MANIFESTO

For the Right to Asylum — Against the Externalisation of the European Border

Legal, ethical and political foundation of a coherence Europe owes itself · 2026

Manifesto for the Right to Asylum — Against the Externalisation of the European Border

Legal, ethical and political foundation of a coherence Europe owes itself

To whom it is addressed

This manifesto addresses two groups that public debate pretends are opposed. Those who refuse to let Europe outsource the pushing-back of human beings to third States. And those who hold real, legitimate concerns about migration management: of them this document asks not to ignore those concerns, but not to let them be stolen by those who turn them into hatred. To criticise a government's method is not to despise those who voted for it in good faith. It is to demand that a border be governed without extinguishing the law on which European legal civilisation rests.

I. Premise — Suffering as political capital

No subject is exploited like migration. The most vulnerable person — fleeing war, hunger, persecution — is turned into a threat, a number, an enemy useful for winning an election. Fear makes voters docile and victims invisible. Others' suffering becomes, literally, political capital: the louder the tone, the more consensus gathered, and the less one is held to account for what happens beyond the border. This manifesto is born of the refusal of that mechanism. The question is not whether Europe has the right to regulate its borders — it does. The question is whether it may do so by delegating to others what at home would be illegal.

II. The fact: Europe outsourcing the border

1. EU–Turkey (2016). The agreement of 18 March 2016 provides for the return to Turkey of irregularly arriving migrants. The Commission states it has allocated almost €12.4 billion to refugees and host communities in Turkey since 2011. On its tenth anniversary, human-rights organisations argue the deal fuelled suffering and weakened legal safeguards. Erdoğan has repeatedly used migrants as diplomatic bargaining chips.

2. EU–Lebanon (2024). On 2 May 2024 the Commission announced €1 billion for Lebanon (2024–2027), largely to block the flow toward Cyprus: around €736 million for Syrian refugees, €200 million to strengthen Lebanese security forces in border control. Days after the announcement, Lebanon introduced new rules making legal residence almost impossible, followed by deportations to Syria — which the Union itself does not consider safe. Europe turned a blind eye.

3. Italy–Albania (2023). The Meloni–Rama protocol of November 2023 provides for processing up to 36,000 asylum seekers a year in two Italian-run centres in Albania (Shëngjin and Gjadër). Operational since October 2024, they sat largely empty for months because of repeated judicial halts; one was later repurposed as a "return hub" by decree-law. A report found their construction cost roughly seven times more than an equivalent centre in Italy.

4. The new EU Pact (in force since 12 June 2026). The European Asylum Procedure Regulation, in force in these days, accelerates expulsions, provides for offshore "return hubs" and allows transfers to "safe third countries", shifting to EU level the definition of what is "safe". Amnesty International summed up the objection: "labelling a country safe does not make it safe."

III. The norms at risk

Externalisation does not operate in a legal void: it operates against a precise body of norms. The principle of non-refoulement (Art. 33 of the 1951 Geneva Convention) prohibits returning a person to a place where they risk persecution or inhuman treatment — directly or through a proxy State. The right to asylum and protection in case of removal are enshrined in Articles 18 and 19 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. The prohibition of collective expulsions is set by Article 4 of Protocol 4 to the ECHR. And the European Court of Human Rights, in Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy (2012), already condemned Italy for pushbacks to Libya: jurisdiction, and therefore responsibility, follows the State even beyond its borders. Externalising does not cancel the obligation. It merely moves it where it is harder to enforce.

IV. The legal crux: Albania and "safe countries"

Here precision is required, because precision is our credibility. The position is sharp and documented: the Albanian centres are built to detain people outside national territory, effectively removing them from the ordinary scrutiny of judges and the guarantees that would apply in Italy. Italian courts have repeatedly blocked transfers; in 2024 Amnesty International found that those detained were unlawfully deprived of liberty. For its critics the scheme violates the right to asylum and creates an accountability void; and entrusting another State with the exercise of coercive power raises a problem of sovereignty and constitutional integrity. The due caution: the status is contested, not yet settled. On 1 August 2025 the EU Court of Justice (joined cases C-758/24 and C-759/24) struck a blow to the "safe countries" scheme. The Advocates General's opinions are divided: in April 2026 an opinion supported the legitimacy of locating the centres; on 11 June 2026 a second opinion confirmed that States remain free to locate them in Albania, but added that compliance with the minimum standards of treatment inside them remains unproven. The binding judgment is expected in the coming months. Note the irony: it is the government invoking "national sovereignty" against the European Court — the same sovereignty the Albanian scheme, in fact, delegates to a third State.

V. The paradox of coherence

It is the same Europe. The one that invokes international law against Moscow and modulates its indignation over Gaza. The one that prosecutes others' crimes and funds the forces that deport Syrians toward a country it itself does not recognise as safe. To externalise the border is to externalise the violation: to move it beyond the line, where the cameras do not reach and European judges struggle to. This is not management of flows: it is the deliberate construction of a place where the law is dimmed. A continent that pays others to look away on its behalf is looking away from itself.

VI. A necessary distinction

It must be said plainly, because it is the point demagogues do not want to hear: having concerns about the management of flows is not racism. Those who fear for public services, for safety, for the fabric of working-class neighbourhoods — often those who live precisely where integration is left without means — deserve serious answers, not slogans. The target of this manifesto is not those citizens: it is whoever takes their legitimate concerns and turns them into hatred to harvest votes, leaving the real problems untouched. Migrants are not bargaining chips, and citizens are not propaganda fodder. Defending the right to asylum and demanding competent management of flows are not opposite positions: they are the same demand for seriousness.

VII. Concrete measures

1. Real conditionality. No European funds to third-State security forces that deport toward unsafe countries or block legal residence.
2. Effective judicial oversight of every centre funded or managed by a Member State, wherever located: jurisdiction follows the State, and with it the right to an effective remedy.
3. Ban on transfers to "safe third countries" without individual examination, access to a lawyer and an effective suspensive remedy.
4. Legal and resettlement routes that are proportionate and funded: the only credible alternative to smugglers, not a concession.
5. Full transparency on agreements and figures — Turkey (~€12.4bn since 2011), Lebanon (€1bn), Albanian centres (costing about seven times an Italian equivalent) — because what is paid in citizens' name, citizens have the right to know.

VIII. Final declaration

The civilisation of a continent is measured not by how many it manages to keep out, but by how many rights it manages not to betray while doing so. A border can be governed without outsourcing one's conscience. Numbers can be debated without dehumanising those who make them up. The Europe that pays others to look away on its behalf is looking away from itself. We will not.

Legal references

Geneva Convention 1951, Art. 33 (non-refoulement) · EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, Arts. 18–19 · ECHR, Arts. 3, 5, 13 and Protocol 4, Art. 4 · Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, ECtHR 2012 · CJEU 1 August 2025, joined cases C-758/24 and C-759/24 · EU Asylum Procedure Regulation, in force since 12 June 2026.

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