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ANALYSIS
Israel after the vote: a majority that cannot govern, the Arab vote under attack, the Palestinian elections postponed
10 November 2026 — Jerusalem – Ramallah
In brief
- In the 27 October election Benjamin Netanyahu's bloc stopped at 53 seats out of 120. The opposition led by former chief of staff Gadi Eisenkot has 48, the Arab parties 19, the best result in their history. Turnout, 77.9%, was the highest since 1999.
- Counted in votes rather than percentages, the numbers read differently: Netanyahu's bloc won 92,000 more votes than in 2022, Likud alone 52,000 more. It lost its majority because almost 930,000 more people voted, and they mostly chose others: the Arab parties went from 511,000 to 838,000 votes.
- In the consultations 67 lawmakers recommended Eisenkot and 46 Netanyahu. On 8 November President Herzog gave Eisenkot the mandate; he has 28 days, plus another 14 if needed, to form a government. Until then Netanyahu remains prime minister.
- The 67 include the 19 Arab lawmakers. Eisenkot does not want them in the government but is willing to accept their outside support; Avigdor Lieberman, his ally, rejects it and proposes replacing them with the ultra-Orthodox parties.
- On election day Arab citizens were the target of the campaign: Netanyahu wrote that they were "stealing the elections", Likud sent activists to their polling stations, civil rights groups reported delays and missing ballots. After the vote the Elections Committee reviewed 9,069 polling stations and found no irregularities capable of changing the result. A security service investigation into alleged foreign funding is still open. The hypothesis of bought votes does not, for now, explain the jump: seven people have been arrested, and Arab turnout rose by more than twenty points in every region, not only in the Negev where the arrests took place.
- International law guarantees every citizen an equal vote, without discrimination. The International Criminal Court's arrest warrants do not depend on who governs. The Palestinian elections, scheduled for 28 November, have been postponed to 11 September 2027.
On Tuesday 27 October, at four in the afternoon, 55.7% of Israelis had already voted: never so many at that hour since the Elections Committee began keeping count. In Arab towns the queues were longer than elsewhere. From his account, Netanyahu posted photos of those queues and urged his voters to go to the polls because it was "a matter of life and death". Two weeks later, those voters are the reason Netanyahu no longer has a majority, and also the reason his opponent is struggling to find one.
The facts
The vote. The Central Elections Committee published the final results on 30 October and delivered them to President Isaac Herzog on 4 November. Likud remains the largest party with 27 seats. Next come Yashar, Eisenkot's party, with 21; B'Yachad ("Together") of former prime minister Naftali Bennett with 12; the Arab Joint List with 11; Yair Golan's Democrats and Ra'am, Mansour Abbas's Islamist party, with 8 each; Lieberman's Yisrael Beytenu, Itamar Ben-Gvir's Otzma Yehudit and United Torah Judaism (UTJ) with 7; Shas and Bezalel Smotrich's Religious Zionism with 6. Netanyahu's bloc, which held 68 seats in the outgoing Knesset, falls to 53 (Times of Israel; Agenzia Nova). Neither bloc reaches the 61 seats needed to govern without the Arab parties.
Votes, not just percentages. When the number of voters changes, percentages can mislead. In 2022 there were 4,764,742 valid votes (Central Bureau of Statistics); this year there were 5,691,426 (Central Elections Committee, data compiled by the US think tank Middle East Forum): almost 927,000 more, 19% more. The number of eligible voters grew by 543,000, but the number of people who stayed home fell from almost two million to 1.6 million. Counted in votes, the results tell a different story.
| 2022 | 2026 | Difference | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Netanyahu bloc (Likud, Otzma Yehudit, Religious Zionism, Shas, UTJ) | 2,304,964 (48.4%) | 2,397,098 (42.1%) | +92,134 |
| of which Likud | 1,115,336 (23.4%) | 1,167,591 (20.5%) | +52,255 |
| Jewish opposition | 1,820,292 (38.2%) | 2,149,375 (37.8%) | +329,083 |
| Arab parties | 511,399 (10.7%) | 838,475 (14.7%) | +327,076 |
Sources: for 2022, Central Bureau of Statistics and Elections Committee; for 2026, results approved by the Committee on 4 November. In 2022 the Jewish opposition includes Yesh Atid, National Unity, Yisrael Beytenu, Labor and Meretz; the Arab parties Ra'am, Hadash-Ta'al and Balad.
Netanyahu's bloc did not lose voters: it gained 92,000. Likud has 52,000 more votes than in 2022, yet its share fell by almost three points and its seats from 32 to 27: with more voters, each seat costs more, about 45,000 votes against 36,000. Had Likud won exactly the same votes as four years ago, it would have 19.6% today. Within the bloc, votes moved: Shas lost 93,000, while Otzma Yehudit and Religious Zionism, which ran together in 2022, gained 101,000. Of the 927,000 additional valid votes, about a third went to the Jewish opposition, a third to the Arab parties and one in ten to the right; the rest, about 180,000, went to lists outside the three groups, almost all of which fell below the threshold, such as Yoaz Hendel's Reservists with 155,000 votes.
Two caveats. First, the blocs are not identical to those of 2022. Back then Benny Gantz's party also included Eisenkot and Gideon Sa'ar, who later joined Netanyahu, and Bennett did not run. Second, these are net balances, not flows. They do not tell us how many voters switched sides, because a move in one direction can offset a move in the other. But they do say one thing with certainty: Netanyahu did not lose his majority because his voters abandoned him, but because hundreds of thousands of people who had not voted in 2022, or could not yet vote, went to the polls and chose others.
The consultations. On 4 and 5 November Herzog met all the parties. Yashar, B'Yachad, the Democrats, Yisrael Beytenu, Ra'am and the Joint List recommended Eisenkot: 67 lawmakers, the broadest backing for any candidate since 2015. Likud, Otzma Yehudit, Shas and Religious Zionism, which ran together with Zehut, recommended Netanyahu: 46. UTJ, Netanyahu's long-standing ally, recommended no one: it will back whoever guarantees military service exemptions for religious seminary students (JNS; Ynet; Al Jazeera).
The mandate. On Sunday 8 November Herzog tasked Eisenkot with forming the government. Eisenkot spoke of a "national emergency government" and invited Likud too to join it under his leadership (ANSA, via l'Adige; Alhurra). The next day Netanyahu replied by proposing the opposite: a unity government led by him, open to any "Zionist" party (Open). The new Knesset is sworn in on 10 November.
The knot. Eisenkot's 67 lawmakers are 48 from the Jewish opposition and 19 from the two Arab parties. During the campaign Eisenkot, like almost the entire Jewish opposition, had ruled out forming a government with the Arab parties, and had denied promising Ra'am a place in it (The Jerusalem Post). After the vote he began studying a minority government: four parties in government and, outside it, the support or abstention of Ra'am, the Joint List and UTJ (Ynet; Ynet). Lieberman sees this as a gift to Netanyahu, who in his view would return to power within six months (Ynet). On 9 November the two met. Lieberman asked him to give up Arab support in exchange for his commitment to bring the ultra-Orthodox into the majority (Ynet); according to Channel 13 they agreed to try with them first and to return to the minority-government option only if those talks fail (Channel 13, via JFeed). The official statement says only that both have "full confidence" they can form a stable government (ANI).
Until a new government is sworn in, Netanyahu remains prime minister with full formal powers and, according to the Israel Democracy Institute, a "duty of restraint" (Reuters, via The Nightly). If Eisenkot fails, Herzog can give the mandate to someone else; if that person fails too, Israel goes back to the polls.
The vote of Arab citizens
Arab citizens of Israel are about a fifth of the population. They are descendants of the Palestinians who stayed in 1948; they have always voted, and have always voted less than Jews: in 2022, 53.2% went to the polls. This time, in Arab and Druze localities, about 77% voted, according to the Israel Democracy Institute's analysis of polling-station data; the first estimates on election night spoke of 80% (IDI; Al Jazeera). The IDI count excludes mixed cities such as Haifa or Lod, so it is not yet the full figure. The certain figure is another one: the two Arab parties won 838,000 votes, against 511,000 for the three Arab lists in 2022, 64% more. In 2022 Balad fell below the threshold and its 138,000 votes elected no one; this time Arab votes went almost entirely to lists that entered parliament, and the seats rose from 10 to 19. Not all votes for Arab parties come from Arab citizens, and not all Arab citizens vote for Arab parties: the count is an indication, not an exact measure.
Before the vote. In September the Elections Committee, made up almost entirely of party representatives, had barred both Ra'am and the Joint List from the elections, at the request of Likud, Otzma Yehudit and other right-wing groups. The attorney general had opposed barring either list: the evidence, she wrote, was not enough (Al Jazeera). On 2 October the Supreme Court, with nine judges ruling unanimously, overturned the bans: the evidence presented, it wrote, did not meet the standard set by case law (Times of Israel; Al Jazeera). This has happened at almost every election, and almost every time the Court has ruled the same way. For Balad's leader, Sami Abu Shehadeh, the attorney general had instead asked for the ban to be upheld over an article he wrote the day after 7 October; the Court let him understand it would uphold it, and he withdrew (Al Jazeera).
The campaign. In the final days Netanyahu campaigned on precisely that turnout. On X he wrote that Muslim Brotherhood supporters were storming the polling stations to "steal the elections" and warned that the alternative was a government "of Mansour Abbas and Ahmed Tibi" (Al Jazeera; Reuters, via GV Wire). Likud and Smotrich's party had announced about two thousand activists at Arab polling stations, with no official role, to prevent fraud for which they had no evidence (Times of Israel). According to Haaretz, Likud had also prepared teams to film Arab voters outside polling stations (Haaretz, via Middle East Monitor).
The polling stations. The Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI) reported delays in opening polling stations in sixteen Arab localities, from Rahat to Tamra. In Segev Shalom, in the Negev, police and Border Police kept about two hundred people outside for "overcrowding" (ACRI, via The Jerusalem Post). Adalah, the Arab minority's legal centre, reported a shortage of Arabic ballots at polling stations in Haifa, Nazareth, Shefa-'Amr and other towns (The New Arab). ACRI wrote that the Arab vote "may have been deliberately obstructed". That is a documented suspicion, not a proven intention. The police have not explained what happened in Segev Shalom.
After the vote. On 27 October, before the polls opened, police arrested three Ra'am activists in the Negev with envelopes of cash, on suspicion of vote-buying; two days later they arrested four more. According to N12, the information that led to the first arrests had been passed to the police by Netanyahu's chief of staff (The Jerusalem Post). On 1 November a judge released one of the three and granted the police less than they asked for on the other two (AP, via News4Jax). Meanwhile, the chairman of the Elections Committee, Supreme Court justice Noam Sohlberg, had asked the Shin Bet, the domestic security service, to check information about foreign funding, attributed to Qatar and Turkey, to boost Arab turnout (Israel Hayom). Qatar denies it. Likud spoke of a "political 7 October".
The Shin Bet stated that its investigation is "focused and limited", does not concern the Arab community as a whole, and that no one should attribute to it conclusions it has not drawn (Arutz Sheva). On 3 November Attorney General Gali Baharav-Miara rejected the Shin Bet chief's request to question four Arab leaders, including Mansour Abbas and Ahmad Tibi: without sufficient evidence, her office wrote, no one can be questioned (Ynet; Outlook India). On 4 November the Elections Committee announced that it had reviewed the protocols of 9,069 polling stations and found no irregularities that compromised the vote or changed the result (same source). The Shin Bet investigation remains open.
Can bribes explain the jump? The hypothesis deserves to be taken seriously. Buying votes is a crime, and the arrests of 27 October suggest someone may have tried. Ad Kan, an Israeli right-wing association known for its undercover investigations, claims that up to 200,000 votes were "tainted", with payments of 400 or 500 shekels, but has not explained how it reached that figure (JNS). We put the hypothesis to the test of the numbers.
The scale. The Arab parties won 327,000 more votes than in 2022. Buying them all at that price would cost between 130 and 165 million shekels and would require hundreds of thousands of cash deliveries, each with a potential witness. So far seven people have been arrested, and a judge has already released one.
The geography. According to the Israel Democracy Institute, which analysed polling-station data in Arab and Druze localities, turnout rose everywhere: from 54% to 76% in the Galilee and the north, from 52% to 78% in the Triangle, from about 51% to almost 80% among the Bedouin of the Negev, from 38% to 74% in the unrecognised Bedouin villages (IDI). The arrests concern the Negev, where the increase is somewhat stronger and where Ra'am is most deeply rooted, and Ra'am is the party that grew most: from 194,000 to 338,000 votes. There, a role for money cannot be ruled out. But it does not explain the Galilee and the Triangle, where Arab and Druze eligible voters number more than 800,000 and where no one has been arrested.
The stated motives. The mobilisation was visible before the vote. In an IDI survey, 87% of young Arab first-time voters said they intended to vote. After the vote, in a survey by the Arabic-language newspaper Kul al-Arab, almost 92% named fear of Smotrich and Ben-Gvir as their main reason (The Jerusalem Post). There is no shortage of reasons. In 2022 there were 116 homicides in Arab communities; in 2023, Ben-Gvir's first full year at the National Security Ministry, there were 244; in 2025 there were 252, the record (Abraham Initiatives, via Times of Israel). In September the two Arab parties had been barred from the elections, and reinstated only by the Court. And the increase is not limited to Arabs: the Jewish opposition also won 329,000 more votes, and no one claims they were bought.
The figure that does not add up. There is, however, one number that sceptics can rightly use. In the last polls the Arab parties reached at most 15 seats, already a record (Arutz Sheva); the exit polls gave them 17 or 18 (JNS); they won 19. The gap is real and needs explaining. It may stem from the difficulty of measuring such unusual turnout, but it is also the point a serious investigation must examine, polling station by polling station.
The legal threshold. Changing one seat takes about 45,000 votes. Any vote-buying, even on a small scale, is serious if proven and must be punished. To change the result, however, it would have to involve tens of thousands of people. Likud has announced an appeal to the Jerusalem District Court, to be filed by 17 November: it will focus mainly on the use of apps to track turnout, banned by the Supreme Court shortly before the vote (Times of Israel). The election law requires showing that the irregularities could have changed the result. No Israeli court has ever annulled a national election.
Until proven otherwise, the explanation the data support is the simplest one: a community that felt threatened went to vote. If the investigations show otherwise, we will report it.
The report the day before. On 26 October, the eve of the vote, the UN Independent Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory published a report accusing Israel of crimes against humanity in the West Bank, including extermination, and of continuing genocide in Gaza despite the ceasefire; the same report criticises the Palestinian Authority for failing to investigate killings by its own forces (Al Jazeera; AFP, via Korea Times). Israel called it a disinformation campaign. We checked whether the report weighed on the vote: no candidate used it in the last hours of the campaign, and no winner mentioned it afterwards. We have no grounds to attribute any effect to it. We wrote about the Commission in "A UN commission of inquiry finds the deliberate targeting of Palestinian children".
The vote that is not happening
In Ramallah, twenty kilometres from Jerusalem, Palestinians were due to vote on 28 November for the first time in twenty years. On 10 October the president of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas, signed a decree cancelling the legislative elections and merging them with the presidential ones, set for 11 September 2027 (Wafa, via Al Jazeera). Three days earlier, in Cairo, Fatah and Hamas had agreed to recommend the postponement (Reuters, via The Jerusalem Post).
The official reason is the obstacles imposed by Israel: the Palestinian election commission and observers were denied access to East Jerusalem and Gaza, and raids, settlement building and settler violence continue in the West Bank (Khaleej Times). Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa'ar replied that it was "yet another lie" to evade responsibility. Many Palestinians do not believe it either: Mustafa Barghouti, secretary general of the Palestinian National Initiative, spoke of deep disappointment (Al Jazeera).
The last Palestinian legislative elections were held in 2006. The Legislative Council has not met since 2007 and was dissolved in 2018. Abbas was elected in 2005 for four years and has governed by decree ever since. This is the second postponement in five years: in 2021 the reason was East Jerusalem. According to a Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research poll last August, 79% of Palestinians want Abbas to resign (The National).
On 27 October there was voting in the West Bank anyway, but only on one side. At polling stations set up inside the settlements, such as the school in Kiryat Arba on the edge of Hebron, the Israeli citizens who live there voted: more than half a million settlers, in a territory home to more than three million Palestinians (AFP, via Ahram Online). Those Palestinians do not vote for the Knesset. In all, across the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza, about three million adult Palestinians have no say in choosing the government that controls their borders, their movement and their papers; in East Jerusalem almost all of them are residents, not citizens, and can vote only for the city council (Al Jazeera). On the same land, whoever lives in a settlement chooses the government; whoever lives in the village next door chooses neither that one nor their own.
Western reactions were regretful. EU High Representative Kaja Kallas tied European support to reforms; Australia, Canada, France and the United Kingdom said they were "deeply disappointed" (The Jerusalem Post). No one announced consequences. Yet several of those countries had tied their recognition of the State of Palestine, in September 2025, partly to the promise of elections within a year; and some, such as Canada, had called for elections without Hamas (The Jerusalem Post).
Legal commentary
The equal vote. Israel is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Article 25 guarantees every citizen the right to vote in periodic elections by universal and equal suffrage; Article 26 prohibits all discrimination, including on grounds of national origin or religion. An Arab citizen's vote counts as much as a Jewish citizen's, and weighs the same. The Covenant does not prevent a party from saying it will not govern with another: that is a political choice. What it prohibits is the State making it harder for part of its citizens to vote, or to stand for election: that is why barring an entire list must rest on serious evidence, and why the Supreme Court reinstated Ra'am and the Joint List. The details matter too, then: polling stations opening late, missing ballots, officers keeping people outside. Today we do not know whether these were the result of design or disorganisation. We do know that those who should answer, the police, have given no explanation.
Suspicion and proof. An investigation into foreign funding of an election campaign is legitimate: almost every legal system forbids a foreign government from paying to influence a vote. But an investigation into some individuals does not authorise treating a million voters as suspects. Israel's institutions have so far kept the two things apart: the Elections Committee checked the protocols, the attorney general asked for evidence before questioning lawmakers, a judge scaled back the arrests. That is the ordinary functioning of the rule of law. It is precisely for this reason that Likud accuses the attorney general of trying to "cover up" the investigation. The Covenant, in Article 14, requires the presumption of innocence; the Basic Law: The Knesset requires elections that are "general, national, direct, equal, secret and proportional".
The government that stays on. An outgoing government in Israel keeps its formal powers, but the Supreme Court has long asked it to show restraint in decisions that bind the future, such as senior appointments. The point matters more than usual, because with the new Knesset the March 2025 law comes into force, changing the judicial selection committee and increasing the weight of politicians in the choice (Times of Israel, via Forward). The opposition had promised to repeal it if it came to power (Axios). The Supreme Court has heard the petitions against the law with its full bench, but no ruling has yet been issued (The Jerusalem Post).
The Criminal Court warrants. The arrest warrants against Netanyahu and former defence minister Yoav Gallant, issued by the International Criminal Court in November 2024, do not depend on the outcome of an election. They apply to the individuals, not to the office: if Netanyahu leaves government, they remain in force. A new Israeli government could ask the Court to leave the case to national judges, under the principle of complementarity (Article 17 of the Rome Statute). But to do so it would have to genuinely investigate the same people for the same conduct: the use of starvation as a method of warfare and attacks against civilians. In December 2025 the Appeals Chamber rejected, by three judges to two, Israel's appeal on this point, and the warrants remained valid (Ynet). Israel also contests the Court's jurisdiction, because it has not joined the Statute; the judges have reaffirmed that the warrants remain valid until they rule on that point (JNS). Eisenkot has promised to set up a state commission of inquiry within two weeks of taking office (Israel Hayom). That commission would investigate the failures of 7 October, not the conduct of the war in Gaza: it is a different thing, and on its own it would not affect the warrants. We wrote about those warrants, never executed, in "Two warrants, zero arrests".
The West Bank. In July 2024 the International Court of Justice found, in an advisory opinion, that the occupation of the Palestinian territories is unlawful, that the settlements violate the Fourth Geneva Convention and that Israel must end it as rapidly as possible. On this, the two candidates differ less than one might think. Netanyahu and Eisenkot both oppose a Palestinian state (Reuters, via Khaleej Times). The difference lies elsewhere: Eisenkot opposes annexing the entire West Bank and the E1 project, which would cut Palestinian territory in two, and promises to enforce the law against violent settlers (Reuters, via WHTC; The Jerusalem Post); but he supports the settlements the Israeli government has authorised, the ones he calls "legal", and opposes only the outposts that not even Israeli law recognises (Reuters, via Al-Monitor). Netanyahu governs with two parties, Ben-Gvir's and Smotrich's, that call for annexation. Under international law that distinction does not exist: "legal" means legal for Israel, not for international law. The Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits an occupying power from transferring its own population into the occupied territory (Article 49), and in its 2024 opinion the Court specified that Israel must immediately cease all new settlement activity and evacuate all settlers, without distinguishing between authorised settlements and outposts. It is an advisory opinion, not a judgment: it cannot be enforced by force, but it sets out obligations that, in the Court's view, already bind Israel. We wrote about settler violence in "The warning from their own generals".
The Palestinian vote. Palestine also acceded to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in 2014: Article 25 applies to Palestinians too. A postponement can be justified if voting is truly impossible, and in East Jerusalem and Gaza today it is, at least in part. It cannot become a way of governing: a president whose mandate expired seventeen years ago and a parliament that has not met for nineteen are not an emergency, they are a system. The Palestinian Basic Law itself sets a four-year term for both the president and the Legislative Council.
Symmetry test
The fraud claims. Let us apply the same yardstick to both accusations. Against the Arab vote: three arrests with envelopes of cash, then four more, and a security service investigation into foreign money that no one has yet proven. Against those who obstructed the Arab vote: the reports by ACRI and Adalah, the party activists sent to polling stations, the announced filming. Even on the accusation on which Likud is building its appeal, the banned apps for tracking who has voted, the count by a group of volunteer observers, the Civilian Election Guard, points the other way: of 374 cases reported, 32% involved Likud activists, 2% Ra'am and 1% the Joint List (Times of Israel). In neither case is there, for now, proof of a scheme capable of changing the result. But only one of the two accusations has been used to claim the elections were "stolen".
Foreign money. If Qatar paid to boost Arab turnout, that is serious interference and must be punished. It is the same Qatar whose funds for Gaza, from 2018 to 2023, flowed with the permission of the Netanyahu government, as we reconstructed in "Qatar's money and Hamas". Those who today call it an enemy of Israeli democracy yesterday considered it a useful channel.
The excluded. Almost all Jewish parties, on the right as in the centre, promised not to govern with the Arab parties. No Arab party promised not to govern with Jewish parties: Ra'am is asking to join the government, the Joint List offers outside support. Excluding a fifth of the lawmakers is not illegal. But a democracy in which the votes of one citizen in five serve to count the others, and not to govern, has a problem no law can solve.
The postponed elections. The Israeli obstacles to the Palestinian vote are real and documented. But the postponement also suits those who govern in Ramallah and in Gaza, who have not faced a count in twenty years. And it suits Western governments, which demanded both swift elections and the exclusion of Hamas, and now limit themselves to saying they are disappointed.
The UN report. We had a hypothesis: that the report published on the eve of the vote had pushed voters to the right by making them feel accused. We checked it, and it does not hold: the data do not confirm it and no one used it in the campaign. We say so because the same yardstick applies to the hypotheses we find convincing.
Our judgment
This section expresses the site's position. It is separate from the facts set out above.
The result of 27 October says two things. The first is that the government in office on 7 October lost its majority without losing its voters: its votes even grew. It was defeated by those who stayed home in 2022 and this time went to vote, in numbers not seen for a generation. The second is that this majority exists only by counting Arab citizens, and part of those who formed it do not want to count them. The campaign tried to keep them at home, and they voted more than ever. Now they risk discovering that their vote is good for removing a government but not for forming one.
The institutions held: the Elections Committee, the attorney general and the judge who scaled back the arrests asked for evidence before accusing. It is the least reported news of these elections, and the most important for anyone who believes the rules apply to everyone.
A change of government would not change everything. Netanyahu and Eisenkot both oppose a Palestinian state, and the Criminal Court's warrants stay where they are. But it would change something that is not small: who decides in the West Bank, whether violent settlers are stopped, whether 7 October is investigated by an independent commission.
And twenty kilometres from Jerusalem, Palestinians are still waiting to be able to vote. Twenty years is too long, whoever is to blame.
What to watch
- Whether Eisenkot forms a government within the 28 days, or the 14-day extension, and with whom: the ultra-Orthodox, outside Arab support, or neither.
- The first decisions of any new government: the state commission of inquiry into 7 October, the E1 project, the judicial selection law.
- The outcome of the Shin Bet investigation into foreign funding, which is due to be delivered to the chairman of the Elections Committee.
- Whether the police explain what happened at the Segev Shalom polling stations and respond to the reports by ACRI and Adalah.
- The Palestinian calendar: the factions' "national dialogue" and the date of 11 September 2027.
Sources: Times of Israel · Agenzia Nova · Central Bureau of Statistics · Central Elections Committee, data compiled by the US think tank Middle East Forum · JNS · Ynet · Al Jazeera · ANSA, via l'Adige · Alhurra · Open · The Jerusalem Post · Ynet · Ynet · Ynet · Ynet · Channel 13, via JFeed · ANI · Reuters, via The Nightly · IDI · Al Jazeera · Al Jazeera · Times of Israel · Al Jazeera · Al Jazeera · Al Jazeera · Reuters, via GV Wire · Times of Israel · Haaretz, via Middle East Monitor · ACRI, via The Jerusalem Post · The New Arab · The Jerusalem Post · AP, via News4Jax · Israel Hayom · Arutz Sheva · Ynet · Outlook India · JNS · The Jerusalem Post · Abraham Initiatives, via Times of Israel · Arutz Sheva · JNS · Times of Israel · Al Jazeera · AFP, via Korea Times · Wafa, via Al Jazeera · Reuters, via The Jerusalem Post · Khaleej Times · Al Jazeera · The National · AFP, via Ahram Online · Al Jazeera · The Jerusalem Post · The Jerusalem Post · Times of Israel, via Forward · Axios · The Jerusalem Post · Ynet · JNS · Israel Hayom · Reuters, via Khaleej Times · Reuters, via WHTC · The Jerusalem Post · Reuters, via Al-Monitor
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