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ANALYSIS

Nine arsenals, one treaty and one silence: North Korea after Shenzhen

21 November 2026 — World / North Korea

In brief

The news

On 19 November 2026, in Shenzhen, the presidents of the United States, Russia and China met all three together for the first time (CFR). The joint declaration has four points: reforming the UN, increasing the production of petroleum products, limiting the International Criminal Court's jurisdiction over state officials and, on nuclear matters, reaffirming that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, with a commitment to dialogue to reduce risks and prevent proliferation (White House; Chinese text, Government of China).

The text does not mention North Korea, the Korean peninsula, the Non-Proliferation Treaty or the word """disarmament""". China's Xinhua news agency later reported that the leaders had discussed the peninsula (Euronews). But in writing, the three countries that matter most to Pyongyang's fate did not put down a single line.

It should be said that the declaration names no state at all: not Iran, not Ukraine, not Taiwan. It is a short, generic text, and the silence alone proves nothing. It carries weight because of what came before it, which we set out below.

The day before, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Rafael Grossi, had announced that the expansion of the uranium enrichment plant at Yongbyon was complete on the outside (TimesLIVE, Reuters). In Seoul, the business daily Money Today commented that denuclearisation seems to be slipping to the bottom of the great powers' agenda (Euronews).

Nine states, three positions under the same treaty

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) recognises as nuclear powers only the five states that had carried out a test before 1967, and asks all the others to renounce the bomb (we explain it here). Today there are nine states with nuclear weapons.

StateWarheads (estimate)Under the treaty
Russiaabout 5,420recognised
United Statesabout 5,040recognised
Chinaabout 620recognised
Franceabout 370recognised
United Kingdomabout 225recognised
Indiaabout 190never signed
Pakistanabout 170never signed
Israelabout 90never signed, never declared
North Koreaabout 60signed, then withdrew

These are the estimates of SIPRI, the Stockholm research institute, as of January 2026 (SIPRI Yearbook 2026; FAS). Israel has never admitted to having the bomb. On North Korea the uncertainty is large. SIPRI estimates that it has material for about 90 warheads, but has assembled fewer, around 60 (SIPRI, notes to the table).

The difference between the last four rows and the others is legal. A treaty binds only those who sign it: India, Pakistan and Israel never signed it, and by building the bomb they did not violate it. North Korea signed it in 1985 and withdrew in 2003. It is the only state in the world to have done so (Arms Control Association).

Why North Korea is a different case

Before talking about double standards, we need to say where North Korea really is different.

It broke the rules while it was still inside. In 1993 it refused inspectors access to undeclared sites; in 2002 Washington accused it of running a secret enrichment programme; shortly afterwards Pyongyang expelled the inspectors and announced its withdrawal (Arms Control Association). The validity of that withdrawal is still disputed today, precisely because it came from a state already in violation (CNS, Middlebury Institute).

Then it carried out six nuclear tests between 2006 and 2017. The first led to the first mandatory sanctions, and from the second onwards every test violated Security Council resolutions binding on all. Russia, like China, accepted ten of them (CSIS). In 2024 it defined South Korea in its Constitution as a """hostile state""", and in February 2026 Kim said he could destroy it if the country's security were threatened (All India Radio).

On this basis the sanctions are not an abuse: they are the rules being applied.

Pyongyang tells the story differently. It recalls that the United States kept nuclear weapons in South Korea from 1958 to 1991 (Korea Times), that in 2002 Bush placed it in the """axis of evil""", and that the oil deliveries promised under the 1994 agreement were suspended that same year, after the American accusation over uranium (Congressional Research Service). And for years it has cited Saddam Hussein's Iraq and Gaddafi's Libya, two regimes that fell after giving up weapons of mass destruction (AFP, via Inquirer). These are not legal mitigating factors, but they explain why no amount of pressure has been enough.

The symmetry test

What happened to the other states that built the bomb outside the rules?

India and Pakistan, 1998. India carries out its tests on 11 and 13 May; Pakistan responds on 28 and 30 May. The Security Council unanimously adopts Resolution 1172: it condemns the tests and calls on both countries to join the NPT (UN). There are no mandatory sanctions. The United States imposes its own, eases them within a few months (Congressional Research Service) and on 22 September 2001, eleven days after the attack on the Twin Towers, lifts those tied to the tests, for both countries, at the moment it is looking for allies in the war on terror (Arms Control Association).

India, 2008. The Nuclear Suppliers Group, created after India's first test in 1974, lifts at the request of the United States the embargo on nuclear trade with India (Carnegie). It is the only country outside the NPT to have obtained this, and India is seen as a counterweight to China (Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation). According to a Carnegie expert, the United States wanted to create a unique status for India: the first """legitimate""" nuclear state outside the treaty (Carnegie).

Israel. It has never signed, never declared, there is no firm public evidence of a test (SIPRI), and it has never been sanctioned. We wrote about it here, comparing it with Iran and Saudi Arabia.

North Korea, 2024-2026. For almost twenty years it was treated in the opposite way. Then, as with the others, the bomb became useful to someone.

Russia. With the war in Ukraine, Pyongyang became a supplier of shells, missiles and soldiers. On 28 March 2024 Moscow vetoed the renewal of the UN panel of experts that monitored the sanctions, shutting it down (DPPA, UN). A few months later Foreign Minister Lavrov declared that for Russia the denuclearisation of North Korea is """a closed issue""" and called Western sanctions """senseless""" (Reuters, via ThePrint). Moscow explains its position by pointing to the alliance between Seoul and Washington, which in its view, having been raised """to the nuclear level""", makes denuclearisation impossible (Yonhap, via Daum). In place of the UN experts, monitoring is now done by a group of 11 countries, all allies of Washington: the United States, Japan, South Korea, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Canada, Australia and New Zealand (Government of the Netherlands). Russia and China are not part of it. Its first report describes the arms transfers between Moscow and Pyongyang as violations of UN resolutions (MSMT report, UN): resolutions that Russia had accepted.

China. Officially, Beijing has never given up on denuclearisation and says it prefers stability and dialogue to pressure. But in November 2025, for the first time in years, its official white paper on arms control no longer mentioned the denuclearisation of the peninsula (Foreign Policy). In June 2026 Xi went to Pyongyang and the word did not appear there either. For Tong Zhao of the Carnegie Endowment, this amounts in practice to tacit acceptance of a nuclear-armed North Korea (Korea Times).

The United States. After the Beijing summit in May, the White House wrote that Trump and Xi had """affirmed their shared goal of denuclearizing North Korea""" (White House, 17 May 2026). After Xi's visit to Washington in September, the fact sheet spoke only of """global concerns, including Russia, North Korea, and Iran""" (White House, 25 September 2026). Meanwhile Trump wants to see Kim again, and Kim has set a condition: the United States must first recognise him as a nuclear state (Arms Control Association).

But Washington has another voice. On 30 October, in Atlanta, Secretary of State Rubio and the foreign ministers of South Korea and Japan reaffirmed in writing their """firm commitment to the complete denuclearization""" of North Korea and the full implementation of UN resolutions (Al Jazeera). The State Department holds the line; the White House blurs it. In Shenzhen, three weeks later, Trump signed the text that stays silent.

The strongest objection

There is a way of reading all this that has nothing to do with double standards: realism. For many experts, after thirty years of failed attempts, demanding complete dismantlement no longer makes sense. Victor Cha, of CSIS in Washington, proposes a """cold peace""": stop making denuclearisation a precondition for talks and aim for what is achievable, namely arms control, crisis-management channels and limits on missile production (Korea Times). Others propose freezing the production of new weapons and then negotiating reductions, even if Washington continued not to formally recognise Pyongyang's nuclear status (Korea Herald).

It is a serious argument: those who make it do not want to reward Pyongyang, they want the arsenal to stop growing. Cha does not propose giving up on denuclearisation: he writes that the United States should not abandon it, even though it is now a distant goal (CSIS, Beyond Parallel). His critics reply that a """cold peace""" still treats the bomb as a given (Daily NK). Seoul is pushing in this direction too: in September President Lee asked Washington to offer sanctions relief in exchange for a freeze of the nuclear and missile programmes (Arms Control Association).

But this is exactly where the difference lies. Freezing an arsenal means managing a fait accompli. Ceasing to name it, removing the word """denuclearisation""" from official documents and shutting down sanctions monitoring mean something else: letting the rule lapse. The problem with Shenzhen is not that three powers are seeking a realistic deal with Pyongyang. It is that, in their joint text, no one wrote down what the rule is while they seek it.

Testing the thesis

The thesis is that how a state with the bomb is treated depends more on its usefulness to a great power than on the seriousness of the violation. It needs to be tested against cases that could disprove it.

South Africa is the only country that built the bomb and then dismantled it on its own: six devices, destroyed between 1990 and 1991, with IAEA verification (South African History Online). It did so when the threat that justified the arsenal had disappeared with the end of the Cold War, and when international isolation had come to cost more than the weapons (NTI). The case shows that fear matters, but that pressure can matter too, once the fear is gone.

Libya gave up its programme in 2003 in exchange for normalisation with the West. In 2011 Gaddafi was overthrown in a Western-backed uprising (NK News). It is one of the examples Pyongyang cites, and it strengthens its reasoning.

The limit of the thesis. UN sanctions against North Korea are still in force, and three of the five permanent members of the Security Council, the United States, the United Kingdom and France, together with Japan, South Korea and the European Union, reaffirmed at the end of October 2026 their commitment to the """complete, verifiable and irreversible""" denuclearisation of North Korea (Government of the Netherlands). And not everything that looks like acceptance stems from usefulness: Seoul proposes freezing the arsenal out of fear of war, not because Pyongyang is useful to it.

The thesis must therefore be refined: usefulness does not erase the violation, but it decides who is willing to make the violator pay for it and, as shown below, also who gets bombed before getting there. For India and Pakistan, three years were enough for Washington to stop being willing. For North Korea, Russia and China are no longer willing, and the United States is split between those who hold the line and those who seek a meeting with Kim.

The lesson the world takes away

Shenzhen invented nothing: it is the latest confirmation of an older pattern. Iran stayed inside the treaty, was found in violation of its safeguards, and was bombed (we wrote about it here). Before it, the same had happened to Iraq in 1981 and to Syria in 2007, when Israel destroyed their reactors (NTI). North Korea left the treaty and completed the bomb. No one had invaded it before either, because it was protected by the artillery aimed at Seoul and by its alliance with China; the bomb adds to that deterrence, and today makes regime change imposed from outside unthinkable. India and Pakistan, which were useful to Washington, were also forgiven and treated as partners.

The pattern, however, does not apply to everyone in the same way. Taiwan, Brazil and Argentina had nuclear programmes and abandoned them, under outside pressure or by choice, without anyone bombing them (Britannica). Those that were bombed were adversaries of the West: usefulness decides, or its opposite.

We must be precise about what the bomb protects against, and what it does not. It does not protect against every attack. In August 2024 Ukraine, which has no nuclear weapons, entered Russia's Kursk region, on the territory of the world's leading nuclear power: it was the largest incursion into Russia since the Second World War, and according to Kyiv the Ukrainian army held about 1,300 square kilometres for weeks (AP, via GV Wire). In May 2025 India struck Pakistani air and missile bases that probably had a nuclear role, and SIPRI writes that this brief war calls into question the very logic of deterrence (Defence Industry Europe, SIPRI). In 2024 Iran attacked Israel directly twice, the first time with hundreds of missiles and drones (Carnegie), despite knowing that Israel, according to SIPRI estimates, has about 90 warheads (SIPRI). What the bomb seems to guarantee is narrower, but for a regime it is what matters most: no one tries to invade it to overthrow it. That is the difference Pyongyang points to when it cites Iraq and Libya. As for Iraq, in 2003 Saddam Hussein had not stopped halfway, because after the 1991 war UN inspections had disarmed him. Iraq shows that being disarmed offers no protection, not that the bomb would have saved him.

And the bomb protects the regime, not the people. North Koreans have paid for it with sanctions, isolation and hunger: according to the UN, almost half of them are undernourished (the background is in our country profile). This is not an argument in favour of proliferation. It is a description of what the great powers are teaching the world, and it is the most dangerous lesson for the treaty: those who feel threatened may conclude that the risk lies not in having the bomb, but in not having it yet.

Those who feel threatened by North Korea draw a conclusion too: in August 2026, 65% of South Koreans were in favour of a bomb of their own (Korea Times, Gallup Korea poll). According to Erin Dumbacher of the Council on Foreign Relations, one of the goals Putin and Xi share is precisely to prevent American allies such as Japan or South Korea from building an arsenal of their own if Washington's commitments weaken (CFR).

What is left of the treaty

The NPT asks states without the bomb not to build it, and the five that have it to negotiate disarmament. In Shenzhen there is no commitment to reduce arsenals, and New START, the last treaty limiting those of Russia and the United States, expired in February 2026 (SIPRI). The treaty rests on a bargain: those who give up the bomb accept an inequality, in exchange for the promise that the inequality will shrink and that the rules will apply to everyone. If the rules apply only to those who are of no use to anyone, the bargain is hollowed out.

Our assessment

North Korea is not a victim of double standards. It is a regime that lied to inspectors, violated obligations it had signed, threatens its neighbours and leaves almost half of its people without enough food while it builds its arsenal (the background is in our country profile). The sanctions imposed on it were grounded in the rules.

Seeking a deal to freeze its arsenal may be the most sensible choice. But the silence of Shenzhen says something about the great powers: to two of them North Korea is useful as it is, the third wants a meeting with Kim, and in the text they signed together no one wrote that the violation still counts. Washington still writes it elsewhere, with its allies. But if it falls silent when it matters, the lesson still reaches anyone thinking about the bomb: whoever goes all the way no longer risks being overthrown, whoever is useful to a great power is forgiven as well, and the adversary that stops halfway gets bombed. The treaty can hold only if two things change: real security guarantees for those who give up the bomb, and the same yardstick applied to everyone, friends and adversaries alike.

Open questions

Sources: CFR · White House · Chinese text, Government of China · Euronews · TimesLIVE, Reuters · SIPRI Yearbook 2026 · FAS · SIPRI, notes to the table · Arms Control Association · Arms Control Association · CNS, Middlebury Institute · CSIS · All India Radio · Korea Times · Congressional Research Service · AFP, via Inquirer · UN · Congressional Research Service · Arms Control Association · Carnegie · Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation · Carnegie · DPPA, UN · Reuters, via ThePrint · Yonhap, via Daum · Government of the Netherlands · MSMT report, UN · Foreign Policy · Korea Times · White House, 17 May 2026 · White House, 25 September 2026 · Arms Control Association · Al Jazeera · Korea Times · Korea Herald · CSIS, Beyond Parallel · Daily NK · Arms Control Association · South African History Online · NTI · NK News · Government of the Netherlands · NTI · Britannica · AP, via GV Wire · Defence Industry Europe, SIPRI · Carnegie · Korea Times, Gallup Korea poll

North KoreaRearmamentUNInternational lawRussiaChinaUnited States

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