoples

Mozambique is a long strip of coast on the Indian Ocean, about 2,700 kilometres, cut in two by the Zambezi River. The south, with the capital Maputo, is more urban and more closely tied to South Africa; the centre and north are more rural. Cabo Delgado is the northernmost province, on the border with Tanzania. The country is divided into 11 provinces.

Cabo DelgadoMakuaMakondeMwaniLomweSenaNyanjaChanganaMozambiqueTanzaniaMalawiZambiaZimbabweSouth AfricaMadagascarIndian OceanMaputoBeiraNampulaPembaPalmaMocímboa da PraiaMontepuezCabo Delgado: war since 2017Offshore gas fields (approximate)
In dark red, Cabo Delgado province, where fighting has gone on since 2017; the triangles mark, approximately, the offshore gas fields in the Rovuma basin. Names in italics show where some of the peoples mentioned in this entry live: they are only a rough guide, because many peoples live in more than one province. We do not draw the areas held by the armed group, which change from month to month. The square marks the capital. Boundaries: Natural Earth (10 provinces; Maputo city is merged with its province).

The inhabitants. According to UN estimates, in 2026 Mozambique has about 36.6 million inhabitants, with a median age of 16.6; 42% live in towns and cities (Population Pyramid, on UN data). The last census, in 2017, counted 28.9 million people (INE, via GHDx).

A word of caution about the numbers. Mozambique's census does not ask which people you belong to: it asks for your mother tongue. The percentages below are therefore those of the languages, the closest we can get to counting peoples, and they refer to the population aged five and over (INE, 2017 census, via Wikipedia). For some small peoples we only have old figures or conflicting estimates, and we say so.

Portuguese is the only official language, but it is the mother tongue of fewer than one Mozambican in five, mostly in towns (INE, cit.).

Religion (2017 census): Catholics 27.2%, Muslims 18.9%, Zionist churches (African Christian churches) 15.6%, Evangelicals and Pentecostals 15.3%, no religion 13.9% (CIA World Factbook, via IndexMundi). Christians are more numerous in the south and centre, Muslims in the north (Afrobarometer). In Cabo Delgado, in 2017, 53% said they were Muslim and 36% Catholic (Open University, on INE data).

Cabo Delgado's resources. Off the province, in the Rovuma basin, there are proven gas reserves of more than 85 trillion cubic feet, among the largest in Africa (Ecofin, on Mozambican ministry data). Three large projects have been approved: TotalEnergies' project, restarted in January 2026 after a five-year halt; the one led by ExxonMobil, which is aiming for a final investment decision by the end of 2026 (Lusa, 12/8/2026); and the floating platforms of Italy's Eni, which have been producing since 2022 (analysis on this site). Inland lies Montepuez, the largest known ruby deposit: the mine is 75% owned by Britain's Gemfields and 25% by the Mozambican company Mwiriti (360 Mozambique). There is also graphite at Balama. Yet Cabo Delgado remains one of the poorest provinces in the country.

A short history

Before the Portuguese. On the coast, Swahili port towns traded for centuries with Arabia, Persia and India; that is how Islam arrived, on the northern coast. In 1498 Vasco da Gama reached the Island of Mozambique (DC Stamps): this began a Portuguese presence that for centuries was limited to the coast and to trade, including the slave trade.

The companies and forced labour (1891-1929). At the end of the nineteenth century Portugal, fearing it would lose the territory to the British and Germans, handed a third of it to private companies. The Niassa Company governed today's provinces of Cabo Delgado and Niassa for 38 years: it imposed a hut tax and chibalo, forced labour on plantations and public works (Wikipedia, on Neil-Tomlinson, Journal of African History; Max Planck Institute). Historians describe the north as the most neglected part of the colony, a "chronic periphery" (Africana Studia, University of Porto).

Mueda and the war of independence (1960-1975). On 16 June 1960 in Mueda, on the Makonde plateau, farmers gathered to demand independence and better living conditions; the colonial police opened fire on the crowd. Estimates of the dead range from a few dozen to about 500 (University of Central Arkansas). On 25 June 1962 three nationalist movements merged in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and founded Frelimo, led by Eduardo Mondlane. On 25 September 1964 Frelimo attacked the administrative post of Chai, in Cabo Delgado: the armed struggle had begun (same source). Mondlane was killed by a parcel bomb in 1969; Samora Machel succeeded him. After the Carnation Revolution in Portugal, the Lusaka agreements of September 1974 opened the way to independence, proclaimed on 25 June 1975. Machel was the first president.

The civil war (1977-1992). Frelimo built a Marxist-inspired one-party state and supported liberation movements in neighbouring countries. Against it rose Renamo, armed first by white-ruled Rhodesia and, from 1980, by apartheid South Africa (Better Evidence Project, George Mason University). The war devastated the country: about a million dead, from fighting and hunger, and about five million displaced people and refugees (Conciliation Resources; Radio Netherlands). On 19 October 1986 Machel died when his plane crashed at Mbuzini, on South African territory: the South African commission of inquiry blamed the Soviet crew, Mozambique and the USSR rejected its findings, and in 2001 South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission found no conclusive evidence either way (South African History Online; Nelson Mandela archive). Joaquim Chissano succeeded him.

The Rome peace (1992). After 27 months of negotiations at the headquarters of the Community of Sant'Egidio, with the Italian government, on 4 October 1992 Chissano and Renamo leader Afonso Dhlakama signed the General Peace Agreement in Rome (Sant'Egidio). Renamo became a party; in 1994 the first multiparty elections were held, won by Frelimo, which has won every one since (Freedom House).

The hidden debts (2013-2016). Between 2013 and 2016 three state companies run by the intelligence services secretly obtained more than two billion dollars in loans from Credit Suisse and Russia's VTB, guaranteed by the state without parliament or the International Monetary Fund knowing. The companies went bankrupt almost immediately; when the scandal broke in 2016, the Fund suspended its support and the country plunged into a financial crisis (AIM). Former finance minister Manuel Chang was sentenced in the United States to eight and a half years; at least ten people were convicted in Mozambique, including the son of former president Armando Guebuza; Credit Suisse paid at least 475 million dollars to British and US authorities (ABC News, from AP). Chang returned to Maputo in April 2026, having served his sentence (AIM).

Renamo takes up arms again (2013-2019). In 2013 Dhlakama withdrew to the Gorongosa mountains and Renamo resumed a low-intensity guerrilla war. Dhlakama died in 2018; his successor Ossufo Momade signed agreements with President Nyusi on 1 and 6 August 2019. The disarmament of 5,221 former guerrillas ended in June 2023 with the closure of the last base, at Vunduzi (Club of Mozambique, from Lusa; UN Mozambique).

Cabo Delgado (since 2017). On 5 October 2017 an armed group attacked Mocímboa da Praia. People call it al-Shabaab, but it has no links with the Somali group of the same name; since 2019 the Islamic State has claimed it as one of its "provinces". In March 2021 it attacked Palma, next to the gas site, and TotalEnergies stopped everything. In July 2021 Rwandan soldiers arrived and, soon after, those of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), which would leave in 2024 (ADF). The war is not over: we have reported on recent years in our analysis of Cabo Delgado.

The 2024 elections. On 9 October 2024 the Frelimo candidate Daniel Chapo won with 65.17% according to the Constitutional Council; Venâncio Mondlane, who came second with 24%, did not accept the result and called people onto the streets (Club of Mozambique, from Lusa). Between October 2024 and March 2025 the civic platform Decide counted about 388 dead, more than 800 people hit by gunfire and thousands of arrests; the government acknowledges at least 80 deaths (Club of Mozambique). Amnesty International has called for an independent investigation (The Citizen, from AFP). Chapo took office on 15 January 2025.

Who governs, and how

Mozambique is a presidential republic with multiparty elections, but the same party, Frelimo, has governed since independence. In its 2026 report Freedom House rates it "partly free", with 42 points out of 100 (13 out of 40 for political rights, 29 out of 60 for civil liberties), and points to corruption and to attacks on journalists who cover it (Freedom House). We explain what distinguishes a democracy from a hybrid regime in the entry Hybrid regime.

One party, one state. Since 2024 the largest opposition party in parliament has been Podemos, which had backed Mondlane, while Renamo has been cut down to size (Freedom House, 2025). Mondlane founded his own party, Anamola, registered in August 2025 (RTP, from Lusa); he has been charged with "incitement to terrorism" over the protests (Club of Mozambique, from AIM). In May 2026 he said that 56 members of his movement had been killed (Sábado, from Lusa): these are his accusations, not the findings of a court. The "Inclusive National Dialogue" to reform the state, launched with a law of April 2025 agreed with the parties in parliament (RTP, from Lusa), has not yet given Anamola a seat on its technical commission (AllAfrica, February 2026).

Who's who

WhoLed byPosition
Government and Frelimo (Mozambique Liberation Front)Pres. Daniel ChapoIn power since 1975. Asks for international help against "terrorism" in Cabo Delgado and rejects the accusations against its soldiers (analysis on this site)
FADM (armed forces)General staffFight the armed group; a special unit protected the gas area. Accused of abuses, which they deny (same source)
"Força local" (local militia)Veterans of the war of independenceMade up mostly of Makonde veterans and their sons, active inland in Cabo Delgado. For years it operated without any law authorising it (ISS)
Islamic State Mozambique (known as al-Shabaab; Ahlu Sunnah wal Jama'a)No publicly acknowledged leaderActive since 2017. Of about 2,400 violent events recorded by ACLED, more than 2,200 involve it (Club of Mozambique, from Lusa)
Renamo (Mozambican National Resistance)Ossufo MomadeThe former guerrilla movement of the civil war, now a party. Disarmament completed in 2023
Podemos and AnamolaVenâncio Mondlane (Anamola)The opposition that emerged from the 2024 elections. Mondlane does not recognise Chapo's victory and is asking to join the national dialogue
RwandaPres. Paul KagameAbout 2,000 soldiers in Cabo Delgado since July 2021, at Mozambique's invitation, largely around the gas area. Since May 2026 Mozambique has been paying for them (analysis on this site)
Tanzania—About 300 soldiers in Nangade district, on the border, under a bilateral agreement (ADF)
European UnionEUMAM mission, led by PortugalTrains and equips army units. Mandate until 31 December 2026 (EEAS)
The gas companiesTotalEnergies, ExxonMobil, EniDeveloping the fields off Cabo Delgado. TotalEnergies is under investigation in France over Palma and the subject of a complaint for complicity in war crimes; it rejects the accusations (analysis on this site)

Where the conflict comes from

We use the four levels of our piece "Are the world's wars 'Muslim'?". In Cabo Delgado religion is the banner the armed group has chosen, but on its own it does not explain why so many young men followed it.

The ground: the forgotten periphery. Cabo Delgado was neglected by the colony and remained poor after independence. Over the past fifteen years rubies, graphite and gas have been discovered there, but the wealth went elsewhere: concessions displaced communities and artisanal miners, and those who lived there saw companies and soldiers arrive more than jobs (Daily Maverick, from ISS). According to the scholars who follow it most closely, the armed group grew mainly out of local causes: young men without work, land and resources taken from communities, a distant government (analysis on this site).

The fault line: Makonde and Mwani. On the coast the Mwani, Muslim and poor, live alongside the Makonde, Catholic and tied to Frelimo's power since the war of independence. Several researchers read the revolt, at least at the beginning, as a rebellion of the Mwani against the advance of the Makonde and their interests on Mwani land (ISS; Kronos). In the early attacks, journalists on the ground reported, only the houses of the Makonde were burned in one mixed village (Mining.com, from Bloomberg). It is a contested reading and does not explain everything: today the group also recruits among the Makua and kills Muslims as well as Christians.

The banner: radical Islam. Radical preachers trained abroad gave the anger a religious language and a goal, Islamic law against the state; then came affiliation with the Islamic State (Good Governance Africa). But Mozambicans themselves see it differently: in an Afrobarometer survey, fewer than one in ten say people join the group for religious reasons (Afrobarometer). None of these reasons makes it lawful to behead a civilian, abduct a child or burn a church.

The outside multiplier: gas and foreign soldiers. Gas has brought huge investment and a heavy military presence to Cabo Delgado. Many troops, Rwandan and Mozambican, are deployed around the construction sites; for those who live there, the security of the gas and their own do not always coincide (analysis on this site). A militia made up mostly of Makonde also risks giving the conflict an even more ethnic face (ISS).

Who gains

We document declared or verifiable interests, not motives. If an actor denies something, we say so.

Those who control the party and the state. Fifty years of uninterrupted power have made it hard to tell Frelimo and the state apart. The hidden-debts scandal showed where this can lead: two billion dollars borrowed in citizens' names, more than 200 million of it paid in bribes to officials and bankers, according to US prosecutors (Daily Maverick).

Those close to the resources. The Montepuez ruby mine has earned almost a billion euros since 2012 (360 Mozambique). In 2019 Gemfields paid 5.8 million pounds, without admitting liability, to settle the case brought by 273 Mozambicans who accused the mine's security of beatings, shootings and abuse (Creamer Media). Analysts often point out that Frelimo's Makonde veterans have access to land and concessions in the north; it is one of the reasons for the resentment on the coast (ISS).

The gas companies. They need security for investments worth tens of billions. For years TotalEnergies supported the army unit that protected the site; since October 2023 it has paid a contribution to the state instead of paying the soldiers directly (analysis on this site). The company rejects any accusation of complicity in abuses.

The armed group. It lives off looting, kidnapping and control of some routes; its strength also depends on how absent the state remains.

Rwanda. It has gained prestige as a force that "works", and for two years part of its mission was paid for by the EU. The same army is sanctioned by the United States for supporting the M23 rebels in Congo, accusations Rwanda rejects (analysis on this site; Country profile: DR Congo).

Who intervenes from outside

The human cost. In Cabo Delgado more than 6,600 people have been killed since 2017, according to ACLED (analysis on this site); more than a million have fled their homes, and many have done so several times (AllAfrica; Club of Mozambique, from OCHA). About 670,000 displaced people are recorded as having returned home (analysis on this site). The Norwegian Refugee Council has placed Mozambique among the world's ten most neglected displacement crises two years running (same source).

Documented violence. We recall some cases, attributed to different parties:

International law

The treaties. Mozambique:

The internal conflict. The Geneva Academy, which classifies conflicts, considers Cabo Delgado a non-international armed conflict (Geneva Academy, RULAC). Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Protocol II therefore apply: they prohibit killing or torturing those who are not fighting, enforced disappearances, rape and the recruitment of children. They apply equally to the armed group, the army, the local militia and the foreign troops. Calling enemies "terrorists" does not suspend these rules.

Companies. The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights ask companies not to contribute to violations, including through those who protect them. In France this duty has been law since 2017, and it underpins one of the complaints against TotalEnergies (analysis on this site).

Justice denied. For the container killings and for the fishermen who were shot, no soldiers are known to have been put on trial. For the deaths during the 2024-2025 protests, Amnesty International is still calling for an independent investigation (The Citizen, from AFP). In the hidden-debts case, by contrast, justice did come, in part, thanks to a foreign court.

Timeline

YearEvent
1498Vasco da Gama reaches the Island of Mozambique
1891-1929The Niassa Company governs Cabo Delgado and Niassa; forced labour
1960Mueda massacre (16 June)
1962Frelimo founded in Dar es Salaam (25 June)
1964Attack on Chai, the war of independence begins (25 September)
1969Mondlane killed; Machel succeeds him
1974Carnation Revolution in Portugal; Lusaka agreements (September)
1975Independence, Machel president (25 June)
1977Civil war with Renamo begins
1986Machel dies in the Mbuzini crash (19 October); Chissano succeeds him
1992General Peace Agreement in Rome (4 October)
1994First multiparty elections
2009Montepuez rubies discovered
2013Renamo takes up arms again; the secret loans begin
2016The hidden-debts scandal breaks
2017Attack on Mocímboa da Praia, the war in Cabo Delgado begins (5 October)
2019Maputo peace agreement with Renamo (August)
2021Attack on Palma; TotalEnergies halts work (March-April); Rwanda and SADC arrive (July); the Afungi container killings
2022Eni starts producing gas at sea
2023Renamo's last base closed (June)
2024The SADC mission leaves (April); elections (9 October) and start of the protests
2025Chapo president (15 January); Chang convicted in the United States; Anamola founded (August)
2026TotalEnergies resumes work (January); fishermen killed at Mocímboa da Praia (March); EU funding for the Rwandan soldiers ends (May); EUMAM mandate until 31 December

Change log

Sources: Population Pyramid, on UN data · INE, via GHDx · INE, 2017 census, via Wikipedia · Minority Rights Group · ISS · Springer · via Wikipedia · Intelyse · Mining.com, from Bloomberg · Good Governance Africa · CIA World Factbook, via IndexMundi · Afrobarometer · Open University, on INE data · Ecofin, on Mozambican ministry data · Lusa, 12/8/2026 · 360 Mozambique · DC Stamps · Wikipedia, on Neil-Tomlinson, Journal of African History · Max Planck Institute · Africana Studia, University of Porto · University of Central Arkansas · Better Evidence Project, George Mason University · Conciliation Resources · Radio Netherlands · South African History Online · Nelson Mandela archive · Sant'Egidio · Freedom House · AIM · ABC News, from AP · AIM · Club of Mozambique, from Lusa · UN Mozambique · ADF · Club of Mozambique, from Lusa · Club of Mozambique · The Citizen, from AFP · Freedom House · Freedom House, 2025 · RTP, from Lusa · Club of Mozambique, from AIM · Sábado, from Lusa · RTP, from Lusa · AllAfrica, February 2026 · Club of Mozambique, from Lusa · EEAS · Daily Maverick, from ISS · Kronos · Daily Maverick · Creamer Media · Lusa, 15/5/2026 · AllAfrica · University of Minnesota · Geneva Academy, RULAC

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