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Autonomous weapons, the Geneva week: states decide whether machines that choose whom to strike will have rules
12 November 2026 — Geneva, Switzerland
Series “Artificial intelligence” · 6 of 7
In brief
- From 16 to 20 November the 128 states of the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) meet in Geneva for the Review Conference, held every five years. The most awaited question: whether or not to open negotiations on a treaty for autonomous weapons.
- In September government experts adopted by consensus a list of "elements" for a future instrument, without deciding whether it will be binding. According to the Washington Post, in the final hours the United States and Russia had the requirement of human verification before an attack removed from the text.
- 76 states, the UN Secretary-General and the International Committee of the Red Cross are calling for negotiations on a binding treaty. The European Union is asking for an "ambitious negotiating mandate". The United States and Russia argue that existing law is enough.
- The Conference decides by consensus. If consensus is lacking, the Convention provides another route: if at least 65 states request it, a negotiating conference open to all is convened.
An autonomous weapon is a system that, once activated, selects and strikes a target without a person approving that individual attack. This is not science fiction: systems with autonomous functions are already in use in Ukraine (Stop Killer Robots, August 2026), and artificial intelligence systems suggest targets to armies, as we reconstructed in the case of the Minab school. The question states are asking in Geneva is simple to state and hard to solve: how much of the decision to kill can be left to a machine, and who answers for it when it gets it wrong.
The facts
The Conference. The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons is the UN treaty that bans or restricts weapons considered too cruel or indiscriminate: fragments undetectable by X-rays, incendiary weapons, blinding lasers. It does so through additional protocols, one for each type of weapon. From 16 to 20 November the states parties meet in Geneva for the seventh Review Conference (Italian mission to the Conference on Disarmament). There they can decide to negotiate a new protocol on autonomous weapons.
The September text. Since 2023 a group of governmental experts had a precise task: to draft, by consensus, the "elements of an instrument, without prejudging its nature". In other words, what a future rule should contain, without saying whether it will be a binding treaty or a set of recommendations. On 4 September the group adopted its final report (UNODA, CCW/GGE.1/2026/3). The text reaffirms that international humanitarian law applies to these weapons, and asks states to review the legality of every new system before adopting it and to assess its risks. On responsibility it is weaker than earlier drafts: where there was talk of obligations, states now "should promote" human responsibility and "are encouraged" to investigate incidents (Opinio Juris).
What was removed. According to the Washington Post, in roughly fifteen hours on the last day American and Russian diplomats had three things removed: the requirement that a person verify the target indicated by a system before the attack, the requirement that systems function predictably and reliably, and the reference to ethical considerations. The newspaper cites three people present at the negotiations, who asked for anonymity, and says it saw the documents (Washington Post, reported by IBTimes). The two governments have not commented publicly.
Who is asking for the treaty. On 25 August the UN Secretary-General and the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross pointed to the November Conference as the clearest path to decide on negotiations for a binding instrument (UN Geneva). At the end of the September session 76 states had said they were ready to negotiate (Washington Post, same source). On 12 October the Council of the European Union asked the Conference for an "ambitious negotiating mandate" and reaffirmed the two-tier approach: ban autonomous weapons that cannot be used in compliance with humanitarian law, regulate the others (EU Council, paragraphs 11 and 13). The EU conclusions, however, do not say the instrument must be binding.
Civil society. The main voice calling for a treaty is the international campaign Stop Killer Robots, which brings together 270 organisations in more than 70 countries. In Italy it includes the Istituto di ricerche internazionali Archivio Disarmo, which together with the Rete Italiana Pace e Disarmo brought the issue to the Senate in January (Archivio Disarmo, press release of 15/1/2026). Its president, the sociologist Fabrizio Battistelli, explained in July the question the campaign considers decisive: an algorithm completes the task it has been given even where a human being would stop, and with artificial intelligence responsibility slides from the operators to the system. That is why, Battistelli argues, taking up the position of the International Committee of the Red Cross, "meaningful human control" is indispensable over every use of force assisted by artificial intelligence (interview with Il Sole 24 Ore, 12/7/2026, published by Archivio Disarmo). Archivio Disarmo is part of the campaign: it is a committed voice, and we cite it as such.
Who is holding back. According to Amnesty International, the United States, Russia, China and India prefer national guidelines or existing international law to a new treaty (Reuters, via Dawn, 2025). Washington has also repeatedly pointed to the possible advantages of these systems, starting with precision (Reuters, 2021). Beijing says it supports a treaty only "when conditions are ripe", and a ban only for the most extreme systems (Lieber Institute). Meanwhile the Pentagon is rewriting its own directive on autonomous weapons, as required by a presidential memorandum in June; at the end of September the new text was not public (IBTimes, same source).
Italy. In 2025 the Italian mission in Geneva described the core of Italy's position as full respect for humanitarian law and the development of norms "towards an additional protocol" (Italian mission). On 7 September, in the preparatory committee, it welcomed the September text and said it wanted to agree on "further steps" at the Conference, without saying which (Italian statement).
What Archivio Disarmo asks of Italy. Asked by us, Battistelli sets out three conditions for Italy to carry more weight in regulating military artificial intelligence (note sent to iwillnotlookaway.org on 11/11/2026). The first is a more explicit mandate from Parliament, through bills, questions and motions, backed by the moral pressure of institutions such as the Presidency of the Republic and the Church. The second is government initiatives, including at European level, on the model of those taken by other countries: the REAIM summit on the responsible use of artificial intelligence in the military domain, launched on the proposal of the Netherlands and South Korea, and NURIST, a platform that simulates how new technologies can distort information flows and compress the time available for nuclear decisions, developed by the European Leadership Network with the support of the German Foreign Ministry (ELN). National initiatives, Battistelli observes, that could involve the whole Union, "the only political entity that to date has carried out a regulation of AI" with the AI Act (EU Regulation 2024/1689), while recalling that it excludes military applications from its scope (Article 2, paragraph 3). The third is for civil society and public opinion to speak up.
How we got here
The states of the Convention have been discussing autonomous weapons since 2014. In 2019 they adopted by consensus eleven guiding principles, including one that matters more than the others: human responsibility for decisions on the use of weapons cannot be transferred to machines. They were non-binding principles. We wrote about them, together with the other instruments under discussion for artificial intelligence, in "How to govern a machine". Since 2023 the UN General Assembly has voted every year on a resolution calling for the problem to be addressed urgently (Stop Killer Robots). In the meantime the weapons have arrived before the rules.
The other route. The Convention decides by consensus: one country is enough to block. But its Article 8 also allows a group of states to propose a new protocol in writing. The UN Secretary-General, depositary of the treaty, then consults everyone: if the majority, that is at least 65 states, agrees, he convenes a negotiating conference, open also to those who are not party to the Convention (Stop Killer Robots, August 2026). It would not be the first time states chose to get around a deadlock. In 1996 the Convention failed to ban anti-personnel mines; the following year a group of countries negotiated the Ottawa Treaty outside it. The same happened in 2008 with cluster munitions.
Legal commentary
The rules that already apply. No one argues that autonomous weapons are outside the law. International humanitarian law, starting with the Geneva Conventions and their protocols, requires those who attack to distinguish between combatants and civilians, not to cause civilians harm that is disproportionate to the military advantage, and to take every feasible precaution. Article 36 of the first Additional Protocol obliges the states that have joined it to verify, before adopting a new weapon, that its use is lawful. These rules apply to an autonomous drone as much as to a rifle.
Where the law is not enough. The problem is who applies these rules. Distinguishing, assessing proportionality, calling off an attack when the situation changes are judgements. The law asks people to make them, and punishes people when they violate them. If a machine chooses the target, the possible responsibilities are split between the commander who activated it, those who programmed it, and those who supplied the data. When each of them can say the choice was not theirs, no one answers. That is why the 2019 principle says responsibility is not transferred to the machine, and why the human verification removed from the September text was not a detail.
What a treaty would change. A binding protocol would turn what is now interpretation into precise obligations: which systems are banned, what human control is required, how incidents are investigated. It would, however, bind only those who ratify it. The Ottawa Treaty has never been signed by the United States, Russia and China, yet for almost thirty years it made anti-personnel mines a weapon that almost nobody admitted to using. It also shows the limit: since 2025 several countries bordering Russia have announced that they will withdraw from it.
Symmetry test
Who is holding back. Many are developing autonomous weapons. Besides the United States and Russia, Human Rights Watch names China, India, Iran, Israel and Turkey among those investing the most (HRW). The front holding back the treaty does not coincide with a political bloc: it unites Washington and Moscow, which are adversaries on almost everything else. The same yardstick must be applied to all: whoever produces these weapons has an interest in not tying their own hands, whoever they are.
Who is pushing. The European Union is asking for an ambitious mandate, but does not write that the instrument must be binding. Italy, which Archivio Disarmo would like to see among the promoters, did not say publicly in September which mandate it will support. Supporting rules costs little when you do not say which ones.
The opposing argument. Those who oppose a treaty do not argue that killing without rules is lawful. They argue that current law is enough and that a well-designed machine can make fewer mistakes than a tired or frightened soldier. It is a serious argument, but it assumes what has to be proven: that the system is predictable and that someone can control it. Those are exactly the two requirements removed from the text.
Our judgment
This section expresses the site's position. It is separate from the facts set out above.
The September text is the most that ten years of consensus have produced, and to get there, according to the Washington Post, the most important sentence was removed: that before striking someone, a human being should look. If in Geneva the consensus rule also blocks the negotiation, the states calling for a treaty have a tool provided by the Convention itself to move forward. Using it would not be forcing the issue: faced with similar deadlocks, for mines and for cluster munitions, states have already found other routes. Waiting for everyone to agree, while these weapons are already on the battlefield, means letting the facts write the rules.
Update, 22 November 2026. The Conference closed at dawn on Saturday 21 November, at around 4.45 am, after a night of negotiations (AFP, via New Straits Times). There is no mandate to negotiate a binding treaty. States committed to continue the work for two years: a group of governmental experts will develop an instrument on autonomous weapons and recommend whether it should be binding (Reuters, via The News; Anadolu, via A News). Decisions, as always in the Convention, require the consensus of all 128 states (Reuters, same source). For the UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Izumi Nakamitsu, the path to a binding treaty "is still open". The president of the Conference, the Swiss diplomat Julien Thöni, spoke of a "significant achievement". The International Committee of the Red Cross spoke of a missed opportunity (Anadolu, same source). For Stop Killer Robots, delaying a binding instrument "puts civilians and humanity at risk" (Reuters, same source).
Who held it back. On the first day Russia blocked the agenda: it demanded that observers speak only at the end of the proceedings (DPA, via IBTimes). Its objections to the rules of procedure led to the cancellation of some formal meetings (Reuters, same source), and the Conference could not carry out the review of the Convention it had been convened for (Anadolu, same source). The United States and Israel also opposed binding rules (Reuters). Washington had proposed five more years of work towards non-binding guidelines (Computer Weekly). It got less time than it asked for, but a non-binding form has not been ruled out.
The numbers. Above we report that in September 76 states were ready to negotiate (Washington Post). In Geneva, around 100 states backed binding rules, according to Reuters. In October, in the First Committee of the General Assembly, 163 states had called for negotiating an instrument, the Red Cross recalls (Anadolu, same source). These are different measures: those who said they were ready to negotiate, those who spoke in favour in the room, those who voted in New York. In a Conference that decides by consensus, none of these majorities was enough.
Italy. We found no national Italian statement at the Conference. According to NPR, at the opening Italy was among at least 50 countries, with Ireland, Brazil, Mexico, France and Germany, calling for a strict timetable to reach binding rules (NPR, via OPB).
Article 8. When the Conference closed, we found no report of a written proposal by a group of states for the route described above.
What to watch
- The final document of the Conference, when it is published: the exact text of the mandate and how many meeting days it provides for in 2027 and 2028.
- The sessions of the group of experts in 2027, and whether it will recommend a binding protocol.
- What Italy declares and how it moves in the debate.
- Whether a group of states chooses Article 8 or a negotiation outside the Convention, as for anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions.
- The Pentagon's new directive on autonomous weapons, expected since September.
Sources: Stop Killer Robots, August 2026 · Italian mission to the Conference on Disarmament · UNODA, CCW/GGE.1/2026/3 · Opinio Juris · Washington Post, reported by IBTimes · UN Geneva · EU Council, paragraphs 11 and 13 · Archivio Disarmo, press release of 15/1/2026 · interview with Il Sole 24 Ore, 12/7/2026, published by Archivio Disarmo · Reuters, via Dawn, 2025 · Reuters, 2021 · Lieber Institute · Italian mission · Italian statement · ELN · EU Regulation 2024/1689 · Stop Killer Robots · HRW · AFP, via New Straits Times · Reuters, via The News · Anadolu, via A News · DPA, via IBTimes · Computer Weekly · NPR, via OPB
Related pieces: How to govern a machine: the tools on the table for regulating artificial intelligence · Minab, the school nobody checked · Who is putting on the brakes?