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ANALYSIS
Yemen, the war is back in full: four thousand dead in a month and a number no one can give
4 November 2026 — Taiz, Yemen
In brief
- Since September Yemen has been at war again on every front. On 9 October the UN envoy Hans Grundberg told the Security Council that the country has "slid back into full-scale war".
- ACLED, the monitor we use for our Map, counts 8,804 deaths in 2026 as of 23 October: four weeks earlier there were 4,689, and 2,940 in the whole of 2025. The WHO counts at least 1,574 since August, but receives no data from Houthi-held areas. The numbers do not contradict each other: they count different things, in different places.
- Taiz, the most populous governorate, is again besieged by the Houthis. For Human Rights Watch the siege may amount to a war crime: starving civilians as a method of warfare.
- On the other side, Saudi-led coalition strikes on Sanaa and the north also hit factories and telephone networks. There, no one independently verifies who dies.
- The Houthis are neither Iran's puppet nor an independent movement: they depend on Tehran for their most advanced weapons, but on choices that touch their survival they decide for themselves. In 2026 the bond is the closest ever documented, and the two agendas coincide.
- No court and no international commission is investigating the crimes of this war today.
Until the summer, Yemen was a mid-sized bubble on our Map: fewer deaths than Sudan, far fewer than Ukraine. Then, when we updated the ACLED data at the end of October, the bubble almost doubled in four weeks. A jump like that can mean one of two things: either the war has changed, or the way it is counted has changed. We went to look. The war has changed. But the way it is counted explains why so little is said about it outside Yemen.
The facts
The coast and the strait (September). On 3 September the Houthis launched an offensive in Taiz governorate, to cut the road between the city and the coast. On 10 September they took Mokha, the historic port on the Red Sea about eighty kilometres from the Bab el-Mandeb (AFP, via Al-Monitor). In the following days they occupied the rest of the western coast and the Hanish islands (Long War Journal). For the first time they control a stretch of coast directly overlooking the strait. The strait matters more than usual today: with Hormuz almost closed by the war between the United States, Israel and Iran, in June more than 7 million barrels of oil and products a day passed through the Bab el-Mandeb (same source, on shipping data).
Taiz cut off (October). On 4 October the Houthis took al-Turbah and with it the last main road between the city of Taiz and Aden (Al Jazeera). Taiz had been under siege since 2015, but one route had stayed open. On 23 October the UN humanitarian agency (OCHA) counted twenty days of isolation. The World Food Programme says it cannot reach more than 600,000 people who depend on aid; the UN humanitarian coordinator, Laurent Bukera, said the city's water production has halved and the health system is "close to collapse" (Human Rights Watch, 29/10/2026).
The counter-offensive (October–November). On the same day, 4 October, the head of the Presidential Leadership Council, Rashad al-Alimi, announced an offensive to retake all Houthi territory, Sanaa included (AAP, via Illawarra Mercury). The Saudi-led coalition said it was taking part with a hundred fighter jets (Al Jazeera, 7/10/2026). In early November the hardest fighting was in al-Jawf, to the north-east, around Taiz and in northern Lahij, on the line between Taiz and Aden (Al Jazeera, 4/11/2026).
The deadliest attacks. On 19 October three Houthi ballistic missiles hit a security forces training camp in Shabwa, in the south: 73 dead, all recruits aged 18 to 20, and more than 200 wounded, according to the governor of the province (AP, via Korea Times). The Houthis say the camp was run by the Saudis (Reuters, via Express Tribune). Since the start of October the Houthis have struck Saudi airports and oil facilities almost daily; we wrote about it in "Airport for airport". The Houthis say Saudi strikes on their territory have numbered more than 2,700 (dpa, via Qatar Tribune); the figure cannot be verified.
Those who flee. Between 1 August and 12 October the International Organization for Migration counted 217,303 displaced people (IOM, via UNI), the highest number since the 2022 truce (The National); at the end of October the UN spoke of more than 250,000 (L'Orient-Le Jour). More than 3,800 have crossed the sea to Djibouti (UN, via Al Jazeera).
The numbers: why they don't add up
There are three counts, and none of them is wrong.
| Who counts | What they count | How many | Where they reach |
|---|---|---|---|
| ACLED | deaths from all political violence, fighters included, from news and local partners | 8,804 in 2026 as of 23 October; more than 6,400 since the war resumed (ACLED, via dpa) | the whole country, with the most conservative figures available |
| WHO | dead and wounded recorded by health facilities | at least 1,574 dead and 6,939 wounded since August | only where hospitals report: not from Houthi-held areas |
| UN human rights office | civilian casualties verified one by one | at least 125 civilians killed or injured from August to 24 September (AFP, via Dhaka Tribune) | where it can verify, that is mostly in government areas |
ACLED counts all deaths, soldiers included, and October's war is above all a war of soldiers: both sides announce hundreds of enemies killed every day. ACLED says it always uses the most conservative estimate available (ACCORD, methodology note); we do not know how much of its total comes from the parties' own figures. There is also a declared limit: since 2025 ACLED has expanded its coverage of Yemen with a local partner, and warns that data from before 2024 are not comparable with today's (ACLED). The comparison between 2025 and 2026, however, holds.
The point that matters for the reader is a different one. The WHO says it receives no figures from Houthi-held areas, where most Yemenis live. In August the UN counted 17 civilian casualties of Houthi attacks in government areas and 2 in Houthi areas (Volker Türk, High Commissioner for Human Rights, via TRT). This does not mean Saudi strikes do not kill: it means there is no one there to count them independently. Missing data is not data worth zero.
Who's who
| Who | What they want | Who backs them |
|---|---|---|
| Houthis (Ansar Allah) | An end to the air and sea blockade, public salaries, the withdrawal of foreign forces, recognition of their power in the north. | Iran: weapons, components and advisers (see below). Who they are, in our Glossary. |
| Presidential Leadership Council (recognised government, in Aden) | To retake the whole country, Sanaa included. | Saudi Arabia: aircraft and money for salaries. UN resolution 2216 recognises it. |
| Saudi Arabia | To defend its territory and its oil routes, and keep the government standing. | The United States, politically. |
| Southern separatists | A southern state. The Southern Transitional Council, backed by the Emirates, dissolved in January after a defeat by pro-Saudi forces; its supporters say the decision was taken under pressure. | Partly the Emirates, until January. |
Houthis and Iran: ally or puppet?
In the news the Houthis are almost always "the Iran-backed rebels", and Yemen's war becomes a front in the war against Iran. That is part of the truth. To see how large a part, it helps to separate three things: the weapons, the people, the decisions.
Weapons: a strong dependence. Since 2018 UN experts have found in Houthi missiles and drones features of Iranian weapons and components made in Iran, in breach of the embargo of resolution 2216 (AFP, via Arab News). Conflict Armament Research, a British centre that examines seized weapons, studied more than 800 missile and drone components intercepted in the Red Sea in 2024 and 2025: the assembly labels use the Iranian names of the missiles, not the Houthi ones, and for the centre external support remains decisive (Conflict Armament Research; Jerusalem Post). The same study, however, shows that only 5% of those components were produced in Iran: the rest bear the marks of companies from 15 other countries, China and Europe included. Iran, in other words, acts mainly as a supply network and a source of designs. The Houthis also assemble and experiment on their own (The National).
People: in 2026, the most direct role ever documented. According to two anonymous Iranian sources quoted by Reuters, the 13 July 2026 flight from Tehran, the one the Yemeni government tried to stop by bombing the runway at Sanaa, carried between 10 and 21 members of the Revolutionary Guards, including senior officers, and missile and drone components. The Houthis say only civilians were on board; Tehran says the flight was bringing home a delegation and patients (Reuters, via bdnews24). On the coastal offensive, five Yemeni government military sources told Reuters that the Revolutionary Guards directed it, and two Iranian sources that Tehran asked the Houthis to step up attacks on Saudi Arabia, promising money, weapons and officers (Reuters, via The New Arab). An AP investigation, based on ten officials and soldiers, describes Revolutionary Guards advisers in the field who helped plan operations and analyse intelligence: the most direct Iranian involvement since the war began in 2014 (AP, via Iran International). These are mostly anonymous sources, and many belong to the Yemeni government, that is to a party to the war: we report them as unverified. Tehran denies directing the Houthis and says they are an ally, "not a proxy".
Decisions: more autonomy than is often said. An Iranian official, in the same Reuters report, says the taking of Mokha was a Houthi decision, not Iran's, even if it suited Iran. In 2014, according to US officials and later President Obama himself, Iran advised the Houthis against taking Sanaa; they took it anyway (HuffPost, 2015). In March 2026, when the United States and Israel attacked Iran, Hezbollah and the Iraqi militias entered the war within the first weeks (Reuters, via ARY); the Houthis held back for weeks, and analysts at ACLED and the Arab Gulf States Institute read this as a calculation about their own survival, not as an order received (ACLED; AGSI). Other analysts think instead that Tehran was holding them in reserve (same source). And the Houthis' story, the six wars with Saleh, the rivalry with Saudi Salafism, the power over Sanaa, began before Iranian support became important.
How we see it. "Iran's puppet" is wrong; "independent movement" is wrong too. The Houthis are an ally that depends on Iran for its most advanced weapons and decides on its own when what is at stake is its survival or power in Yemen. In 2026 the bond is the closest ever documented, and the two agendas coincide: Iran, under attack, has an interest in leverage over the Bab el-Mandeb and Saudi oil; the Houthis have an interest in taking the coast and making Saudi Arabia pay for the blockade. Those who read this war only as a proxy war forget that it is Yemenis who fight it, and die in it, for Yemeni reasons. Those who read it only as a civil war forget where the missiles that hit Riyadh come from.
The same yardstick. The question applies to the other side too. The government in Aden depends on Saudi Arabia for salaries, 346.6 million dollars in February 2026 alone (Arab News), for aircraft and for its very composition: in January 2026 Riyadh broke up the Emirati-backed separatists by force and replaced their members on the Presidential Council (TRT World). If the Houthis are "pro-Iranian", the government is, by the same measure, "pro-Saudi". Neither label is enough on its own.
Legal commentary
Taiz and hunger as a weapon. Besieging a city defended by soldiers is not prohibited in itself. Using the starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is prohibited, and so is blocking aid without military necessity. It is a rule of customary international law, which applies in civil wars too and to an armed group such as the Houthis; Yemen, moreover, has been a party since 1990 to the Second Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions, which sets it out in Article 14 (ICRC, International Review of the Red Cross). For Human Rights Watch the siege of Taiz "may amount" to that crime; intent can be inferred from the circumstances, and people do not have to die of hunger to prove it. The Houthis reply that it is government forces that are closing the roads; residents, civil society workers and UN officials say the opposite.
The Shabwa camp. Were the 73 recruits a military target? It depends on what they were. A soldier in training is a combatant; a police officer, under humanitarian law, is a civilian, unless he is part of the armed forces or takes part in the fighting. The governor says they were training for security in the province, not for the front; the Houthis say the camp was Saudi. No one has yet verified it. It is the first question an investigation should ask.
The Saudi airports. A civilian airport full of passengers is a civilian object. Warning the airlines, as the Houthis did, does not make striking it lawful: it only makes it predictable.
The strikes on the north. The same rules apply to the coalition. Every strike on a factory, an antenna or a neighbourhood of Sanaa must hit a military objective and not cause civilian harm that is excessive in relation to the expected advantage. Whether it has done so or not, today no one knows, for the reason given above: in the north there is no one to verify.
Who judges. No one, for now. Yemen signed the Statute of the International Criminal Court in 2000 but never ratified it (Parliamentarians for Global Action); nor have Saudi Arabia and Iran. The UN group of experts that investigated crimes by all parties was shut down in 2021 by a vote of the Human Rights Council (International Commission of Jurists). Meanwhile 72 UN staff remain detained by the Houthis (Grundberg to the Security Council, 9/10/2026).
Symmetry test
The yardstick. If a regular army closed the last road into a city of hundreds of thousands of people and halved its water, this site would speak of starvation as a method of warfare. We say it here in the same words, for an armed group that the government would like the UN to declare "terrorist" (Al Jazeera, 20/10/2026) and that its supporters call resistance.
The numbers. The data verified by the UN lean one way: almost all the civilian casualties counted were caused by the Houthis. But they lean that way because the UN works mostly on one side. In the years of the air war, between 2015 and 2019, ACLED attributed about two thirds of directly killed civilians to air strikes (ACLED, 2019). Reading the asymmetry of the data as an asymmetry of conduct would be a mistake, in either direction.
The truce. 2022 had stopped the war; no one had ended it. The demands of the Houthis and of the government were already written into the UN "roadmap" of December 2023. Neither side today seems to think it can get more at the table than on the battlefield.
Our view
This section expresses the site's position. It is separate from the facts set out above.
Yemen's bubble on our Map has grown because the war really is back in full, not because of a counting error. But the most important figure is not the number: it is the hole in the number. In half the country the dead are counted from the communiqués of those who fight, and a war that is not counted is a war that is not judged.
Grundberg put it another way: gains on the battlefield cannot replace the negotiations that will in any case be needed to end the war. As long as no one investigates, each side can tell its own war as the only true one.
What to watch
- Whether the UN manages to open a humanitarian route to Taiz, as governor Nabil Shamsan asks.
- Grundberg's next briefing to the Security Council and any resolution on the Bab el-Mandeb.
- Whether anyone verifies the status of the Shabwa recruits and the coalition strikes in the north.
- ACLED's November data and the next UCDP release, to see whether the two sources converge.
- The fate of the 72 detained UN staff.
Sources: AFP, via Al-Monitor · Long War Journal · Al Jazeera · Human Rights Watch, 29/10/2026 · AAP, via Illawarra Mercury · Al Jazeera, 7/10/2026 · Al Jazeera, 4/11/2026 · AP, via Korea Times · Reuters, via Express Tribune · dpa, via Qatar Tribune · IOM, via UNI · The National · L'Orient-Le Jour · UN, via Al Jazeera · ACLED, via dpa · AFP, via Dhaka Tribune · ACCORD, methodology note · ACLED · Volker Türk, High Commissioner for Human Rights, via TRT · AFP, via Arab News · Conflict Armament Research · Jerusalem Post · The National · Reuters, via bdnews24 · Reuters, via The New Arab · AP, via Iran International · HuffPost, 2015 · Reuters, via ARY · ACLED · AGSI · Arab News · TRT World · ICRC, International Review of the Red Cross · Parliamentarians for Global Action · International Commission of Jurists · Grundberg to the Security Council, 9/10/2026 · Al Jazeera, 20/10/2026 · ACLED, 2019
Related pieces: Yemen: its peoples, its history, who is fighting and why · Airport for airport: how the war between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia came back, and what each side wants · Yemen: war intensifies again and fuels child recruitment, as the UN warns of famine risk · Houthis (Ansar Allah): who they are, where they come from, what they want